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Holdouts in sentence

57 examples of Holdouts in a sentence

A huge, open expanse of waist-high grass cluttered only by a handful of crippled, abandoned structures and a few brave holdouts with well-kept homes.
That is why investment treaties that leave an opening for holdouts are counterproductive.
But if most advanced countries were to recognize this new form of global money, they could put pressure on holdouts by limiting their holdings of non-participant currencies and treasury bills in their reserves.
Most important, the graph allows us to evaluate the targets that China and the US – the two most prominent holdouts from the Kyoto protocol – have proposed.
All, that is, except for a few holdouts who bought up the remaining bonds on the cheap and went to court, specifically to the US District Court of the Southern District of New York, asking to be paid in full.
This quixotic strategy met with unexpected success when Federal Judge Thomas Griesa ruled in the holdouts’ favor.
The only holdouts among the world’s leading economies are the eurozone and China.
To be sure, there are still holdouts, like Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who replaced a carbon tax with a plan to tax the country’s citizens in order to pay polluters to cut emissions.
This would compel the remaining holdouts – China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan – to reconsider the CTBT as well.
Until recently, many believed that China and India would be the real holdouts in the global climate-change negotiations.
Moreover, there would be few holdouts that refuse to participate in the exchange.
The Great Communist experiment is virtually over (save for a few holdouts, such as Cuba and North Korea).
Now even the last holdouts among the regime’s opponents will be appearing on the roads of Europe.
While Microsoft could have kept the traditional “.doc” as its default format for MS Word, this would not have served its purpose: eventually, after enough of the world pays for Office 2007, holdouts will be dragged along, kicking and screaming.
Though it is hard to cry for Argentina, the ruling in favor of the holdouts is bad news for the global financial system and sets back the evolution of the international regime for restructuring sovereign debt.
The more likely outcome is that it will manage to come to some accommodation that the holdouts find more attractive than the deal accepted by the other creditors.
That is why, over the last decade, governments have augmented the market-based approach with a contractual approach that resolves the holdout problem by introducing collective-action clauses (CACs) that can also cram down on holdouts the terms accepted by a majority of creditors.
Though 93% of Argentina’s creditors accepted new terms for their bonds in 2005 and 2010 in two exchange offers, a small group of holdouts sued Argentina in the United States, and, with the US Supreme Court recently ruling on the issue, have now won the right to be paid in full.
First, the court ruled for the first time that a country cannot continue to pay those creditors who accepted a big reduction (or “haircut”) on their claims until the holdouts are paid in full.
Second, if the holdouts are paid in full, the majority of creditors who accepted a haircut can request to be paid in full, too.
Holdouts must not be permitted to block orderly restructurings that benefit debtors and creditors.
Most recently, Argentina’s 15-year legal battle with its creditors – in which holdouts did measurably better than creditors who had years earlier accepted a debt exchange – destabilized the international financial architecture and generated a new set of rules.
That is why bankruptcy courts and bonds with collective-action clauses (CACs) seek to impose on all bondholders, including potential holdouts, agreements accepted by a qualified majority of creditors.
First, the defaulted sovereign bonds did not have CACs, so there was no way to force holdouts to accept the initial deal.
As a result, Argentina was barred from making a current interest payment to holders of its restructured debt unless it simultaneously paid the holdouts the full amount of principal and interest contractually owed to them.
Restructuring in the post-Argentina world is made more challenging because the holdouts’ success in that case means that bondholders inclined to negotiate a solution will have to explain to their own investors why they are not pursuing the potentially more lucrative holdout strategy.
Both PDVSA and the government can also use “exit consents”: changing some of the bonds’ terms – the pari passu clause used by Argentina holdouts, as well as other significant provisions – through agreement with a simple majority of PDVSA bondholders and two-thirds of holders of most government bonds.
In this context, the IMF and major governments should support Venezuela’s decision to treat would-be holdouts no better than creditors with which it reaches agreement.
When a significant number of holdouts insist on being paid in full, it becomes impossible to design an effective restructuring, unless other creditors reduce or defer their claims.
No strategy to undermine holdouts can also mean no restructuring at all, which could mean chaos or even a failed state.
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