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Monetary in sentence

5081 examples of Monetary in a sentence

These include the protection of property rights, effective contract enforcement, eradication of corruption, enhanced transparency and financial information, sound corporate governance, monetary and fiscal stability, debt sustainability, market-determined exchange rates, high-quality financial regulation, and prudential supervision.
As Brazil, Colombia, South Korea, and others have learned, limited controls that target specific markets such as bonds or short-term bank lending do not have a significant impact on key outcomes – the exchange rate, monetary independence, or domestic financial stability.
But, for the most part, fiscal and monetary policies have so far not followed leaders’ rhetorical promises of deep structural reforms and redistribution to favor the indigenous and the poor.
The Fed, Trump claims, is applying overdoses of monetary stimulus to hypnotize voters into believing that economic recovery is underway.
During the financial crisis, the monetary authorities were called on to assume temporary emergency powers, including massive purchases of government and private-sector bonds.
When governments and private donors pledge monetary aid, the funds typically pass through a chain of large groups that determine how it will be allocated.
Tax cuts and interest-rate normalization, I expected, would shift the mix toward looser fiscal and tighter monetary policies, the combination that drove up the dollar in the Reagan-Volcker years.
Knowing full well that monetary policy works with lags of 12-18 months, the central bank has to be forward-looking, setting its policy rate on the basis of where it thinks inflation is headed, not on the basis of a backward-looking assessment of where inflation has been.
That could mean that the Fed must contemplate monetary tightening that significantly exceeds the so-called comfort zone of normalization that financial markets are currently discounting.
But such policy prescriptions are misguided, because they do not fully consider the role of the financial account in the balance of payments, or that of monetary policy in influencing international financial flows.
Given that extraordinarily loose monetary policies are causing unprecedented – but predictable – distortions in German and eurozone financial accounts, it seems ill-advised to suggest that German fiscal policy also be loosened to address the current-account imbalance.
More ominously, monetization of these fiscal deficits is becoming a pattern in many advanced economies, as central banks have started to swell the monetary base via massive purchases of short- and long-term government paper.
So the question is whether these euro-zone members will be willing to undergo painful fiscal consolidation and internal real depreciation through deflation and structural reforms in order to increase productivity growth and prevent an Argentine-style outcome: exit from the monetary union, devaluation, and default.
In part, India’s slowdown paradoxically reflects the substantial fiscal and monetary stimulus that its policymakers, like those in all major emerging markets, injected into its economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
So monetary policy has since remained tight, with high interest rates contributing to slowing investment and consumption.
Turkey’s Hot-Money ProblemNEW YORK – The ongoing financial volatility in emerging economies is fueling debate about whether the so-called “Fragile Five” – Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey – should be viewed as victims of advanced countries’ monetary policies or victims of their own excessive integration into global financial markets.
To answer that question requires examining their different policy responses to monetary expansion – and the different levels of risk that these responses have created.
In lieu of capital-flow restrictions, Turkey’s monetary authorities began to cut overnight borrowing rates in November 2010, in order to reduce the profitability of the carry trade (purchases of foreign-currency assets to take advantage of a higher interest rate).
Paradoxically, while Turkey’s monetary authorities acknowledged this relationship, they continued to attribute the decline in credit growth to the success of their prudential measures.
Since the invention of money thousands of years ago, there has never been a monetary system with hundreds of different currencies operating alongside one another.
Fiat currencies are also protected from value debasement by central banks committed to price stability; and if a fiat currency loses credibility, as in some weak monetary systems with high inflation, it will be swapped out for more stable foreign fiat currencies or real assets.
In fact, the monetary union has become a political and economic nightmare, plagued by recession, record-high unemployment, social unrest, and rising distrust among member states.
To escape the crisis, EU leaders must recognize the shortcomings of the eurozone’s one-dimensional framework, and develop a system better suited to managing a multi-faceted monetary union.
Similarly, although the one-size-fits-all monetary policy contributed to Greece’s excessive indebtedness, and to Spain’s real-estate bubble, eurozone leaders have consistently sought to re-align interest rates, for example, by compelling holders of Greek debt to accept “haircuts” (write-downs on principal).
But the impact is severely limited without external devaluation, which is impossible within a monetary union.
This new monetary union would be managed according to the original Maastricht Treaty, with a truly independent central bank responsible for regulating the northern euro’s exchange rate against the euro, which less competitive countries would retain.
This focus supported the ascendancy of “inflation-targeting” as the favored monetary policy framework and, in turn, led to operational independence for central banks.
Moreover, after the financial crisis erupted, central banks were increasingly compelled to depart from inflation targeting, and to implement myriad unconventional monetary policies in order to ameliorate the consequences of the crash and facilitate economic recovery.
In fact, politicization is a matter of scale, not a substantive transformation of monetary policymaking.
The first argument in favor of central-bank independence is that, without it, politicians can exploit expansionary monetary policy’s positive short-run effects at election time, without regard for its long-run inflationary consequences.
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