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Shareholders in sentence

665 examples of Shareholders in a sentence

After all, they have corporate-governance rules and policies, supervisory and management boards, and annual shareholders’ meetings.
Workers in certain industries find their skills in higher demand as foreigners spend their increased dollar earnings, consumers benefit from lower prices, and shareholders and managers see their companies’ profits increase.
As a result, executives were not exposed to the potential negative consequences that large losses could bring about for preferred shareholders, bondholders, and the government as a guarantor of deposits.
Financial institutions’ shareholders?
Companies must do more to maximize their value not just to shareholders, but to all stakeholders in the communities their business affects.
The companies that will define the twenty-first century will recognize that their license to operate is not simply a gift from shareholders or governments; rather, it must be earned by providing real solutions, creating jobs, and playing a constructive role in communities around the world.
Instead, they should become partners of private shareholders, endowing the banks temporarily with new equity capital until the crisis is over.
Goldman Sachs, the venerable Wall Street firm at the epicenter of financial globalization, paid more than $16 billion dollars in compensation to its 25,000 employees in 2006, and spun out another $9 billion for its shareholders – a total that is greater than the annual income of most African countries.
In effect, these instruments turn creditors into shareholders in a country’s economy, entitling them to a portion of its future profits while temporarily reducing its debt burden.
Finally, shareholders and senior executives should tie performance goals to incentives.
But its failure, and the failure of its European shareholders, to adhere to its own best practices may eventually prove to have been a fatal misstep.
When a large financial institution is insolvent, the IMF should take it over, guaranteeing its short-term obligations, but wiping out the shareholders and repaying the long-term creditors only after all the other creditors (including the IMF itself) are repaid.
First, rigid rules that wipe out shareholders and penalize long-term creditors are a clear deterrent from bankers’ point of view.
Consider the extent to which capital – that is, shareholders – rules in large businesses: if a conflict arises between capital’s goals and those of managers, who wins?Looked at in this way, America’s capitalism becomes more ambiguous.
American law gives more authority to managers and corporate directors than to shareholders.
If shareholders want to tell directors what to do – say, borrow more money and expand the business, or close off the money-losing factory – well, they just can’t.
The law is clear: the corporation’s board of directors, not its shareholders, runs the business.
As long as they can elect the directors, one might think, shareholders rule the firm.
That would be plausible if American corporate ownership were concentrated and powerful, with major shareholders owning, say, 25% of a company’s stock – a structure common in most other advanced countries, where families, foundations, or financial institutions more often have that kind of authority inside large firms.
Ownership in large American firms is diffuse, with block-holding shareholders scarce, even today.
Incumbent directors typically nominate themselves, and the company pays their election expenses (for soliciting votes from distant and dispersed shareholders, producing voting materials, submitting legal filings, and, when an election is contested, paying for high-priced US litigation).
But the rules of the US corporate game – heavily influenced by directors and their lobbying organizations – usually allow directors to spurn outside offers, and even to block shareholders from selling to the outsider.
About a decade ago, after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, America’s stock-market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), considered requiring that companies allow qualified shareholders to put their director nominees on the company-paid election ballot.
Then, in the summer of 2010, after a relevant election and a financial crisis that weakened incumbents’ credibility, the SEC promulgated election rules that would give qualified shareholders free access to company-paid election ballots.
Even some capital-oriented thinking says that shareholders are better off if managers make all major decisions.
And often the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned.
But there is considerable evidence that when managers are at odds with shareholders, managerial discretion in American firms is excessive and weakens companies.
Traders might stop trading, but shareholders still might not conduct more fundamental, long-term analysis: the rise of index funds, which hold a broadly-diversified swath of the entire stock market, reflects this trend toward stockholder passivity.
Disclosure standards improved throughout the Continent, as did laws to protect minority shareholders.
Even basic elements of business organization – like limiting public shareholders’ obligation for corporate debts – are said by Brazilian legal experts, such as Bruno Salama, to remain an open question, with all shareholders potentially exposed, especially in labor and tax lawsuits.
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