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Palestinian in sentence

1687 examples of Palestinian in a sentence

The Palestinian security services are discovering that they lack the capacity to do so without risking civil war.
While the ceasefire remains popular--albeit increasingly tenuous in light of recent events--few Palestinians wish to see the Palestinian Authority permanently break the back of the armed resistance forces.
For the younger generation of Palestinian political activists, the best hope for independence lies in the emergence of an empowered young guard, incorporating both nationalists and Islamists.
These younger leaders guided the Intifada, gaining stature within Palestinian society, as well as a feeling that they might soon supplant the traditional old guard of the PLO.
They do not want to deal with the Palestinians, and so are erecting a physical barrier through areas that are now nominally under Palestinian control.
Yet the wall and the second phase of the roadmap, which calls for a Palestinian state with provisional borders, cannot co-exist.
Initially aimed at creating a security fence along the green line, the 1967 borders of Israel, it has gradually stretched across that would-be boundary, confiscating Palestinian land and amounting to a de facto annexation of a large part of the West Bank.
For example, the planned portion of the wall that reaches the settlement of Ariel, deep inside the West Bank, extends 15 kilometers inside Palestinian territories.
By encircling large parts of the West Bank from the east, covering as much as 50% of Palestinian territory, the wall deprives Palestinians of access to Jordan, their eastern neighbor.
This is because the second phase, which still has to be achieved, calls for a Palestinian state with contiguous but provisional borders.
The projected path of the wall eliminates Palestinian contiguity altogether.
So continuing its construction will kill any Palestinian enthusiasm for the second phase of the roadmap.
Permanent status negotiations, dealing with all the major issues of the conflict--including refugees, Jerusalem, settlement, security, water, and, of course, the permanent borders of the Palestinian state--are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2005, while Ariel Sharon is still slated to be Prime Minister.
Immediate resumption of these talks will lead to profound Palestinian despair, much deeper than the disillusion that followed the collapse of the Camp David summit in July 2000.
The roadmap, with its promise of fast achievements in the form of an Israeli settlement freeze and early Palestinian statehood, provides incentives for the Palestinian Authority to deliver security for Israelis on a sustained basis.
If not, no wall will be able to contain Palestinian rage.
But it is not just a matter of willingness; the US has lost its ability to intimidate other countries, even allies and clients like Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Add to that America’s weak response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and it is no wonder that Israeli and Palestinian leaders have dismissed its peace overtures.
This is critical, because the future Palestinian state could not offer Israel much security.
The promise of a regional settlement that offers Israel the needed security guarantee – not to mention a considerable boost to its international standing – would make the painful concessions, including compromises on borders and Jerusalem, which are critical to the creation of a Palestinian state, more digestible for Israeli leaders.
A far more fundamental question has come into view: can a Palestinian government that draws its authority from an agreement with Israel stay in power when it is led by an organization committed to the destruction of Israel?
Hamas must recognize Israel’s right to exist, stop all terrorist activities, and commit itself to carry out all previous international agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority.
In 1993, after the Oslo agreements, the Palestinian Authority established under Yasir Arafat became another militarized authoritarian regime, very much like Syria and Egypt, and did nothing to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian refugees.
As the West grapples with the rapid rise of moderate Islamists in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, the issue of Hamas’s role in the Palestinian territories looms large.
In December, Ismail Haniyeh, Prime Minister of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority in Gaza, embarked on a tour of the Mediterranean that included stops in Tunis, Cairo, and Istanbul.
In February, Mashal crowned these efforts in Qatar with the signing of the new unity agreement with Fatah, which commits both Palestinian movements to a transitional government under Abbas’s leadership.
He missed no opportunity to criticize “futile” peace negotiations, and, in Tehran, he pledged that Hamas’s “resistance” would continue “until all Palestinian land has been liberated.”
Last May, he signed an initial reconciliation agreement with Fatah in Cairo, which committed Hamas to a Palestinian unity government, called for a cessation of violence, and accepted the notion of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.
He may reemerge as the head of a newly established Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, or as a leader of a new Islamist political party under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Such a merging of Hamas with the established Palestinian political organizations would signify Hamas’s formal acceptance of a two-state solution, and would mark an important step in transforming the movement.
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