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Borrowers in sentence

472 examples of Borrowers in a sentence

The regional economic spillovers are limited by the fact that other borrowers can continue to function normally: creditworthiness is determined by a borrower’s fundamentals and not its state of residence.
So the risk remains that a severe enough financial shock in the EU will affect all other borrowers in the same country in a self-fulfilling manner.
Europe’s political elite could have framed the Greek financial crisis as a tale of economic interdependence – you cannot have bad borrowers, after all, without careless lenders – instead of a morality tale pitting frugal, hard-working Germans against profligate, carefree Greeks.
Property markets in Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg have practically exploded throughout the crisis, as a result of banks chasing borrowers with offers of loans at near-zero interest rates, regardless of their creditworthiness.
But cheap credit promotes bad investment and excessive debt, which borrowers often are unable to repay.
To really cure Europe’s ills, policies must attack the source of infection: the dominance that lenders now hold over borrowers in financial markets.
Because Russia, just like many other doubtful borrowers, could only get short term loans, its financing was highly precarious.
This gives China added leverage, which it can use, say, to force borrowers to swap debt for equity, thereby expanding China’s global footprint by trapping a growing number of countries in debt servitude.
The World Bank has received a modest increase in resources, but it has yet to build capacity to lend rapidly and globally beyond existing borrowers and loan arrangements, and its income trajectory is diminishing.
Crisis-hit countries that were not already borrowers were largely left out.
Similarly, the spread of microfinance lending has made capital available to borrowers who until recently were not seen as creditworthy.
This protects both borrowers and lenders.
Moreover, the infrastructure investments of this period were funded by reckless and imprudent lending by public-sector banks, which often funneled resources to high-risk, politically connected borrowers.
In practice, regulators measure the volume of lending to CRA target tracts – poor areas with median income less than 80% of the median income of the local community – as well as to low-income and minority borrowers in non-CRA tracts to verify compliance with the Act.
In fact, Lehman was a small institution compared to the Austrian, French, and German banks that have become highly exposed to Russia’s financial system through the practice of using deposits from Russian companies and individuals to lend to Russian borrowers.
True, global “government” can go too far – for example, when WTO rules conflict with sensible local environmental safeguards, or when IMF requirements for developing-country borrowers narrow the scope for creative heterodoxy in growth and poverty-reducing policies.
Given that banks prefer lending to larger enterprises and borrowers with collateral, small and medium-size enterprises struggle to gain access to credit and capital.
In the interwar Great Depression, the economist Irving Fisher accurately described the process of debt deflation, in which lenders, worried by the deterioration of their asset quality, called in their loans, pushing borrowers to liquidate assets.
The TLTROs were designed to maximize the chances that banks would pass on the funding relief to borrowers.
The main effect so far has been to help bankers generate bonuses (rather than attract borrowers) by hiding exposures.
Either super-CACs need to be designed and introduced (though it will take years to include them in all new bond contracts) or the international community may want to reconsider whether the 2002 IMF proposal for a formal bankruptcy court for sovereign borrowers should be resurrected.
Moreover, Islamic finance is more equitable: lenders and borrowers share risks and rewards, which increases the focus on long-term goals and discourages excessive short-term risk-taking.
They therefore have strong incentives to evaluate financing requests carefully, and to assist borrowers in bad times, thus reducing the pressure to sell assets at “fire-sale” prices and minimizing the likelihood of financial contagion.
Under the first, a soft economic landing occurs after China’s new leadership adopts ingenious policies to curb credit growth (especially through the shadow banking system), forces over-leveraged borrowers into bankruptcy, and injects fiscal resources into the banking system to shore up its capital base.
Should this happen, growth will collapse, many borrowers will default, and financial chaos could ensue.
Now, too, as borrowers find credit increasingly difficult to obtain, and as resentment toward banks – and those responsible for regulating them – grows accordingly, we can expect demands for political intervention to alter the distribution of credit.
But, in a world of fractional reserve banks, there is clearly a danger that the initial stimulus could be multiplied later by the subsequent expansion of private “inside money” purchasing power, as animal spirits return to bank and shadow-bank lenders and borrowers.
The real reason inflation-indexed bond yields are an interesting economic variable is that they report on a market in which both investors and borrowers know exactly what is coming, in real terms.
One can never have negative nominal interest rates (except through some oddity of taxes or regulations), since lenders would rather hold their cash than effectively pay borrowers.
Part of those neighbors’ problem was that domestic borrowing costs looked so high that many small borrowers, including many house buyers, turned to low-interest Swiss-franc loans and were then hit by the franc’s massive appreciation.
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