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Defaults in sentence

234 examples of Defaults in a sentence

Moreover, mortgages, mutual insurance, leasing, and microfinance are underdeveloped in Islamic finance; insolvency and bankruptcy procedures must be improved; and mechanisms to deal with “Islamic bond” defaults must be established.
Or, if you want to avoid making a lot of decisions, you could select from a set of defaults.
The conditions in Greece are now hopeless, and are likely to lead to further defaults and a withdrawal from the eurozone.
Philosophically, the debt-forgiveness approach rests on the belief that creditors share culpability for defaults with debtors, since they made the bad loans in the first place.
A Year of Sovereign Defaults?
Whereas one- and two-decade lulls in defaults are not uncommon, each quiet spell has invariably been followed by a new wave of defaults.
As my recent work with Vincent Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch reveals, peaks and troughs in the international capital-flow cycle are especially dangerous, with defaults proliferating at the end of a capital-inflow bonanza.
In the 1870s, another round of defaults engulfed 11 states.
If markets self-correct, they do so only when defaults are registered and punished.
As a result, a protracted series of confusing legal battles and selective defaults looms.
Disorganized defaults by public corporations will make it hard for any part of the private credit system to function.
Moreover, a higher inflation target remains unthinkable, and the German government argues that defaults on sovereign debt are illegal within the eurozone.
The fall in oil prices – together with market illiquidity, the rise in the leverage of US energy firms and that of energy firms and fragile sovereigns in oil-exporting economies – is stoking fears of serious credit events (defaults) and systemic crisis in credit markets.
Defaults stemming from an unwillingness to pay do not deserve international support.
As the recession deepens, however, bank balance sheets will be hammered further by a wave of defaults in commercial real estate, credit cards, private equity, and hedge funds.
At the same time, real-estate developers who have borrowed heavily from shadow-banking institutions, based on the assumption that property prices would continue to rise steadily, may struggle to repay their debts, with a sharp decline in prices inevitably leading to defaults.
The defaults proved to be costly.
Similarly, spectacular deflation in many countries around the world in the early 1930’s magnified the real value of (unhedged and unindexed) debts, leading to millions of defaults and widespread bank failures.
That makes private lenders susceptible to larger haircuts if the country eventually defaults – and thus more hesitant to lend in the first place.
Weak oil prices also damage US energy producers, which comprise a large share of the US stock market, and impose credit losses and potential defaults on net energy exporting economies, their sovereigns, state-owned enterprises, and energy firms.
The number of defaults is largely irrelevant when it comes to a country like the UK, which is politically stable, carries significant economic weight, and has an independent central bank.
In the table on page 99 of their book This Time is Different, Rogoff and his co-author, Carmen Reinhart, show that Germany experienced eight debt defaults and/or restructurings from 1800 to 2008.
There were also the two defaults through inflation in 1920 and 1923.
The defaults of that time were not confined to one country, but swept across the globe in a contagious panic that destroyed financial systems in lending as well as borrowing countries.
Latin America had a big debt crisis that broke out in 1982, but in fact there were almost no defaults (with the exception of Peru and, for a few months in late 1987, Brazil).
In my recent work with Vincent Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch, I show that over the past two centuries, this “double bust” (in commodities and capital flows) has led to a spike in sovereign defaults, usually with a lag of 1-3 years.
Yet, since the peak in commodity prices and global capital flows around 2011, the incidence of sovereign defaults worldwide has risen only modestly.
This is the case of the missing defaults.
A caveat, as our study highlights, is that there is a potential mismeasurement of the “true” incidence of default, which we cannot begin to quantify at this time – namely, defaults or accumulated arrears on Chinese loans.
Measurement issues aside, there are two types of explanation for the missing defaults.
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