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Lenders in sentence

412 examples of Lenders in a sentence

Indeed, once the unintended consequences of their actions – more financial duress for the non-rich after the crisis – became clear, Bertrand and Morse show that the legislators in unequal districts moved against the financial sector to protect their constituents, voting to set limits on interest rates charged by “payday” lenders (who lend to over-indebted lower-income borrowers at very high interest rates).
Households in US cities received mortgages in 2006 that they could never hope to repay, while taxpayers never dreamed that they would be called on to bail out the lenders.
All is well as long as foreign lenders keep lending and the country keeps investing.
But if lenders get cold feet, the resulting “sudden stop” in capital flows requires the country to cut back on key imports overnight, triggering a recession.
Frightened lenders may then not only refuse to extend new loans, but also demand repayment of old ones.
The pessimistic expectations of lenders are then vindicated.
This induces lenders to provide not only NINJA (no income, no job, no assets) mortgages, but also generous loans to real-estate developers to build ever larger mansions and housing estates.
Lenders find that the collateral (half-finished or empty houses) is worth almost nothing, resulting in huge losses in the banking system (as the US found out in 2008).
The country’s Sparkassen – savings banks with a collective balance sheet of some €1 trillion ($1.1 trillion) – are outside the European Central Bank’s supervisory control, while thinly capitalized mega-banks, such as Deutsche Bank, and the country’s rotten state-owned regional lenders have obtained an implausibly clean bill of health.
They stepped in when private markets froze, acting as lenders and dealers of last resort, and provided additional liquidity to grease the wheels of finance.
If there is a moral hazard, it is on the part of the lenders – especially in the private sector – who have been bailed out repeatedly.
The International Monetary Fund and the G7 countries’ central banks must act as global lenders of last resort and provide ample liquidity – quickly and with few strings attached – to support emerging markets’ currencies.
The low-interest-rate environment has also caused lenders to take extra risks in order to sustain profits.
Banks and other lenders are extending credit to lower-quality borrowers, to borrowers with large quantities of existing debt, and as loans with fewer conditions on borrowers (so-called “covenant-lite loans”).
Some members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC, the Fed’s policymaking body) therefore fear that raising the short-term federal funds rate will trigger a substantial rise in longer-term rates, creating losses for investors and lenders, with adverse effects on the economy.
After the peak, lenders tightened their standards.
Nothing else ultimately explains lenders’ immense willingness, in the boom up to 2006, to lower their credit standards on home mortgages, regulators’ willingness to let them do it, rating agencies’ willingness to rate mortgage securities highly, and investors’ willingness to gobble them up.
The notion that lenders should always be repaid, regardless of how and to whom they lend, is indefensible.
A recent revision of that decision permits banks to repossess homes, but only if they help arrange alternative lower-cost housing – an administrative nightmare for lenders, particularly if a lot of people start defaulting at the same time.
But here the interests of prospective borrowers and lenders are not obviously compatible.
In contrast to development finance, the incentives of potential lenders and borrowers are not aligned.
Permitting the lenders to impose policy conditions on borrowers, and to monitor their compliance, can redress this problem.
But, given the divergent interests of lenders and borrowers, it has never been used – not even in 2008, at the height of the global financial crisis.
That will require establishing effective regulatory structures that facilitate long-term borrowing and repayment, while ensuring that lenders do not exploit borrowers, as has occurred everywhere from rural India to the United States mortgage market.
When courts preside over nonfinancial bankruptcies, they depend on private lenders to provide emergency liquidity.
Certainly, the government must also find better ways to help homeowners and their lenders work out efficient bankruptcy proceedings.
When Swedish, Finish, Spanish, and French banks faced crises in the past decade, their respective central banks exercised the function of lenders of last resort.
For creditors, especially German lenders, the main priority has been to impose austerity and discipline on the eurozone’s profligate south.
More importantly, the lobbying of the quasi-governmental mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would not have been so successful without the idea of the “ownership society.”
If the Trump administration takes aim at major foreign lenders – namely, China – its strategy could quickly backfire.
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