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Industrial in sentence

2197 examples of Industrial in a sentence

At the same time, the government has expanded other forms of social protections for workers, all while pursuing industrial policies geared toward boosting innovation and productivity growth, thus moving the country up the global value chain.
In China, for example, water scarcity has been officially estimated to cost roughly $28 billion in annual industrial output, even though China, unlike several other Asian economies, including India, South Korea, and Singapore, is not listed by the United Nations as a country facing water stress.
This implies that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious plan to transform his country’s oil-based economy into a modern industrial economy will require a long and uncertain process.
Where Stalin had his barbarous yet monumental drive to industrial modernization, Putin boasted of making Russia a great energy power.
It will remove trade barriers and boost investment in infrastructure so that African countries have the industrial capacity to compete globally.
Most industrial economies have grown little since the financial crisis.
Most of this debt is held by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which account for just one-third of industrial output, yet receive more than half of the credit dispensed by China’s banks.
Though the debt-equity ratio of the industrial sector as a whole has declined over the past 15 years, the SOEs’ has increased since the global financial crisis, to an average of 66%, 15 percentage points higher than that of other kinds of firms.
Moreover, whereas Germany in 1914 was pressing hard on Britain’s heels (and had surpassed it in terms of industrial strength), the US remains decades ahead of China in overall military, economic, and soft-power resources.
Ever since the emergence of industrial capitalism, we have been terrible at differentiating between property and capital, and thus between wealth, rent, and profits.
The first two industrial revolutions were built on machines produced by great inventors in glorified barns and bought by cunning entrepreneurs who demanded property rights over the income stream “their” machines generated.
Economic concerns are intensifying in China, too, as growth slows, trade disputes with the US escalate, and global complaints about cyber espionage, forced technology transfer, and its ambitious “Made in China 2025” industrial policy lead to bans on some Chinese tech companies’ products.
To be sure, for 65 years, rapid trade growth has played a vital role in economic development, with average advanced-economy industrial tariffs plummeting from more than 30% to below 5%.
With industrial tariffs already dramatically reduced most potential benefits of trade liberalization have already been grasped.
Meanwhile, for some low-income countries, increased manufacturing and service-sector automation of the sort described by Brynjolfsson and McAfee, whether within advanced economies or within China’s established industrial clusters, will make the path to middle- and high-income status more difficult to achieve.
Will you advocate a development round that emphasizes liberalization of labor markets more than capital markets, elimination of non-tariff barriers that keep developing countries’ goods out of advanced industrial countries, and abolition of so-called “escalating tariffs,” which impede development?
Will you be open to research even when that research shows that policies of the advanced industrial countries may, at least in some circumstances, not be in the interests of developing countries?
We encouraged research-based policies, even when that research was critical of policies being pushed by certain advanced industrial countries and by some in the Bank.
But if the advanced industrial countries that control the Bank refuse to stand by their principles, at least they should give a nod to greater transparency.
The G-8 has been dismissed by history as a club of Western industrial nations; its place has been taken by the G-20, which conceals the underlying formula of power distribution within the new world order: the G-2 (China and the US).
Next in line for ideological modernization is the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB): in a forthcoming report, the bank calls for industrial policies in Latin America.
To be sure, the IADB – never as stodgy as the Bretton Woods twins, but still a traditional international financial bureaucracy – does not speak of industrial policies; it uses the politically correct phrase “productive development policies” (PDPs).
Skeptics also point out that Latin America already went through a round of industrial policy in the 1960’s and 1970’s, with results that were mediocre at best.
But in doing so, claims the IADB, Latin American governments may have gone too far: “There is now a growing consensus among policymakers and analysts alike that by putting all industrial policy out of bounds, the region may have thrown out the baby with the bathwater.
Unlike 1960’s-vintage industrial policy, modern PDPs aim to correct market failures, not do away with market incentives.
If China is to succeed in its economic restructuring, industrial upgrading, and expansion of high-productivity services, the role of SOEs needs to be once again limited to a few relevant sectors.
Others note wide disparities in productivity between leaders and laggards among industrial manufacturers.
In 1977, the US created the Department of Energy (DOE); a year later, it enacted the National Energy Act, which employed tools like industrial regulation and tax incentives to promote fuel efficiency and renewable energy.
Moreover, such projects would promote cooperation between the states in the EU’s southern neighborhood, potentially boosting investments in education, infrastructure, and industrial development.
The latest survey data indicate a major slowdown in industrial activity.
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