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Twentieth in sentence

802 examples of Twentieth in a sentence

This effort rests on four pillars.The first is America’s longstanding commitment to a set of principles that helped to advance peace and security in the region in the twentieth century.
The lesson is also apparent in the economic history of the twentieth century, when – especially in the decades following the Great Depression – most of today’s advanced industrialized countries underwent a sustained process of institutional deepening that broadened the base and strengthened the resilience of their economies.
In the twentieth century, the US government spent billions of dollars to rebuild the European economy.
Darwin’s vision of the world deeply influenced biology in the twentieth century, despite persistent questions posed by factors such as lateral gene transfer, neutral evolution, and chaotic bottlenecks in natural selection.
Menachem Begin, a hawkish predecessor of Netanyahu as prime minister, once had the insolence to say to the great historian Yaakov Talmon that, “when it comes to the twentieth century, I am more an expert than you are.”
First, fascist elements in Russia did not emerge organically as they did in Europe in the early twentieth century.
American RetreatsLos Angeles – As Barack Obama’s incoming administration debates the pace and consequences of withdrawal from Iraq, it would do well to examine the strategic impact of other American exits in the final decades of the twentieth century.
In the early twentieth century, researchers began to examine hemoglobin – the protein responsible for carrying oxygen from the respiratory organs to the rest of the body – in red blood cells.
In fact, from the mid-nineteenth century well into the twentieth, structural shifts wrought by technological change and demographics in America’s market economy lifted many participants – while dropping others.
The Forgotten Twentieth-CenturyBERLIN – It has been 20 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which for many historians marked the real end of the “short twentieth century” – a century that, beginning in 1914, was characterized by protracted ideological conflicts among communism, fascism, and liberal democracy, until the latter seemed to have emerged fully victorious.
Clearly, all history is contemporary history, and what Europeans, in particular, need to learn today from the twentieth century concerns the power of ideological extremes in dark times – and the peculiar nature of European democracy as it was constructed after World War II.
In some ways, the great ideological struggles of the twentieth century now seem about as close and relevant as the scholastic debates of the Middle Ages – especially, but not only, for younger generations.
Nevertheless, much more than most of us would care to admit, we remain enmeshed in the concepts and categories of the twentieth century’s ideological wars.
So how should we think about the ideological legacy of the twentieth century?
For one thing, we need to stop viewing the twentieth century as a historical parenthesis filled with pathological experiments conducted by crazed thinkers and politicians, as if liberal democracy had been there before those experiments and merely needed to be revived after they failed.
It is not a pleasant thought – and perhaps even a dangerous one – but the fact remains that many people, not just ideologues, put their hopes in the twentieth century’s authoritarian and totalitarian experiments, viewing politicians like Mussolini and even Stalin as problem-solvers, while liberal democrats were written off as dithering failures.
Friedman was one of the twentieth century’s leading economists, a Nobel Prize winner who made notable contributions to monetary policy and consumption theory.
What Adam Smith was to the eighteenth century, Milton Friedman was to the twentieth.
It was no different in the late twentieth century.
That term described a transatlantic world that emerged from the twentieth century’s two world wars, redefined the international order during the four-decade Cold War, and dominated the globe – until now.
The West, by contrast, is transatlantic, and it is a child of the twentieth century.
The situation in Asia today has the nuclear attributes of the twentieth century and the national-power dynamics of the nineteenth century.
The question is this: Will twenty-first-century Asia resemble Europe – the dominant region of much of modern history – during the first half of the twentieth century, when it experienced two wars of unprecedented cost and destruction, or the second half, when tensions with the Soviet Union were effectively managed and Western Europe experienced unprecedented peace and prosperity?
Since the fourth quarter of 2008, America’s net national saving rate has been negative – in sharp contrast to the 6.4%-of-GDP averaged over the last three decades of the twentieth century.
As in the darker decades of the twentieth century, today’s nationalism takes the form of heightened opposition to immigration and – to a lesser degree – free trade.
The Cold War, the third major conflict of the twentieth century, is no exception to this rule.
Prior to the twentieth century, leaders were remote figures who rarely made direct contact with the masses.
One need only consider Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey at the start of the twentieth century or the former Yugoslavia at its end.
Even after the Soviet Union’s repudiation of czarist Russia’s debts – perhaps the twentieth century’s most notorious (and most misunderstood) debt default – certain creditors expressed interest in lending to the new regime, in part because Soviet agencies repaid debt that they considered legitimate.
Moreover, does anyone, for example, want to see China return to the years of bloody warlordism of the early twentieth century?
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