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Lenders in sentence

412 examples of Lenders in a sentence

Adding to the confusion, another group, the sarrafs (primarily private money lenders) are the key interface between foreign investors and an Iranian counterpart, whether basij or bonyad.
In Greece, however, official lenders' unprecedented munificence made the adjustment more gradual than in, say, Latvia or Ireland.
With bank accounts, budding entrepreneurs can establish their creditworthiness and tap responsible, formal lenders.
Indeed, many in the West have portrayed their establishment as part of an effort to displace existing multilateral lenders.
As Deputy Finance Minister Shi Yaobin pointed out recently, by recognizing the need to reform their governance, existing multilateral lenders have shown that there are, in fact, no “best practices” – only “better practices.”
After all, managing for the short run encouraged mortgage lenders to offer artificially low “teaser” interest rates to lure potential homeowners.
Multilateral lenders have long understood the importance of debt relief to poverty reduction.
Similarly, I do not blame the lenders for accepting the gift of insurance against currency risk implicitly offered by the IMF.
After all, excessive and chaotic deleveraging by lenders to emerging Europe – and the ensuing credit crunch – would destabilize this economically and institutionally fragile region.
The European Commission and multilateral lenders should help to facilitate ongoing structural change in the banking sector, including bank acquisitions and balance-sheet restructuring for viable export-driven companies.
Indeed, the financial crisis has worsened in recent weeks, reflected in the US Federal Reserve’s takeover of quasi-government mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – which may cost American taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars – as well as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the sale of Merrill Lynch.
When a country requires assistance, it is tempting for lenders to insist on a long list of reforms.
Certainly, there are some good economic reasons why lenders have such an insatiable appetite for debt.
A better approach would be to create a mechanism for orchestrating orderly sovereign default, both to minimize damage when crises do occur, and to discourage lenders from assuming that taxpayers’ money will solve all major problems.
Benign disinflation means rising real incomes for lenders, pensioners, and workers, and falling energy prices for industry.
Of course, ending graft is also a good way to reassure lenders, and the timing of Kenya’s housecleaning is no accident.
Financial volatility rose, unsettling investors; stocks went on a rollercoaster ride, ending substantially lower; government bond yields plummeted, and lenders found themselves in the unusual position of having to pay for the privilege of holding an even bigger amount of government debt (almost one-third of the total).
It has almost doubled, to 180%, in the Netherlands, where the average mortgage is 110% of home values, because lenders are happy to finance all the purchasing costs.
This contrasts sharply with the experience of two large regional multilateral lenders: the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank.
Every time, borrowers and lenders claimed to have learned their lesson.
It helped bail out Bear Stearns, the government-backed mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and the insurance giant AIG.
This requires, first of all, cozying up with China and the autocratic Gulf states – the main lenders to the US Treasury – as well working with Iran and Russia to limit the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In recent years, lending by both institutions contracted dramatically, even though they have increasingly become the exclusive lenders to the world’s poorest countries.
If debt is owed largely to foreign lenders, interest-rate risk is compounded by exchange-rate risk.
And so, in late 2008, the way forward seemed obvious: recapitalize the banks, guarantee loans, use the government-backed housing lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to resolve underwater mortgages, drop short-term interest rates to zero and use quantitative easing to prevent deflation or dangerously low inflation, and embrace deficit spending.
The European Union, the European Central Bank, and private-sector lenders have spent more than €1 trillion over the past two years, but the eurozone remains in no better shape today than in the autumn of 2009, when the full scale of Greece’s fiscal problem was revealed.
Sandbu argues that this would not only insulate public finance from the follies of banks; it would also lead to an equilibrium that mimics fiscal risk-sharing between countries that are net borrowers and countries that are net lenders.
Europe’s political elite could have framed the Greek financial crisis as a tale of economic interdependence – you cannot have bad borrowers, after all, without careless lenders – instead of a morality tale pitting frugal, hard-working Germans against profligate, carefree Greeks.
This was designed not so much to shield the peripheral countries from a market run as it was to “bail in” private lenders.
Predictably, lenders saw through the announcements and understood the unfeasibility of the underlying fiscal cuts.
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