Bondholders
in sentence
210 examples of Bondholders in a sentence
Likewise, while the European Central Bank’s collateral policy imposes different “haircuts” on
bondholders
depending on a country’s credit rating, it discriminates little between countries.
Both act as a wealth levy: inflation means that
bondholders
suffer a real loss in proportion to their wealth and the size of the devaluation.
If efforts to produce a parallel bail-in arrangement, which allows
bondholders
to share the pain, are also successful, we might be within sight of a sensible and not-too-costly reform with which the market can make peace – and which regulators would have a realistic chance of managing.
In essence, this is a back-door debt restructuring: Europe’s bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) would lend the money for Greece to buy back its own debt in the secondary market at deep discounts, thereby imposing a loss on private
bondholders
without the need to declare a default.
To speed things up, after the default was declared in December 2008, Ecuador completed the buyback with an inverse auction for the remaining bondholders, to be settled in cash – rather than a regular exchange in which the legality of undercover purchases was likely to be questioned.
With the larger part of the outstanding stock in friendly hands, and institutional
bondholders
pressed to liquidate their positions in the midst of the post-Lehman Brothers selloff, the operation was a success.
The premise that only a credible default ensures significant private-sector involvement (that is, that private
bondholders
take a real hit) is apparent when we compare the market-friendly Uruguayan debt exchange in 2003 with the draconian Argentine restructuring of 2005.
So the question arises: how are private
bondholders
to be convinced to get rid of their Greek bonds at a loss if there is a credible buyer of last resort?
Would the EFSF be retiring Greek debt at bargain prices or would it be providing insurance to current
bondholders?
Finally, last February, Griesa agreed to drop the injunctions, if Argentina repealed laws barring payment of its defaulted debt and paid off
bondholders
who settled by the end of that month.
Bank officers may have walked away with hundreds of millions of dollars, but everyone else in our society – shareholders, bondholders, taxpayers, homeowners, workers – suffered.
Such episodes are bad for everybody – workers who lose their jobs, entrepreneurs and equity holders who lose their profits, governments that lose their tax revenue, and
bondholders
who suffer the consequences of bankruptcy – and we have had nearly two centuries to figure out how to deal with them.
There are no heroes in this story, certainly not Argentina’s policymakers, who a decade ago attempted unilaterally to force a massive generalized write-down on foreign
bondholders.
For starters, taking the IMF’s preferred-creditor status at face value, an IMF loan would entail substituting its “non-defaultable” debt for “defaultable” debt with private bondholders, because the Fund’s money is used primarily to service outstanding bonds.
As a result, a group of lucky
bondholders
would be bailed out at the expense of those that became junior to IMF debt and remained highly exposed to a likely restructuring.
Its nominal interest rates will rise as
bondholders
fear inflation.
At the end of the nineteenth century the huge amount of investment and technological progress in America's railroads appeared to benefit everyone but the stockholders and
bondholders
of railroad companies, as bust followed boom and ramming worthless securities down the throats of investors became Wall Street's favorite sport.
All that is needed, he suggests, are "collective action" clauses that allow the majority (or a supermajority) of a group of
bondholders
to impose their will on a minority, so as to prevent scavengers who, in the past, bought up small stakes in a bond issue and used their position to extract large concessions for themselves.
At the annual Fed conference at Jackson Hole, Wyoming in August, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke explained that he was considering a new round of quantitative easing (dubbed QE2), in which the Fed would buy a substantial volume of long-term Treasury bonds, thereby inducing
bondholders
to shift their wealth into equities.
Before any tears are shed for the bondholders, it is important to consider the fundamental differences between private and public debt.
Forcing
bondholders
to accept a “haircut” on what they will be paid also promises to discourage reckless lending to eurozone sovereigns in the future.
Because of the difficulty of putting banks through a bankruptcy-like procedure, there is an incentive, like that which arises in the context of sovereign debt, to postpone the painful process of imposing losses on
bondholders
and instead provide a bailout and hope for the best.
This bails in the
bondholders
and helps to recapitalize the financial institution in question.
Extending this idea to sovereign debt, government bond covenants could stipulate that if a sovereign’s debt/GDP ratio exceeds a specified threshold, principal and interest payments to
bondholders
would be automatically reduced.
Adjustment, we are told, is morally commendable, whereas the alternatives all amount to repudiating the contracts that governments entered into with
bondholders.
And restructuring is a levy on bondholders’ wealth, including that of middle-class pension savers.
Finally, both inflation and restructuring put some of the burden on non-resident
bondholders
(through exchange-rate depreciation and the direct reduction of the value of assets, respectively).
Domestic and foreign bondholders, especially banks, have experienced capital losses, which have damaged balance sheets, capital adequacy, and confidence.
Proponents of the financial repression explanation essentially view low interest rates as a hidden tax on bondholders, who receive a lower interest rate than they would otherwise.
It is now very clear that the taxpayer will always be there to guarantee that
bondholders
get paid.
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