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Borrowers in sentence

472 examples of Borrowers in a sentence

Back in 1986, Hyman Minsky warned about the longer-term dangers to financial stability if “Ponzi” borrowers – those who can service their debt only with new debt – become the main pillar of the economy.
A zero-interest-rate environment is of course ideal for such borrowers, because there is nothing to provide an indication of solvency; borrowers can just roll over their debt.
If macroprudential policy limited additional credit to marginal borrowers effectively, monetary policy would have no impact on demand (as long as the most solvent agents refuse to spend more).
The recovery was ultimately fueled by so-called “subprime” mortgages: home-purchase loans extended to borrowers with lower credit ratings.
It has an income-contingent education-loan program that permits borrowers to spread their repayments over more years if necessary, and in which, if their income turns out to be particularly low (perhaps because they chose important but low-paying jobs, say, in education or religion), the government forgives some of the debt.
Making matters worse, much of the new credit has originated in the shadow-banking sector at high interest rates, causing borrowers’ repayment capacity to become overstretched.
So potential borrowers like India and Mexico, which should have voted for Okonjo-Iweala, acted prudently and voted for Kim instead.
Market participants, be they lenders or borrowers, know that “easy money” has an expiry date.
Crowdsourced funding and peer-to-peer lending schemes give borrowers the opportunity to circumvent many of the hurdles of traditional banking – including, in some cases, collateral requirements and credit ratings.
But if the country’s borrowers have a lot of dollar-denominated debt, depreciation can be ruinous.
“[H]eightened and prolonged uncertainty,” owing to the impending referendum, “has the potential to increase the risk premia investors require on a wider range of UK assets, which could lead to a further depreciation of sterling and affect the cost and availability of financing for a broad range of UK borrowers.”
They should learn about China’s asymmetric relationships with many of its trading partners, and the stark terms of Chinese loans, which have left many borrowers mired in a debt trap.
There is a credit crunch, as banks with insufficient capital do not want to lend to risky borrowers, while slow growth and high levels of household debt have also depressed credit demand.
When bankers try to cover up bad loans on their books, they extend new loans to enable their insolvent borrowers to pretend to be servicing the original loan.
But what about Spain or Ireland, where the borrowers were not the government but the private sector?
Negative interest rates are the latest attempt to overcome the mismatch of incentives for lenders and borrowers.
Overstretched sovereign borrowers on the eurozone periphery argue that issuing government securities backed by all eurozone countries is the only way out of their “debt trap.”
The problem is that both groups of borrowers have been transferring large sums of money to other countries.
The healthy borrowers worried that creditors would demand higher rates if the penalties for default softened.
Even setting aside the more charged and controversial restructuring of sovereign debt, the write-off of private debt incurred during the boom (often under a very rosy set of assumptions about borrowers’ future income and wealth) has been an integral part of the resolution of banking crises through much of known history.
As difficult as the foreclosure episode was in the US, it enabled borrowers and banks to adapt to the collapse of the housing bubble and to move on.
From this perspective, the proposal to use the IMF as a conduit for ECB resources (thereby circumventing restrictions imposed by European Union’s treaties), while providing the ECB with preferred-creditor status, would exacerbate the Fund’s exposure to risky borrowers.
But their eurozone membership meant that government and private-sector borrowers alike benefited from very low interest rates.
But it is not self-evident that governments’ ability to regulate has been seriously harmed by their status as borrowers.
Just as we have learned to distinguish between governments as shareholders and as regulators – which must be done carefully, because the actions of one do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other – today we must distinguish between governments as borrowers and as financial regulators.
As traditional monetary policy becomes ineffective, other unorthodox policies will continue to be used: policies to bail out investors, financial institutions, and borrowers; massive provision of liquidity to banks in order to ease the credit crunch; and even more radical actions to reduce long-term interest rates on government bonds and narrow the spread between market rates and government bonds.
Creditors and banks often preferred to do business with known borrowers, and where local jurisdictions could settle any disputes.
A gold-standard rule would have produced higher rates for the southern European borrowers, which would have attracted funds to where capital might be productively used, and at the same time acted as a deterrent against purely speculative capital flows.
The banks claim that lending remains constrained by a shortage of creditworthy borrowers, owing to the sick economy.
Sovereign borrowers will not – and should not – trust the fairness and competence of the US judiciary.
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