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Strategic in sentence

2937 examples of Strategic in a sentence

Ethiopia’s diplomacy will be vital to minimizing the potential for such violence to spread, but Ethiopia can fulfill this role only if it receives strong strategic backing from the West.
The US should be prepared to make clear to the Chinese that any change in political arrangements on the Korean peninsula would not result in a strategic loss to China.
Given the evolution of American strategic thinking after Iraq (and now Afghanistan), and of Israel’s strategic thinking after Lebanon, a preventive strike is highly unlikely.
The third analogy is reflected in Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s recent references to Israel’s nuclear deterrent, which may have been a mistake, but probably indicate the evolution of Israeli strategic thinking.
The Kremlin continues to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, maintaining a strict aversion to military intervention and seeking to defend its strategic interests, including its naval base in the Syrian city of Tartus.
After all, while decades of bilateral dialogue have given the United States and Russia a good sense of each other’s strategic perspectives – including the issues on which they disagree – China’s perception of strategic stability is unfamiliar.
But trilateral dialogues, catalyzed by skillful US diplomacy, could also serve as an opportunity to manage the countries’ strategic relations, which currently are characterized by contradictions and mistrust.
Russia seeks China’s support in opposing American missile-defense systems, and calls for the involvement of all nuclear states in future strategic arms-control talks, but then cites concerns about China’s military modernization to justify its refusal to negotiate with NATO on tactical nuclear-weapon reduction.
China, which has never adopted legally binding limits on its nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles, rejects Russia’s call to join negotiations – a stance that the US supports until the Russian and US nuclear arsenals move closer in size to those of China.
The US should capitalize on this situation, leveraging Russian concerns and interests to induce China to join strategic arms-control efforts.
China has become every other Asian country’s largest trading partner, inexorably gaining strategic leverage as a result.
In other words, the strategic government intervention needed to ensure macroeconomic stability was not only straightforward, but also minimal: the authorities need only manage a steady rate of money-supply growth.
China needs a mature strategic dialogue, particularly with the EU.
If Beijing is serious about building strategic partnerships with the West, it should back up its charm offensive with deeds and take the initiative in fostering more effective cooperation.
Truly effective global governance is the strategic horizon that humanity must pursue today with all its energy.
As a result, its leaders believes that China ought to be able to project military power and defend what it regards as its strategic space – just like the US.
Nor do US strategic considerations threaten the free flow of international trade and shipping.
The Third Plenum initiatives, for example, have a strategic focus: promoting the economy’s long-awaited pro-consumption structural rebalancing.
What has separated China from the pack has been its strong inclination to place greater emphasis on strategic objectives in charting its economic-development path.
But the recent Work Conference failed to consider China’s growth slowdown in this strategic context, placing considerable weight instead on the macro-stabilization imperatives of “proactive fiscal and prudent monetary policies.”
But focusing on a near-term growth target, and fine-tuning fiscal and monetary policies in order to achieve it – to say nothing of yet another credit crunch roiling Chinese short-term funding markets – detract from the emphasis on strategic shifts that economic rebalancing now requires.
Indeed, most of the six major economic tasks for 2014 set by the recent Work Conference – including efforts aimed at ensuring food security, containing local-government debt, and improving coordination of regional development – have little or nothing to do with China’s strategic rebalancing imperatives.
In fact, only two of the six major economic tasks identified by the Work Conference fit neatly with the Third Plenum’s strategic agenda.
Finally, there is a need to separate stabilization objectives from strategic imperatives.
With few notable exceptions, such as US Ambassador to Brazil Tom Shannon, US diplomacy has lacked a strategic vision for Latin America.
Such “inadvertent escalation” can stem from a pattern of imprudent operational behavior, for example, or from persistent strategic miscalculation.
At the same time, governments must contend with significant strategic challenges, which vary according to national conditions.
President Donald Trump has painted himself into a strategic corner: he needs a concession from North Korea on the nuclear-weapons issue in order to save face with his base, not to mention with the global community.
Time to Talk with IranBERLIN – The recent comprehensive assessment by America’s spy agencies about Iran’s nuclear program and ambitions – the so-called “National Intelligence Estimate” – has opened the door to fresh strategic discussions among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany.
Such a strategic reconsideration is probably most necessary for those in the Bush administration (and a few elsewhere), who until recently have been prophets of imminent danger.
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