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Sovereigns in sentence

114 examples of Sovereigns in a sentence

How do you hold the sovereigns of cyberspace accountable to the public interest when most CEO's argue that their main obligation is to maximize shareholder profit?
Competition means, not only were there a hundred different political units in Europe in 1500, but within each of these units, there was competition between corporations as well as sovereigns.
Fifth, some argued that highly indebted sovereigns would push investors into gold as government bonds became more risky.
By making it impossible for sovereigns to restructure, he effectively rendered them unable to borrow in the United States.
And the same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, for other heavily indebted sovereigns.
The eurozone has proven itself unable to develop a convincing economic strategy to revive economic growth, reduce public debt to normal levels, and raise credible liquidity walls around its distressed sovereigns.
In fact, the eurozone will contract in the first half of next year – and probably in the second half, because of the deficit-cutting policies now being pursued – placing further pressure on banks and sovereigns.
So the crisis of the sovereigns engulfs the banks.
Despite the unique status of Libya’s economy and political system today, scrutinizing the process of investment in foreign companies, as well as defining the nature of the relationships between the Libyan regime and fund management, is necessary to ensure healthy commercial relations between sovereigns and their portfolio investments.
After all, sovereigns are called that because they have the power to impose taxes, regulations, and, at the extreme, confiscation.
To be sure, the European Central Bank has done what it takes to narrow the borrowing cost differences between European sovereigns.
As the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns grows, confidence in a growing number of governments’ debt has steadily been eroded.
But the former would tend to reinforce the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns, while the latter would likely avoid socializing a rising volume of private debt as the feedback loop is attenuated.
Indeed, we understood that monetarist cures were likely to prove insufficient; that sovereigns need to guarantee each others’ solvency; and that withdrawing support too soon implied enormous dangers.
One of the main problems today is too much debt in the global financial system – among sovereigns, banks, and households, and especially among the advanced economies.
Before doing anything else, we must relieve some of the balance-sheet pressures – on sovereigns, households, and banks – that risk smothering the recovery.
And, in Europe, the sovereigns must address firmly their financing problems through credible fiscal consolidation.
And, in fact, it wasn’t: monetary policy was explicitly intended to buy time for households, the financial sector, and sovereigns to repair their balance sheets and for growth-enhancing policies to kick in.
Sovereigns with high and/or rising debt levels may find them sustainable now, given aggressively accommodative monetary policy.
The rebels, rather than the internationally recognized regime, become the de facto sovereigns of areas they control.
Until recently, the conventional view was that “mature” sovereigns always honored their debts, while only banana republics failed to do so.
In the eyes of most observers, to reach the leaders’ goal of “break[ing] the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” required centralizing authority for bank resolution and rescue.
Breaking the negative feedback loop between distressed sovereigns and distressed banks – whereby bank rescues exhaust fiscal resources and make it likely that the next financial institution in trouble will not be able to count on government support – requires ensuring that it will not recur even in extreme circumstances.
According to Standard and Poor’s, for example, “The rating on EFSF reflects our view that guarantees by ‘AAA’ rated sovereigns and freely available liquidity reserves invested in ‘AAA’ securities will, between them, cover all of EFSF’s liabilities.”
But European leaders have yet to recognize that old bank business models are obsolete, and that reliance on private-sector leverage for balance-sheet repair of both sovereigns and banks is doomed to failure.
As the bond market begins, finally, to price in greater relative risk in euro-zone sovereigns, the intellectual underpinnings of the idea of a global division between emerging-market and developed-market bonds will be fundamentally tested.
As investors reduce their exposure to the eurozone periphery’s sovereigns, banks, and corporations, both flow and stock imbalances will need to be financed.
The second objective should be to “break the link between banks and sovereigns,” which has been a particularly dangerous feature of the last year, while the third is to “minimize the risks for taxpayers through adequate contributions by the financial industry.”
All that is required is the same resources that the European Central Bank is squandering today on at-par debt purchases from distressed peripheral sovereigns – an effort that does not seem to be impressing the markets.
The Secular Stagnation Hypothesis accounts well for the mistakes made in the eurozone in the aftermath of the global recession, when sovereigns attempted to deleverage while companies and households were unwilling to spend, and the ECB was keeping monetary policy relatively tight.
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