Regulators
in sentence
982 examples of Regulators in a sentence
Despite these positive developments, however, mini-grids’ full potential to lay the foundation for rural economic development will remain unrealized until politicians, regulators, and international development practitioners embrace decentralized grids as viable, complementary, and inter-operable solutions to energy poverty, rather than sources of competition for traditional power utilities.
A number of other drugs – some new and some repurposed – are currently in the last stage of clinical trials, and one new drug has been approved by US
regulators
for treatment of MDR-TB even before such trials have been completed.
So property rights rely on courts and legal enforcement, and markets depend on
regulators
to rein in abuse and fix market failures.
A Banker’s RevolutionKUALA LUMPUR – Financial
regulators
are generally known for taking a measured and cautious approach to change.
Bringing the world’s two billion unbanked people out of the shadows and into the mainstream financial system will require new partnerships among regulators, the private sector, non-profits, regional bodies, and international organizations.
Regulators
are caught in a crossfire of conflicting expectations.
Consumers and their political representatives want
regulators
to be aware of every transaction, ready to intervene in real time if any glitch occurs.
Financial
regulators
and the international financial institutions have been following that sage advice a lot recently.
In retrospect, mispricing of risk was a flashing red warning sign that
regulators
and investors ignored in the run up to the 2008 crisis.
Are the
regulators
genuinely anxious, or just covering their backs?
The received wisdom among
regulators
is that they are better off being able to say, “We told you so” if something goes wrong, and that there is little downside in occasionally issuing dark warnings.
And even if they do check,
regulators
can always claim that the worst was avoided precisely because they had warned of the risk.
Their boom-and-bust character reflected nothing more than the relevant regulators’ failure – or refusal – to understand the risks involved.
The
regulators
were “captured” – meaning that they identified so closely with the intellectual perspective and worldview of large complex financial institutions that they were persuaded to allow something that was actually very dangerous.
Unfortunately, despite all we have been through in the past five years, these big banks’ shadows survive in various forms today – and
regulators
do not seem sufficiently inclined to turn on the lights.
In fact, the value of assets held by such funds fluctuates, and it is only an accounting convention – permitted by
regulators
– that allows them to report a stable value.
Some US
regulators
are pushing in this direction.
First, modern finance is simply too politically powerful for legislatures or
regulators
to restrain its ability to create systemic macroeconomic risk.
Its airport has become a global hub of such significance that German
regulators
recently had to force Emirates Airlines to raise its rates to Frankfurt, lest national champion Lufthansa lose too much business.
It is easier for both
regulators
and market participants to follow the crowd.
Regulators
permitting, insurance companies will then be able to write policies against loss of home value for individuals, and then will be able protect themselves against the risk to which these policies expose them by taking offsetting positions in the futures or options markets.
The biggest threats to the legal wildlife trade are poaching, smuggling, improper trade permitting, and animal abuse, all of which must be addressed by
regulators
and rural community stakeholders at the local level.
Hensarling blamed
regulators
and excused Wall Street for the financial crisis; condemned government-funded bank bailouts; characterized the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation as a power grab; and called for increased congressional oversight of the Federal Reserve.
Regulators
use two key measures to mitigate such risk-taking: they require banks to hold more capital and to keep investments, loans, and operations safer (and potentially less profitable) than the banks want them to be.
Because these two central regulatory methods achieve the same end, they can theoretically be substituted for one another –
regulators
can set banks’ capital requirement very high, or they can set the riskiness of banks’ activities very low.
In practice, because
regulators
cannot do either perfectly, they do some of each.
The third problem is one of logistics: Hensarling’s plan would hardwire into legislation the parameters for banks to take a regulatory off-ramp, thus tying regulators’ hands.
Because financial circumstances change quickly, regulators, who can adapt to new conditions faster than Congress can, should have discretion to set capital-requirement and loan-risk tradeoff benchmarks.
Despite all of this,
regulators
should thank Hensarling for pushing forward the concept of a flexible tradeoff framework.
But pursuit of perfection should not be allowed to impede progress, especially in an environment in which American and British regulators, in particular, are already struggling against a fierce headwind of lobbying by financial firms and threats by them to relocate, much like today’s corporate-tax optimizers.
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