Assets in sentence

2739 examples of Assets in a sentence

In a recent speech in Chicago, Irish President Michael D. Higgins explained how private debt became sovereign debt: “As a consequence of the need to borrow so as to finance current expenditure and, above all, as a result of the blanket guarantee extended to the main Irish banks’ assets and liabilities, Ireland’s general government debt increased from 25% of GDP in 2007 to 124% in 2013.”

This raises another risk: with major law-enforcement assets deployed in or near Sochi, terrorists might try to strike elsewhere during the Olympics.

All the money circulating in the eurozone originated in these five countries and was then largely used to buy goods and assets in the northern member countries and redeem foreign debt taken from them.

As a result, returns on assets are likely to decline compared to the recent past; with prices already widely believed to be in bubble territory, a downward correction seems likely.

As the prices of these assets fall, their yields will rise.

Solidarity unionists, even if they often opposed many specific policy proposals, stopped firm managers from stealing assets; and the Church provided a force with which all governments to reckon.

The government (the visible hand) sets the benchmark price for risk-free financial assets through monetary policy and control over fiscal deficits, while the market (the invisible hand) sets the risk premia of risky assets above the benchmark rate.

But the system rests on the assumption that the government will set accurate benchmark interest rates for risk-free assets.

In fact, lowering the benchmark rates for risk-free assets changes the distribution of the risk premia on risky assets, making it too low when asset bubbles are forming and too high when they burst.

But setting the correct rate for risk-free assets is difficult when capital flows easily across borders, enabling market participants to exploit discrepancies between countries’ rates.

Preventing this from occurring in emerging economies requires that these countries’ leaders balance monetary, fiscal, and macro-prudential policies in a way that enables correct pricing of risk-free assets.

Anticipating the prospect of such future fire sales (of loans, financial assets, or institutions), it is understandable that even strong banks will restrict their lending to very short maturities, and their investments to extremely liquid securities.

This may also explain why markets for some assets have dried up.

First, the authorities can offer to buy illiquid assets through auctions and house them in a government entity, much as was envisaged in America’s original Troubled Asset Relief Program.

Moreover, once a sufficient number of distressed entities sell their assets, prices will rise simply because there is no longer a potential overhang of future fire sales.

Both effects can lead to increased trade in illiquid assets today, and unlock lending, though this outcome may require significant government outlays.

A second approach is to have the government ensure the stability of significant parts of the financial system that hold illiquid assets by recapitalizing regulated entities that have a realistic possibility of survival, and merging or closing those that do not.

For those entities that are closed down, this would mean moving illiquid assets into a holding entity that would gradually sell them off.

One problem is that the public’s appetite for a bailout of the unregulated and hemorrhaging “shadow” financial system, consisting of institutions like hedge funds and private equity firms, is rightly small, yet it too can serve to hold back bank lending if a large proportion of the distressed assets are held in weak institutions there.

Perhaps, therefore, a mix of the two approaches can work best, with the authorities buying illiquid assets, which can help even unregulated entities, even while cleaning up the regulated financial sector, focusing particularly on entities that are likely to become distressed.

This differs substantially from the current approach (in which well-capitalized entities are given even more capital), which does not deal with the overhang of illiquid assets that more distressed entities hold.

The IMF could use its bond-issuing power to purchase GDP-indexed bonds from national governments, thereby providing the new global reserve assets with backing and interest-generating capacity, while creating an incentive for governments to issue them.

OECD countries like Germany counter that the problem is the lack of investment-worthy assets; there are simply not enough bankable projects available.

This requires, first and foremost, abandoning the view that infrastructure assets fit into the paradigm of traditional asset classes like equity, debt, or real estate.

Moreover, innovative mechanisms to supply new assets to investors would be needed – and that requires the creativity found and priced by markets.

Another important consideration is the considerable technical expertise that infrastructure investments demand, which makes them more complex than most assets.

With nearly 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lacking access to electricity and 65% of South Asians lacking access to basic sanitation, there is no greater imperative than to plan, fund, build, and maintain infrastructure assets.

As SOE profitability, despite their privileged position, continues to decline (it averaged less than 2% in 1995) because of ongoing deterioration in the management of assets and competition from the non-state sector, policymakers and workers in state industries begin to open their minds to the prospect of more change.

With the growth of private savings, the capital restructuring of SOEs (putting private investors in control) without outright sales of state assets (ie, public redistribution of the capital stock) becomes feasible in both economic and political terms.

This would drive up the value of those assets, increasing household wealth and therefore consumer spending.

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