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Stabilizers in sentence

62 examples of Stabilizers in a sentence

Without automatic stabilizers or a strong financial-stability framework underpinned by deposit insurance, coping with the downside risks of the potentially destabilizing financial reforms that the government is pursuing will be difficult enough; a credit shock could prove disastrous.
China’s lack of automatic stabilizers places the tension between reform objectives and growth imperatives in sharp relief.
While undoubtedly mitigating the impact of the crisis, Europe’s “automatic stabilizers” are now said to be enough to ensure recovery, despite strong evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, the usual automatic stabilizers of unemployment benefits and reduced income tax collections will do nothing to offset this fall in demand, because it is not caused by lower earnings or increased unemployment.
According to the CBO, less than half of the 5.7%-of-GDP increase in the budget deficit was the result of the economic downturn, as the automatic stabilizers added 2.5% of GDP to the rise in the deficit between 2008 and 2010.
The CBO analysis calls the changes in the budget deficit induced by cyclical conditions “automatic stabilizers,” on the theory that the revenue decline and expenditure increase (mainly for unemployment benefits and other transfer payments) caused by an economic downturn contribute to aggregate demand and thus help to stabilize the economy.
In other words, even without the automatic stabilizers – that is, if the economy had been at full employment in 2008-2010 – the US budget deficit still would have increased by 3.2% of GDP.
But, in order to preserve investors’ confidence, some eurozone countries must strike a difficult balance between austerity and overkill, which would have been facilitated had the European Council issued a clear statement that letting automatic stabilizers work, while remaining on track with structural budget targets, fully complies with European Union obligations.
These markets needed the big banks to act as stabilizers and take the other side of bets.
Moreover, there is now massive re-leveraging of the public sector in advanced economies, with huge budget deficits and public-debt accumulation driven by automatic stabilizers, counter-cyclical Keynesian fiscal stimulus, and the immense costs of socializing the financial system’s losses.
Finally, Poland needs sound public finances – that is, fiscal space for automatic stabilizers during economic crises.
More progressive income taxation will also help stabilize the economy, through what economists call “automatic stabilizers.”
First, from a macroeconomic perspective, we can no longer count on declining prices for raw materials, one of the economic stabilizers in times of crisis.
Some economists – such as Jason Furman of Harvard University’s Kennedy School – have argued for another type of fiscal reform, which would increase the magnitude of automatic stabilizers.
But automatic stabilizers have been working well for many years.
From 2000 to 2018, the output gap accounted for 38% of the cyclical component of the deficit, about the same as the 36% share over the five decades from 1969 to 2018, based on data from the CBO’s January 28, 2019, report on the automatic stabilizers.
One reason sometimes given to justify strengthening the automatic stabilizers is that monetary policy can no longer do the job because it is constrained by the zero bound on interest rates.
Without measures to strengthen automatic stabilizers, social insurance programs, and workers’ bargaining power, the increased supply of labor from rising unemployment will suppress many workers’ reservation wage (the minimum pay that a worker can or will accept).
The problem is that, unlike defined-benefit pensions, 401(k)s and Social Security do not act as automatic stabilizers.
So is the idea that strengthening “automatic stabilizers” such as unemployment insurance and transfers can solve all problems of fiscal-policy credibility by enabling adjustment to occur without political action.
The fact is that stabilizers invariably have incentive effects, and political battles over how far any should be expanded are inevitable.
But the deeper problem is that in any given circumstance, policymakers can – and often do – override automatic stabilizers.
Moreover, automatic stabilizers – such as taxation and the extension of unemployment coverage and social benefits – have played a much larger role in the eurozone, where they amount to about 5% of GDP.
Likewise, many observers advocate bolstering “automatic stabilizers” such as unemployment benefits.
Europe, with much higher levels of social insurance and taxation, has correspondingly stronger automatic stabilizers than does the United States or Japan.
But proponents of higher automatic stabilizers pay too little attention to the negative incentive effects that come with higher government spending and the taxes needed to pay for it.
A less skeptical observer than Rogoff would have looked more closely at proposals to strengthen automatic fiscal stabilizers, rather than dismissing them on the grounds that they will have (bad) “incentive effects” and that policymakers will override them on occasion.
To address these problems, the eurozone needs a budgetary tool to serve as an insurance mechanism in severe crises (automatic fiscal stabilizers) and to support the monetary- and fiscal-policy coordination that effective demand management requires, especially when interest rates are near-zero or negative.
To stabilize the eurozone in the long term, Germany and France will have to reach compromises on issues such as shared liability in the EU’s banking union, the introduction of automatic fiscal stabilizers, and adjusting Germany’s export-heavy economic model.
Policymakers and leading economists also must be more sensitive to how the fruits of economic growth are shared; among other things, there should be better protections for the most vulnerable segments of society and stronger automatic stabilizers.
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