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Borrowers in sentence

472 examples of Borrowers in a sentence

Both views accept that the central source of weak aggregate demand is the disappearance of demand from former borrowers.
Writing down former borrowers’ debt may be slightly more effective in producing the old pattern of demand, but it will probably not restore it to the pre-crisis level.
In any case, do we really want the former borrowers to borrow themselves into trouble again?
As shadow banking has become the primary source of finance for SMEs – which tend to be higher-risk borrowers – the financial risks in China’s economy have grown exponentially.
Moreover, taxation would increase costs (passed on to borrowers) and reduce the volume of transactions, thereby fueling market volatility amid decreasing liquidity.
As a result of both tendencies, there is a high concentration of credits on a few large borrowers.
Thus, during periods of expansion, when banks are eager to fund ever more risky borrowers, the reserve ratio rises, curbing potentially disruptive asset bubbles or overinvestment.
Stronger bankruptcy laws, for example, would enable Chinese banks and state authorities to enforce credit discipline, pushing weak or failed borrowers out of the system.
With deflation leading to negative income growth, the weight of debt relative to income increases, potentially becoming unbearable for borrowers – and thus increasing the risk of sovereign- and private-debt crises.
The argument is simple: All economies have both borrowers and savers, and changes in the cost of borrowing (or the return to saving) affect them differently.
When interest rates decline, borrowers are able to borrow more.
At the macro level, a less credit-constrained economy (with a large mass of effective borrowers) could then experience a fall in the savings rate as borrowing rose.
Borrowers and savers are naturally grouped by age.
If asymmetric credit constraints are indeed important, young borrowers and middle-aged savers will display distinct patterns in constrained versus less-constrained economies.
Sixth, global banks are challenged by lower returns, owing to the new regulations put in place since 2008, the rise of financial technology that threatens to disrupt their already-challenged business models, the growing use of negative policy rates, rising credit losses on bad assets (energy, commodities, emerging markets, fragile European corporate borrowers), and the movement in Europe to “bail in” banks’ creditors, rather than bail them out with now-restricted state aid.
But this positive credit cycle is less visible than the doom loop, because it takes a lot less time to cut the number of borrowers and push the economy into a recession than to foster a recovery when credit becomes available again.
Even if over-stretched borrowers can spend and invest, they most likely won’t do so right away.
It was widely known that banks and mortgage companies were engaged in predatory lending practices, taking advantage of the least educated and most financially uninformed to make loans that maximized fees and imposed enormous risks on the borrowers.
When this new bankruptcy law was passed, no one complained that it interfered with the sanctity of contracts: at the time borrowers incurred their debt, a more humane – and economically rational – bankruptcy law gave them a chance for a fresh start if the burden of debt repayment became too onerous.
Such a system worked as long as events in one country did not have a negative impact on other borrowers and there was no systemic risk or systemic contagion.
After that, the IMF began to encourage some countries to renegotiate debt rather than seek new money, at least if they were relatively small scale borrowers such as Ukraine or Pakistan and thus could not endanger the whole system.
Moreover, they argue that the cost of any increase in required equity capital would simply be passed on to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, bringing economic growth to a grinding halt.
At the very least, the combination of higher interest rates in the shadow-banking sector and weaker nominal GDP growth undermines borrowers’ debt-repayment capacity.
This is the functional equivalent of promoting another surge of “zombie lending” – the uneconomic loans made to insolvent Japanese borrowers in the 1990s.
With operating cash flows inadequate to repay much of China’s debt, borrowers have little choice but to finance payments with new credit.
Those apparently low-risk claims cannot really be worth 270% of Chinese GDP if a significant proportion are matched by loans to borrowers who cannot repay.
Egypt’s low credit rating has forced the government to borrow domestically, which has crowded out other borrowers to the point that private investment amounts to just 11% of GDP.
In the absence of some positive shock – such as an acceleration of GDP growth – servicing that debt becomes impossible for at least some borrowers.
For both borrowers and creditors, the risks and costs are enormous.
Of the largest borrowers, only Brazil, in 1987, formally defaulted – and only briefly.
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