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Incentives in sentence

1725 examples of Incentives in a sentence

A financial crisis is caused by a country’s excessive indebtedness, which generally reflects a combination of mismanagement by the debtor country, over-optimism, corruption, and the poor judgment and weak incentives of creditor banks.
But even if the commitment strategy produced beneficial incentives, it might not have been worth the risk.
Third, we need to provide incentives to take the long view.
We will then require a long-term framework of incentives to develop the technologies of the future.
Originally formulated after an experience with poor trains in West Africa, Hirschman realized that if a complex social system allowed people to leave (exit), its efficiency might deteriorate; a better solution would be to retain people (loyalty), which would give them incentives to articulate demands (voice) that would improve the system’s performance.
There can also be negative incentives to loyalty that induce everyone to keep up appropriate standards of behavior.
The Group’s report showed that a modest price on emissions, in the range of $20-25 per ton of carbon dioxide, would push incentives in the right direction, raise substantial public revenue, and foster private investment crucial to the new industrial revolution needed to make the low-carbon economy a reality.
With a price of around $25 per ton of carbon dioxide, and providing incentives for private sector flows, increased flows from carbon markets could be $30-$50 billion.
The government implemented a step-by-step transformation of the country into a service economy, putting in place the infrastructure and incentives necessary to build up financial services, tourism, medical services, real estate, media, arts, and culture.
By offering generous economic incentives to its Southeast Asian neighbors, it has weakened their will to confront China in a coalition.
The problems we see in the financial markets have very much to do with lack of good information, misaligned incentives, and, in fact, rational responses to the environment.
Again, informational asymmetries and misaligned incentives are at the heart of what happened.
If, on the other hand, we believe that economic actors will respond rationally to incentives and information, then we can usefully reform regulatory frameworks with well-targeted measures, including restrictions on off-balance sheet vehicles, tougher disclosure requirements, and controls on rating agencies’ conflicts of interests.
But how can the benefits of a global patent system that provides incentives for innovation and new discoveries be combined with an assurance that poor people gain access to the medical care that they desperately need?
Any viable solution requires that the following conditions be satisfied:- drug companies – whether patent holders or generic drug producers – must provide drugs to poor countries at prices near to production costs;- drug prices in rich countries must remain higher through patent protection to preserve incentives for innovation;- rich and poor markets must be separated, so that cheap drugs from poor countries are not smuggled into rich countries (or are not allowed in legally through parallel-market imports);- governments in rich countries must provide substantial assistance to poor countries, so that the poor – who are too poor to afford these drugs even at reduced prices – can make use of them.
But without them, the stream of new antiretroviral products used to fight AIDS would not have flowed, because the incentives for developing new drugs would be lacking.
By rewarding executives for risky behavior, and by insulating them from some of the adverse consequences of that behavior, pay arrangements for financial-sector bosses produced perverse incentives, encouraging them to gamble.
Such pay structures gave executives excessive incentives to seek short-term gains – say, by making lending and investment decisions that would improve short-term earnings – even when doing so would increase the risks of an implosion later on.
By contrast, prohibiting executives from cashing out shares and options until they leave the firm would provide executives who have accumulated shares and options with a large monetary value with counter-productive incentives to depart.
In addition to the excessive focus on short-term results, a second important source of incentives to take excessive risks has thus far received little attention.
These structures provided executives with incentives to give insufficient weight to the possibility of large losses, which in turn motivated executives to take excessive risks.
Such structures would provide incentives to take risks that are closer to the optimal level.
Moreover, it will require that market participants put in place appropriate incentives and mandates to consider sustainability and climate action in decision-making.
The financial sector, in particular, lacks the right incentives to contribute to addressing the climate challenge, because financial institutions’ decision-making is guided primarily – even exclusively – by monetary profit-seeking.
Financial institutions need new incentives to reshape their operations, including their investments.
We are about to get a comprehensive package of re-regulation focused on capital requirements and leverage, transparency, ratings and other sources of information, incentives, conflicts of interest and limits on the scope of financial firms, consumer protection, and resolution mechanisms.
The developing world, alas, contributes only a tiny fraction of worldwide scientific advance, and the major drug companies generally lack the market incentives to invest in diseases afflicting the poor people of the developing world.
Rather, the challenge is how best to shift incentives at the margin in order to improve the distributional effects.
That said, private incentives and social objectives are not perfectly aligned.
Public-sector co-investment properly targeted, however, could shift these incentives by lowering the cost of private technology investment.
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