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Lenders in sentence

412 examples of Lenders in a sentence

But, while Fannie and Freddie jumped into dubious mortgages (particularly those known as Alt-A) and did some work with subprime lenders, this was relatively small stuff and late in the cycle (e.g., 2004-2005).
Thus far, such policies have failed to revive the global economy largely because commercial banks and other lenders retained the liquidity they received from their central banks, instead of channeling it to the real economy by providing credit to small and medium-size enterprises and investing in long-term infrastructure projects.
That makes private lenders susceptible to larger haircuts if the country eventually defaults – and thus more hesitant to lend in the first place.
The simplest solution is to treat official funding no differently from private debt – best achieved if official lenders buy sovereign bonds as they are issued (possibly at a predetermined yield) and agree to be treated on par with private creditors in a restructuring.
That knowledge should have given lenders incentives to make loans only to those who could repay.
But lenders perhaps knew that, with the Republicans in control of government, they could make bad loans and then change the law to ensure that they could squeeze the poor.
When the 2005 bankruptcy law was passed, lenders were the beneficiaries; they didn’t worry about how the law affected the rights of debtors.
The real reason to worry is that India has lost international competitiveness and has been buying time by borrowing from fickle lenders.
Lenders to defaulting countries were also punished, as their instruments (mostly bonds) became worthless.
Too-big-to-fail banks enjoy lower interest rates on debt than their mid-size counterparts, because lenders know that the bonds or trading contracts that such banks issue will be paid, even if the bank itself fails.
The reality is that over the next decade, these new institutions will not be huge lenders.
The money for recapitalizing distressed banks would now come primarily from creditors, not European taxpayers, with a pecking order to specify which lenders would be repaid first.
It is, of course, possible – I would say likely – that China and other foreign lenders will not be willing to continue to provide the current volume of lending to the US.
Although the higher level of household saving will limit the rise in US interest rates, it will not change the fact that the combination of large future fiscal deficits and foreign lenders’ reduced willingness to buy US securities will lead to both a lower dollar and higher US interest rates.
In advanced economies, traditional lenders are now subject to such a mass of regulation that they have had to withdraw from foreign activities.
They are a threat to all, especially in times of high capital mobility, when governments rely too much on foreign lenders’ apparent willingness to provide funds and find themselves in dire straits when capital inflows stop.
Market participants, be they lenders or borrowers, know that “easy money” has an expiry date.
Lenders are unwilling to provide long-term credit at fixed interest rates, because a jump in inflation would destroy the value of their bonds and loans.
Negative interest rates are the latest attempt to overcome the mismatch of incentives for lenders and borrowers.
When France’s Dominique Strauss-Kahn took over the helm in the fall of 2007, even poor African countries were shunning the IMF like a leper, preferring to make deals with non-traditional lenders such as China.
Some measures may already have been exhausted: the country may not have any wealth or reserves left to tap, and there may be a shortage of willing lenders.
What if private debt represented a share so small that no haircut would restore sustainability, forcing multilateral lenders to pitch in with some debt relief?
Global debt ratios have risen sharply since the financial crisis began, while traditional lenders’ margins have been squeezed, raising questions about their overall health.
On the other hand, whereas, lenders once demanded commitments from Brazil that were often nearly impossible to meet due to the political situation, these same investors now generally seem completely satisfied with Brazil, despite its economic policy paralysis.
For the first time in decades, Brazil has been able to take advantage of good economic times to reduce its external debt, thereby lowering the risk to lenders.
At the moment, however, many lenders don’t have the capacity to evaluate properly the financial, environmental, social, and governance-related risks associated with these types of projects.
They gave up the pretense that Greece is solvent; admitted that excessive interest rates could only make the problem worse; agreed to extend more and longer-term loans; called for private lenders to bear some of the burden; guaranteed that even if Greek government bonds are rated in selected default, Greek banks would not be cut off from access to liquidity; recognized the need to support economic growth; and agreed to broaden the scope of the European Financial Stability Facility, making it a more flexible tool for intervention.
Unfortunately, the bail-in of private lenders is too limited in size and it is to be feared that the official sector will have to bear the burden of future debt reductions.
Foreign lenders who underestimated the risk of short-term loans to Indonesia and Korea would have charged higher risk premiums in a floating-rate world.
In the East Asian currency crises, the tough macro policies required by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury were intended to restore the confidence of international lenders and investors.
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