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Elites in sentence

1011 examples of Elites in a sentence

Chinese bloggers, American Tea Party activists, British Europhobes, Egyptian Islamists, Dutch populists, Greek ultra-rightists, and Thai “red shirts” all have one thing in common: hatred of the status quo and contempt for their countries’ elites.
Italian elites are not the only ones in need of being shaken up.
His rants against the elites were often confused, but he was funny, which made the old elite politicians look like stuffy old bores – which many of them were.
They attack the old elites not to shake things up, but to take their power.
Like a beneficent king, he would give them money, and promised to challenge the old elites in Bangkok – the bankers, generals, judges, and even the courtiers surrounding the Thai king.
As it happens, Thaksin was overthrown in 2006 by a military coup that was largely backed by the Bangkok elites.
She has railed against immigration, Islam, globalization, multiculturalism, NATO, the elites, the “system,” the markets, the media, and, above all, the European Union – the monster supposedly responsible for all of France’s ills.
It also extends to private-sector elites, particularly banks and multinational companies.
With the exception of countries like the Philippines, where voters opted in last month’s presidential election for a blatantly anti-establishment candidate in Rodrigo Duterte, the tendency in the emerging world has been for adaptations within the confines of existing political elites.
Now it is up to these elites to respond effectively to the causes of popular anger, or risk facing the eventual emergence of anti-establishment movements, like their American and European counterparts.
Lebanon’s experience reveals the discord between the psychology of crowds and the goals of the political elites who rally behind them – a conflict that can also be seen in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, Tunisia’s Sidi Bouzid, and Tripoli, Libya, where crowds have stormed the parliament building several times in the last few months.
This discord is threatening to derail these countries’ burgeoning democratic processes, owing to growing competition between what Le Bon called the “sovereignty of the crowds” and the sovereignty of political elites.
For the Arab world’s new political elites, the lesson is clear: crowd dynamics cannot be ignored.
It is the kind of vocabulary that emerges from nativist movements that are hostile to ethnic or religious minorities, or to financial or intellectual elites who supposedly conspire to undermine the true sons and daughters of the nation.
One thing that unites many of Trump’s followers, as well as right-wing populists in other countries, including Israel, is a shared grievance against Muslims and the liberal urban elites who are often accused of coddling them.
Social elites, liberal intellectuals, and critical journalists are the enemy of those who crave power but feel looked down upon by people who appear to be more sophisticated.
Thus, resolving these questions is vital for Russia’s political elites who are anxious to preserve the current perks and gain more.
Last year’s Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the United States were the twin symbols of populist revolt against global elites.
In a country without resource wealth, by contrast, elites have little alternative but to nurture a decentralized economy in which individuals have incentives to work and save.
Finally, some promising ideas have virtually never been tried at all: denominating bonds in oil prices instead of dollars, to protect against the risk of a price decline; choosing commodity-price targeting as an alternative to inflation targeting or exchange-rate targeting for anchoring monetary policy; and distributing oil revenues on a nationwide per capita basis, to ensure that they do not wind up in elites’ Swiss bank accounts.
The political clout of traditional land-owning elites declined, and powerful new working-class-based parties began to emerge.
Public dissatisfaction with traditional elites and parties is on the rise.
In fact, such selective sanctions could be more effective in influencing Russian policy than the more generalized economic restrictions, as they provide an explicit and tangible warning to Russian elites that their impunity ends at the country’s borders.
These parties and movements share a sense that native-born citizens have been let down by liberal political elites, who seem unable or unwilling to stem the tide of immigration, crime, and Islamist militancy, as well as the erosion of national sovereignty by EU bureaucracy and global capitalism.
But anxieties about being swamped by foreigners and dominated by outside powers are more acute in smaller countries, whose political elites seem particularly impotent.
As the first revolution in the post-industrial world, the Russian revolution of the 1990s was characterized by limited violence and broad compromises with the old elites.
It has had to deal with a widespread and understandable loss of confidence in elites – academics, policy analysts, Wall Street, business leaders, regulators, and politicians – which makes implementing pragmatic, centrist policies more difficult.
Elites, after all, failed to see the crisis coming and to take steps to prevent it, and some of them appear to be the only ones who are recovering: profits are up, but employment is not.
The economic and political implications of this long-term trend have been widely discussed but left largely unattended, betraying the general lack of concern for distributional issues that shadows elites’ excessive faith in markets to provide beneficial outcomes.
The administration, political and policy elites, and private-sector leaders need to state clearly that the main goal of domestic economic policy and strategy is to reestablish a pattern of inclusive growth and employment.
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