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States in sentence

7075 examples of States in a sentence

The Fed cannot even provide credit to specific regions, let alone states on the verge of bankruptcy (for example, California).
Indeed, as we face today’s security challenges - terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states - we cannot afford not to.
What is needed instead are policies that reflect particular circumstances in different states and regions, together with an awareness that democracy is, above all, a statement about national realities and depends primarily on domestic factors.
The EU has offered to play a facilitating role: we urge both leaderships to promptly seize this opportunity, with a view to their states’ further steps along the path towards the European family to which all Balkan countries naturally belong.
Both europhiles and eurocrats shudder at the prospect that rejection in several member states, particularly in a large one, might kill the project, leaving the Union to muddle through with the Nice Treaty.
But the elevation of the Social Chapter, previously a list of good intentions, to the status of fundamental constitutional rights, threatens to encumber workers and businesses in the member states with burdensome judicial proceedings and expensive social entitlements written by judges in Luxembourg whose last word is beyond appeal.
Article II-52 states that the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution (including its 12 "social rights") apply only to the actions of the Union, and of member states when they are implementing Union decisions .
If this preferred solution proves unacceptable, an alternative would be to strengthen Article II-52, to state clearly that the twelve "social rights" of Part II apply to the Union, but not to the member states, even when these are implementing Union directives.
If the Union decides, as it could, that all member states must provide public health care for all unemployed persons, it would be up to national parliaments, not 25 judges in Luxembourg, to determine how to address that objective.
Just as Britain refused to concede naval supremacy to Germany a century ago, the US will not easily accept any Chinese challenge to its strategic position in the western Pacific, especially given that so many East Asian states are pleading for US protection.
The United States, in the past a staunch supporter of European integration, would likely adopt a policy of bilateral special relationships with individual European states.
I wrote those words with the French political scientist Jacques Rupnik in 1991, just as war was breaking out among Yugoslavia’s successor states.
That stance is driven less by a sense of insecurity than by confidence in “ASEAN centrality” – that is, its member states’ ability to shape the regional order and realize a common destiny on their own terms, without foreign meddling.
Over 14 million people are in urgent need of assistance in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe alone.
Its member states are constantly being evaluated for their economic potential and desirability as a market for investments, goods, and services.
Such organizations often take advantage of states that lack the legitimacy or capacity to administer their own territory effectively, launching a mix of political and armed operations that, over time, give them coercive control over local populations.
For some weak states, internal threats provide clear objectives.
And, as a rule, such states then try to safeguard their interests by imposing their predominance (hegemony), which is a recipe for dangerous conflict if based on coercion rather than cooperation.
They now tend to be disconnected from national politics altogether, driven as much by the logic of EU institutions as by member states’ needs.
Moreover, EU-level decisions have been pickled into rigid codes to which member states must adhere, even if their governments or electorates do not support them.
It is understandable that European leaders would latch onto Brexit as the one thing EU member states can agree on.
Community colleges are a classic example of how US states operate as “laboratories of democracy.”
But the desire to punish the British, if only to deter other member states from bolting, is surely also a contributing factor.
While penalties and other coercive measures may be able to keep wavering member states in for a while, this approach would leave the EU susceptible to instability and its members vulnerable to exploitation.
In the age of globalization, they are also hopelessly and increasingly lagging behind developed states.
The rise of incompetent states brings about huge challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, religious and ethnic strife, rivalry for natural resources, waves of migration, drug trafficking, and deterioration of the environment.
Such states call into question our traditional attitude towards national sovereignty.
Indeed, incompetent states now comprise almost a majority in the UN, which undermines that body's moral legitimacy in the eyes of many in the developed world.
The new role the US envisages is closely tied to the profound destabilization brought about by the proliferation of incompetent states.
Indeed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki seem an eternity ago; new nuclear-weapons states have emerged without the world ending; no terrorist nuclear device has threatened a major city; and possession of nuclear weapons, for the states that have them, seems to be a source of comfort and pride rather than concern or embarrassment.
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