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Shareholders in sentence

665 examples of Shareholders in a sentence

Most of the corporate windfall that Trump’s tax cut will deliver will be passed through to shareholders in the form of dividends and share buy-backs, and given to managers as higher pay.
Here is a way for the IMF to secure, visibly, the legitimate political support of our shareholders.
Last summer, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that Russia must pay $50 billion to Yukos’s shareholders – a judgment expected to be upheld on appeal.
The admission that securities analysts deliberately skewed their research to attract investment-banking customers shows how easily the proper functioning of checks and balances in corporate governance can break down-even in the most advanced system-leaving minority shareholders at risk.
Finally, managers, not distant shareholders, control access to well-paid appointments and lucrative consulting jobs.
Diffuse ownership, with a large number of relatively small shareholders entrusting day-to-day company operations to independent managers, prevails in the US and the UK.
Concentrated ownership, with one or more controlling shareholders, prevails in continental Europe (and, indeed, in the rest of the world).
In the past decade, it became fashionable to extol the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model, with its supposed virtuous circle of diffuse ownership and strong protection for distant shareholders.
Even leaving aside perks and privileges, majority shareholders can appropriate private benefits through transactions with other companies that they own, such as transfer pricing and privileged credit relations.
Moreover, concentrated corporate ownership impedes the growth of equity markets, making it difficult for smaller shareholders to sell.
Instead, lawmakers and regulators should focus on providing better protection to minority investors, whether the threat comes primarily from managers, as in diffuse ownership systems, or from controlling shareholders, as in concentrated ownership systems.
Similarly, when there is a controlling shareholder, a certain number of seats on boards and audit committees should be explicitly reserved for directors representing minority shareholders.
Renewed awareness that even seemingly strong protections for minority shareholders can be illusory has created a window of opportunity for undertaking necessary reforms.
Unless the public sector invests, and invests wisely, the private sector will continue to hoard its funds or return them to shareholders in the forms of dividends or buybacks.
In their case, a resolution authority, in London or Washington, would take control of the parent company, remove senior management, and apportion losses to shareholders and unsecured creditors.
For example, Unilever has rejected the short-term pressures of capital markets by ending quarterly earnings reporting and broadening its focus to advance greater social interests, rather than just the interests of its shareholders.
Large, publicly traded companies in other countries also often face lax limits on their use of corporate resources to influence political outcomes, fueling fears that the interests of shareholders will trump those of other groups, such as consumers and employees.
But corporate spending on politics can also hurt the interests of shareholders.
In particular, the influence of corporations on politicians and political outcomes can be expected to weaken the rules that protect shareholders and ensure that companies are well-governed.
Rather, such decisions are likely to reflect the preferences and objectives of the insiders who manage the companies, ostensibly on shareholders’ behalf.
To be sure, on many issues the interests of corporate insiders overlap with those of investors, and here insiders can be expected to lobby in directions that are consistent with the interests of shareholders.
As a result, insiders benefit from, and prefer to have, rules concerning corporate governance and investor protection that are more lax than those that are in the interest of shareholders and society.
Such managers can be expected to use their influence to obtain and maintain rules that weaken the rights of dispersed shareholders and make it difficult for shareholders to replace them.
Thus, in the US, corporate influence makes it difficult to obtain long-needed reforms that would eliminate barriers to takeovers and remove legal impediments to the ability of shareholders to replace company directors.
In such countries, rules are supposed to limit the controlling shareholders’ power to advance their interests at the expense of minority shareholders.
But the insiders that direct corporate lobbying can be expected to seek to obtain and maintain rules that provide insufficient protection to minority shareholders from such opportunism.
In sum, corporate meddling in politics is bad not just for those members of society who are not corporate shareholders.
Here, Corbyn focuses on accountability in corporate boardrooms, while May calls for giving workers and shareholders a stronger voice in firms’ decision-making and ensuring that the largest companies have incentives to think long term.
Corbyn accuses companies of handing out large dividends to shareholders, while infrastructure crumbles, service deteriorates, and companies pay far too little in taxes.
For more than two decades, shareholders in all the developed countries, unorganized and passive from 1945 until 1975-1980, have recast themselves in the form of pension funds, investment funds, and hedge funds.
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