Example collocations logo

Mortgages in sentence

375 examples of Mortgages in a sentence

What started as a problem with sub-prime mortgages has now spread to houses more generally, as well as to other asset classes.
Negative equity is significant because mortgages in the United States are generally “no recourse” loans.
Even in those states where mortgages are not “no recourse” loans, creditors generally do not pursue the assets or income of individuals who default.
MOSCOW – Skeptics of financial liberalization and innovation have been emboldened by the crisis in the world’s credit markets that erupted in mid-2007, when the problems with sub-prime mortgages first appeared in the United States.
The entire sub-prime market is largely a decade-old innovation – the word “sub-prime” did not exist in any language before 1994 – built on such things as option adjustable-rate mortgages (option-ARM’s), new kinds of collateralized debt obligations, and structured investment vehicles.
But others – those involved with the securitization of mortgages – were clearly important long-run innovations, because they can help spread risks better around the world.
Reducing the face value of mortgages and providing the upside – in case home prices were to rise in the long run – to the creditor banks is another way to convert mortgage debt partly into shareholder equity.
For several years until then, home prices in the United States rose dramatically, fueled by massive borrowing by homebuyers and banks’ investments in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
The banks pushed unsuspecting consumers into risky mortgages, fueling the housing bubble in the first place, and then bet on the bubble themselves, knowing that should things turn sour, the government would bail them out.
The indictment contains four counts: that Greenspan wrongly cheered the growth of non-standard adjustable-rate mortgages, which fueled the housing bubble; that he wrongly endorsed Bush’s tax cuts; that he should have reined in the stock market bubble of the 1990’s; and that he should have done the same with the real estate bubble of the 2000’s.
He says that he did not understand how the growth of non-standard mortgages had lured borrowers and investors into bearing dangerous risks.
He was, he now says, focusing on how fixed-rate mortgages are relatively bad deals for borrowers in times of low inflation, which was a mistake.
But Greenspan would have served the country and the world better if he had been somewhat more paternalist in slowing the growth of non-standard adjustable-rate mortgages.
America’s financial industry polluted the world with toxic mortgages, and, in line with the well established “polluter pays” principle, taxes should be imposed on it.
Temporary workers also do not have access to bank loans and mortgages in many countries.
Today’s crisis started in rich industrial countries – not only with sub-prime mortgages in the United States, but also with mismanagement of banks and public debt in Europe.
The GFSR confidently noted that “stress tests conducted by investment banks show that, even under scenarios of nationwide house price declines that are historically unprecedented, most investors with exposure to subprime mortgages through securitized structures will not face losses.”
The consequences could be severe, and not only in the US, where 21% of mortgages last year were for more than 90% of a home's purchase price, up from 7% at the peak of the boom in the late 1980s.
In the last years before the crisis, the flow of new mortgages had been 60% higher than the value of residential construction.
As it stands, there are considerable disparities between the one-year fixed deposit rate (3%); the official lending rate (6-8%) reserved for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), large corporations, and mortgages; and the market lending rate (10-20%) paid by private business and local-government projects that rely on shadow banking.
This was centrally important to sustaining global growth, for the performance of world’s largest economy has been fueled by real estate in recent years, with individuals refinancing their mortgages and spending some of the proceeds, and with high prices leading to more construction.
As a result, refinancing of mortgages will grind to a halt, leaving no money to draw out of housing to sustain Americans’ consumption binge.
While financial institutions tried to mitigate risks by bundling subprime mortgages, Fukushima’s cooling system was able to cope with either a blackout and an earthquake or a tsunami.
One governor opined that the Fed should regard it as a good thing that markets were starting to worry about subprime mortgages.
Similarly, financial authorities should vary the loan-to-value ratio on commercial and residential mortgages for risk-weighting purposes in order to forestall real estate bubbles.
When housing prices fell, so did the value of the mortgages and the securities based upon them.
But lack of transparency played a central role in this past summer’s credit crunch; toxic mortgages were sliced and diced, spread around the world, packaged with better products, and hidden away as collateral, so no one could be sure who was holding what.
With roughly 25% of all homeowners with mortgages owing more than their homes are worth, the decline in house prices reflects high rates of default and foreclosure.
And so, in late 2008, the way forward seemed obvious: recapitalize the banks, guarantee loans, use the government-backed housing lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to resolve underwater mortgages, drop short-term interest rates to zero and use quantitative easing to prevent deflation or dangerously low inflation, and embrace deficit spending.
Others fretted that resolving underwater mortgages would reward feckless borrowers.
BackNext