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Historian in sentence

343 examples of Historian in a sentence

One such truth is the murder, described by the historian Jan Grabowski, of about 200,000 Polish Jews by their non-Jewish neighbors.
The Rule of the LawlessCAIRO – In one of his last essays, the late, great historian Tony Judt asked what we should have learned from the last century, a period in which so many soldiers and civilians died in conflict.
Indeed, Yale University historian Timothy D. Snyder, who could hardly be accused of harboring anti-Polish sentiments, has concluded that Poles behaved more or less the same as other people under similar circumstances.
As the economic historian Alexander Field has shown, many firms took the “down time” created by weak demand for their products to reorganize their operations.
But, as the late English historian A.J.P. Taylor concluded, after studying eight great wars since the late eighteenth century, wars have often “sprung more from apprehension than from a lust for war or for conquest.”
Perhaps, before firing any more salvos at a fellow historian, its author should re-read his own book.
As the historian Diarmaid MacCulloch writes in A History of Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years, the two centuries before Luther featured near-constant challenges to papal supremacy on issues of philosophy, theology, and politics.
But, according to the British historian Andrew Pettegree, between 1517 and Luther’s death in 1546, local publishers “turned out at least 2,721 works” – and average of “91 books per year,” representing some three million individual copies.
Research by the economic historian Jared Rubin indicates that the mere presence of a printing press in a city before 1500 greatly increased the likelihood that the city would become Protestant by 1530.
It more closely resembles the “composite monarchy” that the historian John Elliott identified as the prevalent form of rule in the sixteenth century, when separate entities, such as Aragon and Castile, had to be held together.
Some observers, such as the Harvard historian Niall Ferguson, believe that “debating the stages of decline may be a waste of time – it is a precipitous and unexpected fall that should most concern policy makers and citizens.”
The historian Ben Friedman has observed that the “central question” in US history is not “the poverty of the most disadvantaged” or “the success of the most privileged”; it is “the economic well-being of the broad majority” of the population.
Soros is what the late historian Isaac Deutscher would call a “non-Jewish Jew” – one who sought ideas, inspiration, and fulfillment beyond the boundaries of Jewry, and yet continued to belong to the Jewish tradition.
What the late historian Richard Hofstadter called the “paranoid style” has reached the commanding heights of political power in the US and Poland.
As the economist and historian Deirdre McCloskey has noted, while the bourgeoisie provides the clerisy with a living, in times of crisis, the clerisy tends to promote anti-bourgeois fantasies, from nationalism to communism.
The historian John Elliott describes the Catalan clerisy’s role in spurring the 1640 rebellion against Spain.
The British historian A.J.P. Taylor had a cynical view of people’s ability to learn from their mistakes.
As the historian Henk Wesseling has explained, rather than reflecting political, institutional, and economic reality, the map of Africa “helped to create it” in at least three key ways.
In this sense, Trump has taken what the historian Richard Hofstadter described as the “paranoid style” from the fringes of US politics into the mainstream.
Global Conflict in a New Age of ExtremesTEL AVIV – The late historian Eric Hobsbawm described the twentieth century as the “age of extremes,” in which state socialism led to the gulag; liberal capitalism led to cyclical depressions; and nationalism led to two world wars.
In his classic 1939 study The Twenty Years Crisis, the historian E. H. Carr argued that international law has always been espoused by “satisfied” powers but is always challenged by powers that hope to change the international system in their favor.
For years, China funneled its surpluses back into the purchase of US Treasury bills, thus underwriting American profligacy and forging a symbiotic arrangement that the historian Niall Ferguson has called “Chimerica.”
But, as the historian Eamon Duffy notes, with the systematic “stripping of the altars” throughout this period, many English subjects experienced dislocation and alienation.
But a recent book by the Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari offers an opportunity to correct this imbalance.
(A political historian, Lichtman is famous for having devised a model that has enabled him to predict the election of every American president from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump.)
Liberal cycles, the historian Arthur Schlesinger thought, succumb to the corruption of power, conservative cycles to the corruption of money.
Nearly 50 years ago, a statistically minded historian of science, Derek de Solla Price, observed that the best indicator of academic research production is a nation’s energy consumption per capita: both grow together.
The Whig historian of the nineteenth century Thomas Macaulay described this difference well.
Indeed, as the eminent historian Wang Gungwu has pointed out, the first maps to claim the South China Sea were Japanese, and were inherited by Nationalist China.
The economic historian Harold James has shown in a recent book that in the 40 years of negotiations leading to the adoption of the common currency, all of the problems that now beset the eurozone were discussed repeatedly.
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