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Bondholders in sentence

210 examples of Bondholders in a sentence

Paying the recalcitrant bondholders would mean losing face and possibly triggering a salvo of copycat lawsuits; not paying would mean technical default and all of its attendant costs.
With debt exploding, foreign bondholders could begin to worry that the US will find a way to reduce its real value by stoking inflation or imposing a withholding tax on all government bond interest.
That is a very generous deal for COFINA bondholders.
But if Puerto Rico’s other bondholders are hoping to receive similar treatment, they should think again.
Thanks to the oversight board, COFINA bondholders will now be getting far more than what they could have expected last December, when Puerto Rican bonds bottomed out.
Prices of both COFINA and general obligation bonds have steadily recovered, owing to a political game over disaster relief funds that has been playing out among the oversight board, the US Congress, and bondholders – a game that Puerto Rico’s House of Representatives joined a few days ago when it passed a bill to allow for the COFINA deal.
As long as the money needed for investments is going to pay bondholders, sustained growth is impossible.
Dividend payments made by under-capitalized banks amount to a substantial wealth transfer from subordinated bondholders to shareholders, because it is bondholders who will suffer the losses in a crisis.
Moreover, it is potentially a wealth transfer from taxpayers to private shareholders, because under new banking rules government bailouts are possible after bondholders have covered (bailed in) 8% of a bank’s equity and liabilities.
A Second Chance for European ReformMUNICH – The European Central Bank has managed to calm the markets with its promise of unlimited purchases of eurozone government bonds, because it effectively assured bondholders that the taxpayers and pensioners of the eurozone’s still-sound economies would, if necessary, shoulder the repayment burden.
If buying time is not enough, will there finally be a greater call on bondholders to share the pain?
We can debate the exact fiscal pressures in each case, and precisely how various kinds of bondholders were treated, but the simple fact of the matter is that when the going gets tough, the US pays its debts.
If interest-rate spreads on Spanish and Italian government bonds are any guide, bondholders are no longer betting on a eurozone breakup.
Low interest rates have eased the burden of those debts (in effect, negative real interest rates are a tax on bondholders), but rates are on the rise.
But if a country fails the solvency test, it must impose a sufficiently deep haircut on its bondholders to bring it to the “high probability” standard needed to qualify for IMF assistance.
Persuading the bondholders to agree would be challenging – even more so in light of recent court decisions in the United States that strengthen the hand of holdout investors.
Private bondholders, people and entities who lent money to banks, are being allowed to pull out their money en masse and have it replaced by public debt.
It provides a common resolution mechanism for all banks in Europe, which forces losses to be absorbed by shareholders, bondholders, and large depositors before any government money is committed.
Bondholders would be wise to exchange their current bonds for longer-dated instruments that would benefit from the upturn.
Now, however, many former HIPCs are selling bonds in the global market to private investors, which has become significantly riskier in recent months, in the wake of court rulings in the United States that permit bondholders to reject debt workouts and sue for full payment.
In particular, the government’s safety net should never be extended to include the bondholders of such institutions.
Shareholders were often required to suffer losses or were even wiped out, but bondholders were generally saved by the government’s infusion of cash.
For example, bondholders were fully covered in the bailouts of AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Fannie Mae, while these firms’ shareholders had to bear large losses.
Bondholders were saved because governments generally chose to infuse cash in exchange for common or preferred shares – which are subordinate to bondholders’ claims – or to improve balance sheets by buying or guaranteeing the value of assets.
But, while these considerations provide a basis for providing full protection to depositors and other depositor-like creditors when a financial institution is bailed out, they do not justify extending such protection to bondholders.
Unlike depositors, bondholders generally are not free to withdraw their capital on short notice.
Thus, if a financial firm appears to have difficulties, its bondholders cannot stage a run on its assets and how these bondholders fare cannot be expected to trigger runs by bondholders in other companies.
Moreover, when providing their capital to a financial firm, bondholders can generally be expected to obtain contractual terms that reflect the risks they face.
Indeed, the need to compensate bondholders for risks could provide market discipline: when financial firms operate in ways that can be expected to produce increased risks down the road, they should expect to “pay” with, say, higher interest rates or tighter conditions.
But this source of market discipline would cease to work if the government’s protective umbrella were perceived to extend to bondholders.
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