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Agreements in sentence

1458 examples of Agreements in a sentence

Asian and European countries, in particular, should be preparing for the worst by negotiating their own trade agreements with one another to preempt American mercantilism.
If the Doha Round fails, trade liberalization would shift from the WTO to preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which are already spreading like an epidemic.
Such agreements comprise more than expressions of intent; they contain codified, enforceable rules, along with sanctions for non-compliance.
The point of carefully negotiating international agreements is that once they become law, they cannot be changed, except through formally agreed amendment processes.
It was logical that Poland was the spiritus rector of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which led to EU association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
The EU also needs common initiatives to replace piece-meal bilateral agreements on tax evasion and tax havens, which undermine the goal of a fair society.
The US presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump have both made opposition to trade agreements a key plank of their campaigns.
Sanders has forcefully advocated the renegotiation of trade agreements to reflect better the interests of working people.
But such arguments immediately run up against the objection that any standstill or reversal on trade agreements would harm the world’s poorest, by diminishing their prospect of escaping poverty through export-led growth.
That is why trade agreements that tighten the rules are in fact mixed blessings for developing countries.
Similarly, trade agreements could incorporate a “development box” to provide poor countries with the autonomy they need to pursue economic diversification.
Obama confined himself to promoting the pending bilateral agreements with Colombia and other emerging-market countries.
This ignores the far greater losses that a failed Doha Round would entail, for example, by undermining the World Trade Organization’s credibility as the principal guarantor of rules-based trade, and by leaving trade liberalization entirely to discriminatory liberalization under preferential bilateral agreements.
Last year, China signed 14 bilateral agreements with Cambodia, totaling $1.2 billion, to finance every conceivable item, from irrigation canals to uniforms for the Cambodian military.
The trade-liberalization agreements that the EU has in the pipeline with Asia’s vibrant economies (including South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, Japan, and Thailand) are more ambitious in scope than previous bilateral deals.
As large-scale regional free-trade arrangements take shape, the EU continues to signal unequivocal commitment to free trade through sophisticated bilateral agreements.
But Treasury officials believe that they must keep up the pressure, lest Congress follow through on threats to punish supposed currency manipulators, derailing the TPP and other trade agreements.
In it, the government seeks an “Association” that would leave Britain within the EU’s external tariff area for all trade in goods made in Britain and the EU, but free to conclude its own free-trade agreements with everyone else.
With multilateral talks floundering – the WTO’s Doha Round talks stalled again this summer, as India blocked implementation of the “Bali Package,” the modest agreement reached at last year’s ministerial conference – some of the WTO’s largest members, notably the US and EU, are pursuing bilateral and regional trade agreements.
The reason most of the large “plurilateral” negotiations are taking place outside of the WTO is simple: agreements within the WTO need the approval of all members to proceed.
But unanimous approval is likely only when the content of agreements is not controversial – hence the proposal to abandon the rule.
Such a reform would eliminate individual countries’ veto power, allowing agreements to progress within the WTO even if certain members oppose them.
To be clear, the WTO, like its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has always allowed sub-groups of countries to form “members-only” plurilateral agreements, including regional integration initiatives, like the EU, and bilateral deals.
Many of these agreements benefited members and non-members alike.
Countries are also allowed to negotiate regional trade agreements outside of the WTO.
But the WTO’s consensus norm has helped to ensure that such agreements do not undermine the global trading system’s multilateral core.
Though dropping the consensus norm might help deliver agreements and make the WTO more “efficient,” it poses real risks to the organization’s legitimacy.
Some commentators suggest that letting plurilateral agreements become the norm for trade liberalization is not a problem as long as their benefits are extended to all WTO members.
The JCPOA was not simply a precedent for further agreements; it actually demanded them.
Nothing, however, prevents smaller groups of member states from aiming at bolder goals through separate agreements, if their mutual trust and similarities encourage them to do it.
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