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Strategic in sentence

2937 examples of Strategic in a sentence

Last year, the country forged a strategic partnership with ASEAN.
Obama’s efforts in Southeast Asia were all part of his broader strategic “pivot” to Asia, announced in 2011.
Aimed at helping the US to maintain its strategic primacy in the Asia-Pacific region, the policy has been quietly welcomed by most regional actors, as it dovetails with their desire to check China’s hegemonic ambitions in the region.
Trump is likely to focus overwhelmingly on domestic issues, at the expense of America’s strategic interests abroad.
Indeed, he may well back away from strategic engagement with ASEAN and its members, causing their relationships with the US to deteriorate.
The strategic rebalancing toward Asia that Obama worked so hard to advance may be thrown into reverse, dealing a heavy blow to Asia and the US alike.
Although Trump has criticized China extensively for supposedly stealing American jobs – and even blamed it for creating the “hoax” of climate change – he may take a softer stance on Chinese strategic expansionism in the region, especially in the South China Sea, than Obama did.
If nothing else, Trump may resist the idea of China gaining strategic primacy in the region.
Germany would be committing a monumental strategic blunder if it did not engage seriously with his proposals.
In the short term, the strategic vacuum would be filled partly by Russia, which has already seized on America’s gradual withdrawal from the region to strengthen its foothold there.
But contemporary Asia’s economic miracle rests on a less-discussed strategic miracle: the maintenance of peace and order.
Indeed, they are now coming under increasing pressure – putting the strategic miracle that has facilitated Asia’s economic miracle in jeopardy.
But Europe is too weak and too divided to be effective globally, with its leaders unwilling to pursue a common policy based on their countries’ own strategic interests.
By definition, any alliance with a superpower is unequal; so efforts to establish close ties with the United States have long run up against India’s tradition of strategic autonomy.
Moreover, some commented, it was unwise: not only would Trump need to rely on these agencies in future crises; they’re filled with skilled infighters who know how to use strategic leaks.
But also at stake is the strategic leadership of East Asia and, eventually, the international order.
And if the US does agree to any military concessions, China’s strategic position will be strengthened.
The US and Western Europe have an overriding strategic interest in patching this hole in the international financial architecture, and preventing their private investment funds from aggressively seeking compensation from a future Ukrainian administration.
These efforts will culminate at the Warsaw Summit, where NATO should establish a new strategic outlook that accounts for the complex and diffuse security challenges affecting its southern flank.
NATO’s ability to transform its strategic outlook and develop an effective southern strategy will depend on its leaders’ ability to reconcile the interests of these two groups of members.
It means taking responsibility for hard strategic choices even when these are unpopular at home.
A second concern is that PMSCs may affect the strategic balance of a conflict in the pursuit of their own interests.
Top-level intelligence analysis is intended to shape strategic policy.
What is wrong is that those concerns and policies are driven largely by anger over Putin’s own nationalism, rather than by a careful consideration of the diplomatic and strategic milieu.
But a sense of strategic vulnerability breeds interdependency, which has always been the key to successful US leadership in Asia.
After the US election, Trump and his advisers appeared to have concluded that the best way to upend China’s strategic position was to subject all past conventions, including the “One China” policy, to reexamination.
Raising issues that have long been resolved is not conducive to bilateral cooperation, and will only exacerbate the growing strategic mistrust between China and the US.
He doesn’t recognize NATO’s strategic necessity, and he has shown an interest in transatlantic relations only when he has alluded to unpaid bills.
India and China are simply doing what the US and European countries have done for so long: trump rhetoric about democracy and human rights with policies that serve their strategic and energy security interests.
Israel recently became the first country to conclude an Individual Cooperation Program with NATO, through which it conducts an ongoing strategic dialogue with the Alliance covering a wide array of areas, including terrorism, intelligence sharing, nuclear proliferation, procurementand logistics, and rescue operations.
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