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Multilateral in sentence

1507 examples of Multilateral in a sentence

People say to me, "The Chinese, of course, they'll never get themselves involved in peace-making, multilateral peace-making around the world."
And then we can see that this is one combination of private, international, multilateral money, private sector and the African that we can put together as a partnership, so that aid can be a facilitator.
Since the establishment of the United Nations, wars of aggression have been outlawed and multilateral conventions refer to armed conflict instead of war.
It's clear that multilateral cooperation is essential.
And in this moment of extraordinary international uncertainty, when our multilateral institutions are paralyzed and our nation-states are in retreat, cities and their leaders are our new 21st-century visionaries.
And using the Western art of reasoning, I would recommend that the West adopt a new "three-m" strategy: minimalist, multilateral and Machiavellian.
Instead, what you see in southeast Asia is one of the most peaceful and prosperous corners of planet earth with the second-most successful regional multilateral organization, ASEAN.
And the answer is that the best way to constrain them is through multilateral rules and multilateral norms, multilateral institutions and multilateral processes.
And more than half of humanity lives in this space, so with this direct cultural connection, I can say with great conviction that if the West chooses to adopt a wiser strategy of being minimalist, multilateral and Machiavellian, the rest of the world will be happy to work with the West.
Since 1993, however, it has become an occasion for informal multilateral and bilateral summits among the heads of government of some 20 member states.
The agreement with Iran can still be salvaged, precisely because it is a multilateral agreement, endorsed by the UN Security Council (Resolution 2231), not an agreement solely between the US and Iran.
Showing no appreciation of the time-honored linkage between trade deficits and macroeconomic saving-investment imbalances, the president continues to fixate on bilateral solutions to a multilateral problem – in effect, blaming China for America’s merchandise trade deficits with 102 countries.
China’s massive pan-Asian infrastructure plan, the Belt and Road Initiative, together with its muscular behavior in the South China Sea, pose far greater threats to American hegemony than does one bilateral piece of a much larger multilateral trade deficit.
Far too little attention has been devoted to understanding why multilateral development lending has so often failed, and what might be done to make it work better.
Multilateral development institutions have probably had their most consistent success when they serve as “knowledge” banks, helping to share experience, best practices, and technical knowledge across regions.
But anyone who is even vaguely familiar with the US approach to multilateral lending knows that no other country has been as adept at exploiting its power and leverage for strategic gain.
The impact on the global system, with its existing structure of multilateral institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization) and myriad standard-setting and consensus-building organizations, may be smaller than one thinks.
However, if the global trade framework institutionalised in the WTO advances, especially through multilateral, non-discriminatory liberalisation in the present Doha Round, the new regionalism will probably turn out to be benign.
First, as the Helsinki Final Act put it, every sovereign nation has an inherent right “to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.”
NATO needs Russia, and Russia needs NATO, and the US shift away from unilateralism has restored the importance of multilateral security institutions while giving NATO the chance to establish new partnerships with the EU and Russia.
The revived importance of multilateral security institutions is creating a new climate and new prospects for a security system that can meet the needs of the twenty-first century.
At the COP 23 Climate Conference in Bonn, Germany, in November, multilateral development institutions showed themselves to be more committed than ever to the urgent and central issue of supporting and financing these critical goals.
Multilateral development institutions have never been more relevant.
As multilateral development institutions, we reconfirm our commitment to the Paris climate agreement.
In July, the G20 Sustainability Action Plan embedded the Paris agreement in G20 policies and noted that more effective use of financing from multilateral development institutions is key to innovation and private investment in climate action.
In 2016 alone, multilateral development institutions committed over $27 billion in climate finance, and we continue to step up our work, determined to broaden the private and public finance mobilized for climate action at COP 23.
It is fitting that this threat to national economies and to every person on earth, and the opportunity to counter it, should be tackled with the backing of multilateral development institutions.
Even cooperation on climate change is crumbling, with the US and China rejecting the multilateral, top-down approach to policymaking.
But this new, bottom-up framework, in which states determine the conditions for a multilateral agreement, lacks an authority to establish standards.
This is the only way to promote and defend the EMU’s economic interests in a world where the challenges are global and overcoming them will increasingly depend on multilateral cooperation.
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