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Mortgages in sentence

375 examples of Mortgages in a sentence

Unlike virtually every other country, US residential mortgages are effectively “no recourse” loans.
Nearly 50% of those who had their mortgages modified nevertheless defaulted within six months.
Knowing that the government will pick up the pieces if necessary, they will postpone resolving mortgages and pay out billions in bonuses and dividends.
Other countries appear to have adopted a “Field of Dreams” – also known as “build it and they will come” – approach to private credit markets, In the US, for example, artificially low interest rates for home mortgages, resulting from the Federal Reserve’s policy activism, are supposed to kick-start prudent financing.
The Wolf of Wall Street was a predator, but so were all those reputable investment banks that shorted the products they were selling, and the retail banks that offered mortgages to unviable borrowers, which they could then repackage and sell as investment-grade securities.
Housing payments are higher because mortgages are of short duration (an average of ten years) and tight loan-to-value restrictions force borrowers to seek additional higher-cost loans from second-tier deposit institutions and non-financial companies.
Because banks would need to accept higher risk, a secondary market for mortgages is necessary.
When they get into the polling booth in November, will Americans vote on “culture wars” issues – sex and guns – or on the basis of whether they can afford to pay their mortgages?
The cynical, and increasingly popular, view is that they were again voting their pocketbooks – all financial legislation in the run-up to the 2008 crisis was supposedly driven by the financial sector’s appetite for more customers to devour with teaser loans and dubious mortgages.
DFCU Bank in Uganda, for example, has built a successful portfolio of business loans, leases, and mortgages that target women entrepreneurs.
Households in US cities received mortgages in 2006 that they could never hope to repay, while taxpayers never dreamed that they would be called on to bail out the lenders.
The reason: easy credit, especially subprime mortgages, which helped those without means to keep up with the Joneses.
Everybody now knows about America’s dodgy “sub-prime” mortgages (the term says it all).
Sub-prime mortgages made the American dream come true.
The absence of “no money down” mortgages might be more important than Confucian ethics in explaining China’s high savings rate.
This induces lenders to provide not only NINJA (no income, no job, no assets) mortgages, but also generous loans to real-estate developers to build ever larger mansions and housing estates.
While the basic risks originated outside the systems – a tsunami for Fukushima, over-investment in real-estate mortgages for financial institutions – design defects and bad luck meant that the system couldn’t contain the damage.
Even though 10% of US households with mortgages had already lost their homes, the pace of foreclosures appeared to be increasing – or would have, were it not for legal snafus that raised doubts about America’s vaunted “rule of law.”
But the second line of defense is macroprudential manipulation of capital requirements, to be applied across the board or to selected market segments, such as mortgages.
As I pointed out, with the United States and global economy sliding into a severe recession, bank losses would extend well beyond sub-prime mortgages to include sub-prime, near-prime, and prime mortgages; commercial real estate; credit cards, auto loans, and student loans; industrial and commercial loans; corporate bonds; sovereign bonds and state and local government bonds; and losses on all of the assets that securitized such loans.
Second, job losses will lead to a more protracted and severe housing recession, as joblessness and falling income are key factors in determining delinquencies on mortgages and foreclosure.
By the end of this year about 8.4 million US individuals with mortgages will be unemployed and unable to service their mortgages.
Third, if you plug an unemployment rate of 10% to 11% into any model of loan defaults, you get ugly figures not just for residential mortgages (both prime and subprime), but also for commercial real estate, credit cards, student loans, auto loans, etc.
Its members could not agree even on how to define subprime mortgages and calculate how many such mortgages there were in the United States at the time of the crisis.
Nothing else ultimately explains lenders’ immense willingness, in the boom up to 2006, to lower their credit standards on home mortgages, regulators’ willingness to let them do it, rating agencies’ willingness to rate mortgage securities highly, and investors’ willingness to gobble them up.
Nearly all mortgages have floating rates that vary with the five-year loan rate set by the People’s Bank.
However, late last year, Everbright Bank and some others began offering fixed-rate mortgages.
As Bernanke pointed out, 45% of US farms were behind on mortgage payments in 1933, and in 1934, default rates on home mortgages exceeded 38% in half of US cities.
The measures include tighter limits on home purchases by non-locals in cities with excessive price gains, a reinforced 20% capital-gains tax, mandatory 70% down payments, and a 30% benchmark interest-rate premium for second mortgages.
The authors did address whether global imbalances, derivatives, and subprime mortgages posed a threat to financial stability.
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