Example collocations logo

Bondholders in sentence

210 examples of Bondholders in a sentence

Loans from the China Development Bank carry higher interest rates than the West’s traditional lending mechanisms, but they also come with fewer restrictions on policy, and allowed Venezuela to escape the worst of the bondholders’ wrath – at least so far.
As a result, they cannot provide a guarantee to bondholders that the cash will be available to pay them at maturity.
That is the only way to impose real discipline on shareholders, bondholders, and corporate leaders.
If risk premia increase, it would be a result of creditors’ doubts about a government’s ability to finance itself in the long run, owing to a downward revision of growth expectations or a domestic political stalemate in which taxpayers oppose bondholders.
Domestic bondholders might be the first to recognize potential risks, spurring escalating capital flight.
The proposed crisis mechanism would effectively insure government bond purchasers against the risk of insolvency, but it would entail deductibles that compel bondholders to assume some of the investment risk.
The bankers’ pursuit of self-interest (greed) did not lead to the well-being of society; it did not even serve their shareholders and bondholders well.
But, as Greeks’ suffering intensified, policymakers pressed private-sector banks and other bondholders to write off most of their claims.
While the government and PDVSA owe about $60 billion to foreign bondholders, these entities reportedly owe a comparable (if not larger amount) to Russia and China.
Moreover, this pattern has emerged whether the creditors are bondholders (as in the case of Puerto Rico’s debt and about half of Venezuela’s), commercial banks, or official creditors (as in Greece).
The core issue is burden-sharing across bondholders, citizens of the deficit countries, the EU, and, indeed, the rest of the world (via the International Monetary Fund).
By 2015, that share had risen to about 80%, meaning that most capital held by public corporations today is owned and traded by bondholders.
The more creditors insist on lower living standards and higher taxes, the more the tax base will simply leave the island – causing bondholders’ losses to rise.
And, whether it comes in the form of a capital strike by foreign bondholders, or of domestic labor strikes and wider social and political unrest, France’s leaders remain entirely unprepared for the inevitable.
Increased resolution authority will help, but only a little: in the last crisis, US government “blinked,” failed to use the powers that it had, and needlessly bailed out shareholders and bondholders – all because it feared that doing otherwise would lead to economic trauma.
Among other things, this unprecedented skewing of priorities led to a collapse in oil production, because the national oil company PDVSA failed to maintain its productive infrastructure and defaulted on payments to key contractors in order to pay its bondholders – thereby killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.
That is why bankruptcy courts and bonds with collective-action clauses (CACs) seek to impose on all bondholders, including potential holdouts, agreements accepted by a qualified majority of creditors.
Restructuring in the post-Argentina world is made more challenging because the holdouts’ success in that case means that bondholders inclined to negotiate a solution will have to explain to their own investors why they are not pursuing the potentially more lucrative holdout strategy.
Both PDVSA and the government can also use “exit consents”: changing some of the bonds’ terms – the pari passu clause used by Argentina holdouts, as well as other significant provisions – through agreement with a simple majority of PDVSA bondholders and two-thirds of holders of most government bonds.
Even Germany at that time had to pay bondholders more than 6%.
The latter would imply senior status for the ECB relative to private bondholders, as in the case of the Greek “haircut” imposed on creditors.
A common framework for regulating the financial system is also required, as is a common banking-resolution framework that serves the interests of taxpayers and government bondholders, rather than those of banks and their creditors.
In effect, the long-term bondholders would guarantee the rest of a bank’s debts, including the riskiest ones.
If the bank faltered, the guaranteeing bondholders would stabilize the most troubled elements of the firm.
The bondholders – not the bank’s core operations – would take the hit.
They also hope that the guarantees would motivate the bondholders to monitor banks’ activities and pressure bank managers to limit their risky operations.
In an ideal world, distressed countries would default as soon as private markets stopped funding them, and they would impose the losses on private bondholders.
Six months later, it went bankrupt, wiping out many bondholders’ assets along the way.
One is that the bondholders of insolvent banks are being protected at the expense of taxpayers for fear of provoking a financial crisis.
In large financial institutions, however, the incentive to gamble at taxpayers’ expense does not apply only to managers; it extends to bondholders, who are de facto protected by the government.
BackNext