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Soviet in sentence

1440 examples of Soviet in a sentence

But Gorbachev, though still a believer in communism, refused to maintain the Soviet empire at the barrel of a gun.
With the Soviet Union’s collapse, a unique opportunity to end the nuclear competition emerged.
While elimination did take place in the former Soviet Republics, the Kremlin hung on to its nuclear arsenal – the last vestige of Russia’s former superpower status.
As then-Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained to General Wesley Clark in 1991: “We learned that we can intervene militarily in the region with impunity, and the Soviets won’t do a thing to stop us… [We’ve] got about five to ten years to take out these old Soviet ‘surrogate’ regimes – Iraq, Syria, and the rest – before the next superpower [China] comes along to challenge us in the region.”
Elements within Russia's political power structure have periodically waged war on the country's business elite--either to rein in the political ambitions of the oligarchs or to grab a bit of wealth for themselves--ever since the Soviet collapse.
During the early stages of the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish town of Kobani, just across the border in Syria, Turkey seemed to be replicating the Soviet Union’s tactic during the 1944 Warsaw uprising, when Nazi German troops fought Polish resistance fighters: Let the belligerents exhaust each other as much as possible before intervening.
Take for example the abuse heaped on Andre Sinyavsky for his rescue (in his book "Strolls of Pushkin") of the Pushkin idol cast in the Soviet canon.
Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from the Afghanistan War (1991) spoke of a distant fight – the nine-year Soviet war in Afghanistan – that eroded Russian culture and humanity, while Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster (1997) meditated on the global significance of the nuclear disaster.
In saying aloud that "there can be no just Europe without an independent Poland on its map," the Pope effectively swept away the unjust postwar settlement that had subjugated Poland to Soviet power.
By its nature communism--whose bureaucracy still exists in almost unadulterated form in the countries of the former Soviet Union--spawned lobbies and clans with a combined might that even the closest-knit family can scarcely expect to overcome.
The latter approach held that efforts to roll back Communism in the short run were too risky, given the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and that the United States and the West should content themselves with limiting the spread of Soviet power and influence.
This pressure at various times took the form of US, British, and French nuclear programs;NATO’s willingness to counter Warsaw Pact deployments of both conventional military and tactical nuclear forces; the decision to defend South Korea against the North’s aggression; the arming of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan to bleed Soviet occupation forces; and the decision to build a costly missile-defense system aimed both at negating the Soviet Union’s principal military investment and bankrupting its government.
In this narrative, the Cold War was not so much won by the US and the West as lost by the Soviets, the inevitable result of Soviet economic weakness and political decay.
The Soviet and other top-heavy regimes increasingly found themselves losing the battle of ideas and, as a result, the support of their own citizens.
It was important to moderate the competition in order to allow pressure for change to build up from within the Soviet bloc.
And it was important to expose the societies under Soviet control to their shortcomings and to the advantages of outside ideas.
It is important here to keep in mind that containment, the dominant doctrine of the Cold War era, sought to push back against Soviet and Communist expansion – not just to limit the reach of Soviet power, but to frustrate it – in order to create a context in which the inherent flaws of communism and authoritarian rule would come to the fore.
In 1990, at the White House, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev unexpectedly suggested that NATO membership for a reunified Germany would stabilize the continent.
Russian leaders also have a long history of agitation and propaganda, or “agitprop” as their Soviet predecessors called the overt and covert campaigns to shape public opinion in foreign countries.
For, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, most Europeans viewed the United States as both its defender against the Soviet Union’s expansionist aims and the key external actor for their deeply wounded continent’s moral and economic reconstruction.
In those years when we, as so-called dissidents, resisted totalitarian rule, we all probably agreed that one objective was dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, that instrument of Soviet imperial power.
Indeed, in Soviet films, Baltic actors were usually cast in the roles of Nazi generals and American spies.
Even after the Soviet Union’s repudiation of czarist Russia’s debts – perhaps the twentieth century’s most notorious (and most misunderstood) debt default – certain creditors expressed interest in lending to the new regime, in part because Soviet agencies repaid debt that they considered legitimate.
Centuries of being part of the Russian and Soviet empires have, in different ways, shaped how Ukrainians view their country and its interests.
Europe must play its part as Ukraine redefines its historic ties to Russia, and its actions must do nothing to undermine Ukraine’s national independence – or, indeed, that of any of the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union’s breakup.
And the timing couldn’t have been more congenial: the Soviet empire’s collapse and China’s opening generated a surge of labor supply for global capitalism – a billion additional workers – that boosted profits and stifled wage growth throughout the West.
No British governmental institution would have invited the chief Soviet censor as its guest of honor at an event celebrating Russian literature.
Roughly three-quarters of them fled after the Soviet invasion in 1979, with smaller numbers escaping the rule of pro-Soviet president Najibullah or the subsequent 1992-1996 civil war between the various mujahideen parties and then the rule of the Taliban.
As in Soviet times, the main task of today’s ruling elite – Putin and his former KGB associates – is to preserve their tight-knit political and economic regime, built for their personal control and material benefit.
After all, Putin knows well the old Soviet playbook: the fate of previous KGB functionaries may await him.
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