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Weapons in sentence

2993 examples of Weapons in a sentence

At the same news conference, Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that preventing the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons would require such clear, comprehensive intelligence that obtaining it is “almost unachievable.”
In the aftermath of America’s poorly executed recent wars and confounded planning with respect to Syria’s chemical weapons, such vetting is the least that Americans and their allies should expect in order to prevent the realization of the sum of all our fears: the first nuclear attack or intentional major radiological event of the twenty-first century.
In the words of a recent Brookings Institution book, Obama had an “activist vision of his role in history,” intending to “refurbish America’s image abroad, especially in the Muslim world; end its involvement in two wars; offer an outstretched hand to Iran; reset relations with Russia as a step toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons; develop significant cooperation with China on both regional and global issues; and make peace in the Middle East.”
In this sense, though Obama did not back away from rhetorical expressions of transformational goals regarding such issues as climate change or nuclear weapons, in practice his pragmatism was reminiscent of more incremental presidential leaders like Dwight Eisenhower or George H. W. Bush.
The European Union, the United States, and other interested countries hope that Syria’s warring parties will stop fighting each other, and turn their weapons instead on ISIS and other extremist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra.
Nevertheless, the stakes are far higher than in the seventeenth century, because Iran represents a threat that combines a fanatic religion with a determination to acquire nuclear weapons.
On the contrary, Israel has said that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
There are fragile states to contend with, as well as the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, authoritarian regimes, and the threat of extremism.
While sanctions may deepen Iran’s predicament, they are unlikely to break the diplomatic impasse on nuclear weapons.
The US invaded in 2003 on false pretenses (Saddam’s alleged but nonexistent weapons of mass destruction), squandered another $800 billion in direct military outlays, destabilized the country, caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, and, contrary to stated US objectives, plunged the region into turmoil.
And the halt in its development of nuclear weapons is due entirely to President Barack Obama’s diplomacy, not Bush’s militarism and threats.
At the start of 2002, a fragile 1994 agreement between the US and North Korea was still restraining the North’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, though the US had dragged its feet on several parts of the agreement.
Its proponents also understood that the war would not be limited to weapons, but would need to be a sustained effort, involving, as they put it, the “whole of government,” with civilian agencies marshaled behind military – or paramilitary – objectives.
It is too late now for non-military tools of coercion to have much effect, although Security Council threats of International Criminal Court prosecution for atrocity crimes – including any use of chemical weapons – must remain on the table .
A troubling proportion of the opposition forces are Islamic extremists, and there is no guarantee that weapons deliveries will stay out of their hands.
More broadly, increases in the supply of weapons funneled to rebel forces by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others have correlated with surges in the civilian death toll, suggesting that they cost more lives than they save – and with no evident strategic gains.
If the rationale for arming the opposition is not so much to win the war as to weaken the government’s resistance to negotiation, it is arguable that the elements of a “hurting stalemate” are already in place, with more weapons likely to produce nothing but more fighting and more casualties.
Trump’s signature Asia policy – his pledge to stop North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons – should be a clear-cut example of American military resolve.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a threat to both the NATO allies and Russia.
But China and Russia should welcome THAAD, because it alleviates the need for South Korea or Japan to pursue other defense options, which could include the development of nuclear weapons.
North Korea is escalating its bellicose rhetoric and behavior as it strengthens its military capabilities, which include weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and cyber and special forces.
The US has repeatedly warned North Korea not to pursue nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, to no avail.
Recent developments have undermined US credibility, from President Barack Obama’s failure to enforce his “red line” warning against the use of chemical weapons in Syria, to the Republican Party’s nomination of Donald Trump as its presidential candidate.
Some members of South Korea’s governing conservative Saenuri Party now openly call for the acquistion of nuclear weapons, believing that this will deter a North Korean attack and prompt China to increase pressure on its client to roll back its weapons programs.
Japan has an enormous stockpile of separated plutonium and the technical wherewithal to be a “virtual nuclear power”: without having any nuclear weapons on hand, it could quickly develop them if necessary.
By developing nuclear weapons, South Korea and Japan would each be risking its relationship with the US and exposing itself to economic and energy sanctions.
Short of that doomsday scenario, nuclear weapons are of limited use in deterring small-scale provocations.
Moreover, if South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons, a regional – or even global – arms race could result; and not every country seeking to develop its own nuclear arsenal would be favorably disposed to the West.
The US, South Korea, and Japan should cooperate on missile defense as the first line of regional deterrence, while also fortifying and dispersing vulnerable targets, deepening trilateral intelligence sharing on North Korean threats, and working with the international community to disrupt the North’s weapons programs.
There have been significant increases in defense budgets and weapons purchases, particularly in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela.
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