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Borrowers in sentence

472 examples of Borrowers in a sentence

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau – established by Dodd-Frank to protect borrowers with payday, student, and car loans – is also now being curtailed.
Moreover, virtuous creditors should not bail out irresponsible borrowers, be they private or public.
When a central bank reduces long-term interest rates via current and expected future open-market operations, it does not prevent potential lenders from offering to lend at higher interest rates; nor does it stop borrowers from taking up such an offer.
These transactions don’t take place for a simple reason: borrowers choose freely not to enter into them.
The BRICS’ “no strings” policy explicitly challenges the conditionality imposed on borrowers by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, though the policy remains untested.
Moreover, slowing economic growth, tighter prudential regulation, and increased liability have made banks much more risk-averse, driving them to demand a significantly higher risk premium from borrowers, who must now not only provide collateral, but also find third parties to guarantee the loans.
Claims on entities within partner countries would be redenominated in weaker currencies – or the borrowers would default on them.
To be fair, the Bank has embraced the message of eclecticism, but a new leader will have to go further, paying greater attention to the specific contexts and demands of individual borrowers and learning from a wider set of successful development experiences.
The globally disruptive effects of US monetary tightening – a rapidly rising dollar, capital outflows from emerging markets, financial distress for international dollar borrowers, and chaotic currency devaluations in Asia and Latin America – may loom less large in next year’s economic outlook than in a rear-view glimpse of 2015.
And, when some of the IMF’s largest debtors (Brazil and Argentina) began to prepay their debts a few years ago with no new borrowers in sight, it looked like the final nail in the coffin had been struck.
And, while traditional fiscal policy (government spending and tax cuts) will be pursued aggressively, non- traditional fiscal policy (expenditures to bail out financial institutions, lenders, and borrowers) will also become increasingly important.
But what financial repression usually involves is keeping interest rates below their natural market level, to the benefit of borrowers at the expense of savers.
The borrowers are often governments, and in many emerging economies the state has funded its extravagances by paying bank depositors derisory rates of interest.
There are two central precepts of Islamic finance: absolute prohibition on charging interest on financial transactions, and high moral standards on the part of lenders and borrowers.
Shadow banking in China is dominated by lending to higher-risk borrowers, such as local governments, property developers, and SMEs.
In an environment dominated by direct quantitative controls, such as increasingly stringent lending quotas, shadow banking is meeting genuine market demand, with the interest rates that borrowers are willing to pay providing a useful price-discovery mechanism.
This includes ensuring that borrowers are accountable and that their liabilities are transparent; deleveraging municipal debt through asset sales and more transparent financing; and shifting the burden of resolving property-rights disputes from regulators to arbitrators and, eventually, to the judiciary.
Until recently, that might have been unthinkable, so the new borrowers’ initial bond issue should be viewed as a sign of great investor confidence.
This is small change in the grand scheme of global finance; but, given that many of these borrowers were in distress or default just a decade ago, and needed debt forgiveness, theirs is an especially impressive turnaround.
Whether poor borrowers can avoid such a financial squeeze will depend on several factors.
Those borrowers with sound macroeconomic policies will probably retain some appeal for global financial markets; but less prudent governments might suddenly find themselves cut off.
Traditionally, low-income countries’ creditors were rich-world governments and multilateral organizations that found it politically unfeasible to call in debts if this meant that borrowers had to cut vital public services such as education or health.
Sound debt management is, in effect, sound social policy – a lesson that borrowers and lenders alike should heed as they enter into debts that, if not properly managed, can turn out to be more complicated than first assumed and more troublesome than anyone expected.
Unfortunately, as we discovered during the financial crisis, such markets can become less liquid or even dry up completely when lenders start to fear unforeseen problems, either with borrowers or with the assets that they pledge as collateral.
That means that lenders could pursue borrowers’ other assets – not just the house – in case of default.
To this litany of concerns we can add the fear of borrowers that the massive American deficits would drain the supply of global savings, and worries of holders of US dollar reserves, that America may be tempted to inflate away its debt.
What were called “teaser rates” allowed even lower payments for the first few years: they were teasers, because they played off the fact that many borrowers were not financially sophisticated, and didn’t really understand what they were getting into.
But even as short-term interest rates began to rise, the day of reckoning was postponed, as new borrowers could obtain fixed-rate mortgages at interest rates that were not increasing.
This suggests that macroeconomic policies, though necessary, are insufficient without parallel institutional reforms in planning, regulation, and bankruptcy procedures to enforce credit discipline for all borrowers, regardless of whether they are in the private sector or state-owned.
Most emerging-market borrowers had learned their lesson by the turn of the century, as exchange-rate volatility had made the risks of currency mismatch more tangible.
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