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Union in sentence

2117 examples of Union in a sentence

The lack of consensus on basic features of an economic framework – be it a retirement age commensurate with Europe’s demographic outlook or a legislative commitment to budgetary discipline – makes one wonder how eurozone countries could enter a monetary union in the first place.
One thing is certain: it will require a lot more than a warmed-over Lisbon Agenda, with easy targets and toothless enforcement, to restore confidence in the euro and safeguard the monetary union.
But, in view of the negotiations – set to begin in 2018 – on a European fiscal union (implying systematic transfers from the EU’s north to its south), it wouldn’t hurt if Germany and the Netherlands knew what would happen if they did not sign a possible treaty.
As it stands, they will presumably agree to a fiscal union, if only because it will enable them to hide the expected write-off losses in a European transfer union, rather than disclosing those losses now.
These programs are needed to limit contagion and restore stability to the eurozone, pending deeper institutional reforms that address fiscal interdependency in the context of monetary union.
The Maastricht Treaty established a monetary union, but the political union that is an indispensable precondition for the common currency’s success remained a mere promise.
The eurozone now rests on the shaky basis of a confederation of states that are committed both to a monetary union and to retaining their fiscal sovereignty.
Ending the monetary union would end the European project itself, and wreak unmanageable havoc.
The last thing they need is for people to be led to believe that an implicit transfer union is already in place, and that reform and economic restructuring can wait.
But it is hard to see how the single currency can survive much longer without a decisive move towards a far stronger fiscal union.
But the Union's capacity to act as a union is now a pre-condition to securing each European country's national interests.
But they have never been able to emulate it, because their motivations for union have been so varied.
In 1940, Charles de Gaulle proposed, and Winston Churchill accepted, the idea of a Franco-British union in the face of the Nazi challenge, which had already overwhelmed France.
In 1950, five years after the war, Germany’s first postwar chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, also proposed a union – this time between France and Germany – as a way out of his defeated country’s existential crisis.
The fundamental idea behind a fiscal union is that poorer, less creditworthy countries can gain from joint debt liability with richer countries.
So the Russian government proposed what would have amounted to a full fiscal union with Britain and France for war-related finances.
In reality, a fiscal union between such diverse political systems would have been unworkable.
The European Union’s commitment to monetary union enabled the eurozone’s Mediterranean countries to improve their debt dynamics and public finances dramatically.
Their borrowing costs fell as they locked their currencies into a union with countries – Germany, in particular – with a stronger reputation for stability.
But that takes time, as the history of the US – the world’s most successful union born of emergency – amply demonstrates.
If Europeans want to keep the euro, we must forge ahead with political union now; otherwise, like it or not, the euro and European integration will be undone.
What is required, therefore, is an open bilateral French-German dialogue about a comprehensive realignment of the monetary union.
But the textbook economics I was teaching showed how damaging EMU could be in the absence of European fiscal and political union.
But the monetary union itself turned out to be a gigantic banana skin, inducing capital flows that pushed up costs around the European periphery.
It also needs a higher inflation target (to reduce the need for nominal wage and price reductions); debt relief, where appropriate; a proper banking union with an adequate, centralized fiscal backstop; and a “safe” eurozone asset that national banks could hold, thereby breaking the sovereign-bank doom loop.
Unfortunately, economists have not argued strongly for a proper fiscal union.
Five years on, the eurozone still lacks a proper banking union, or even, as Greece demonstrated, a proper lender of last resort.
And no one is talking about real fiscal and political union, even though no one can imagine European Monetary Union surviving under the status quo.
In this sense, the cartel would double as an international workers’ union, lending bargaining power to employees in countries where unions are weak or not permitted at all.
After more than two years of vacillation, policymakers have moved decisively toward economic and political union.
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