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Bondholders in sentence

210 examples of Bondholders in a sentence

Facing immediate credit rationing and large output contractions, they could be stabilized only by exceptional official financing from abroad, and, in some extreme cases, by defaulting on past commitments (including to bondholders and, most recently, bank depositors).
In recent years, shrewd creditor lawyers have argued that investment treaties give bondholders the same rights as foreign direct investors, and have smuggled sovereign-debt cases into international arbitration proceedings wherever they have found investment treaties with broad, open-ended definitions.
Thousands of Italian bondholders refused Argentina’s debt-restructuring deal, successfully arguing that the Italy-Argentina investment treaty gave them the right to pursue compensation through investor-state arbitration.
The Eurogroup, for example, has declared that all eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013, should include CACs, which render a government’s debt-restructuring proposal legally binding on all bondholders if a majority of bondholders accept the deal.
Yet before the cameras turn away from Ukraine, officials and leaders can ensure that a future administration there is not left facing bondholders one by one in international arbitration proceedings.
Today, this means consistent negative real interest rates – equivalent to an opaque tax on bondholders and on savers more generally.
Griesa’s ruling threatened to hold the Bank of New York Mellon, the Argentine government’s agent, in contempt if it paid other bondholders without also paying the vultures.
But experience has shown that bondholders are not inclined to subordinate their claims to some untested international bankruptcy court.
First, they could clarify the pari passu clause, specifying that it guaranteed comparable treatment for existing bondholders, not for existing bondholders and earlier bondholders whose claims were already extinguished.
Second, issuers could add “aggregation clauses” specifying that an agreement supported by a qualified majority of a country’s bondholders, say, two-thirds, would bind one and all.
By contrast, purchasing a third of a country’s entire debt stock, as required for a blocking position when all bondholders vote together, is an altogether more costly proposition.
In Europe, voters in fiscally responsible countries like Germany and the Netherlands are balking at bailouts of governments, banks, and bondholders.
Interest payments on the debt eventually become so burdensome that bondholders demand higher interest payments (Greek debt recently yielded over 30%).
Even if the wind does not blow as hard as usual or operating and maintenance expenses turn out to be higher than we assumed, there is enough of a cushion that bondholders will be paid out on schedule.
As it is, bank executives expect to share in any gains that might flow to common shareholders, but they are insulated from the consequences that losses, produced by their choices, could impose on preferred shareholders, bondholders, depositors, or the government as a guarantor of deposits.
In addition, such insulation discourages the raising of additional capital, inducing executives to run banks with a capital level that provides an inadequate cushion for bondholders and depositors.
Nevertheless, while such a compensation structure would lead executives to internalize the interests of preferred shareholders and bondholders, thereby improving incentives, it would be insufficient to induce executives to internalize fully the interests of the government as the guarantor of deposits.
In the future, banks should consider basing bonus compensation on broader measures, such as earnings before any payments made to bondholders.
The common shareholders in financial firms do not have an incentive to induce executives to take into account the losses that risks can impose on preferred shareholders, bondholders, depositors, and taxpayers.
It was the equivalent of a “Chapter 11” restructuring of American corporate debt, in which debt is swapped for equity, with bondholders becoming new shareholders.
Unlike foreign bondholders, who could cut and run after the IMF guaranteed that they would be paid, these direct investors suffered major losses when crisis struck--and thus can hardly be said to have benefited from bailouts.
Bondholders can be given a choice between par bonds with a face value equal to their existing bonds but a longer maturity and lower interest rate, and discount bonds with a shorter maturity and higher interest rate but a face value that is a fraction of existing bonds’ face value.
First, bondholders will need to be reassured that their new bonds are secure.
Even if the risk to the financial system was minimal, the impact on banks and bondholders was substantial.
And they offered an extended aid package to Greece without building a convincing case that the rescue can succeed: they arranged for the participation of bondholders in the Greek rescue package, but the arrangement benefited the banks more than Greece.
Initially, to facilitate debt reduction, bondholders would face another haircut.
Rather than leading rich-country savers to invest their money in poor countries out of greed, liberalization of capital flows has led poor-country savers to park their money in rich countries out of fear – fear of political instability, macreconomic disturbances, and deficient institutions (especially those that protect the rights of bondholders and minority shareholders).
The theory of “debt overhang” – the intellectual origin of the proposal – explains why troubled banks are reluctant to issue new equity: the benefits accrue mostly to the bank’s bondholders and dilute existing shareholders.
Moreover, in the case of domestic debt, a higher interest rate or risk premium merely leads to more redistribution within the country (from taxpayers to bondholders).
The government fell, and one of its fleeting successors announced a cessation of payments to foreign bondholders and an end to the currency peg.
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