Regulators
in sentence
982 examples of Regulators in a sentence
All of this, together with post-crisis improvement in EU institutions (such as financial regulators) contributes to greater European convergence.
The banks, it would be fair to say, do not wholly accept regulators’ arguments about that, but they have bitten their tongues and paid up.
(US
regulators
have also imposed high penalties on foreign banks for breaches of American sanctions policies in relation to Iran.)
The
regulators
maintain that much of this insurance was worthless to borrowers and was mis-sold.
The irony here – not lost on the major banks’ finance directors – is that as fast as banks add capital from rights issues and retained earnings to meet the demands of prudential regulators, the funds are drained away by conduct
regulators.
But more has gone to the
regulators
themselves and onward to national governments.
But that seems unlikely when banks and investors seem punch-drunk, barely reacting to regulators’ blows.
Senior bank managers and
regulators
have a common interest in developing a more effective system – one that punishes the guilty and creates the right incentives for the future.
A return to monetary decentralization would require radical policy changes, including the implementation of 1930’s-style laws enabling
regulators
to monitor banks, ensure that deposit insurance is credible and comprehensive, and halt off-balance-sheet financial activities.
The Fed and other
regulators
would have to provide resources and backing to examiners in the field.
Policymakers and financial
regulators
lately have been seeking to reduce funding costs for businesses, which have been piling on risky debt in recent years, as insufficient access to official loans has pushed them to the shadow banking system.
Is it a system in which market discipline again dominates, or will
regulators
sit on the shoulders of management for the foreseeable future?
In the old days – think of the 1980’s Latin American debt crisis – one could get creditors, mostly large banks, in a small room, and hammer out a deal, aided by some cajoling, or even arm-twisting, by governments and
regulators
eager for things to go smoothly.
But, with the advent of debt securitization, creditors have become far more numerous, and include hedge funds and other investors over whom
regulators
and governments have little sway.
The irony is that the
regulators
have allowed the creation of this dysfunctional system.
Regulators
should not have allowed the banks to speculate as they did; if anything, they should have required them to buy insurance – and then insisted on restructuring in a way that ensured that the insurance paid off.
The conclusions that we might draw for the future depend heavily on how central banks and
regulators
react to the crisis.
Regulators
are already talking about imposing leverage ratios, as well as limits on risk-weighted assets.
And then, too, there are auditors, lawyers and
regulators.
In fact, this is well understood – and is the reason why we have
regulators
for most such systems.
But, prior to both Japan’s nuclear crisis and the financial crisis,
regulators
were unable to prevent the risk.
Consequently, relying on low failure probabilities, national policies, the caution of private actors, and monitoring by
regulators
seems to be insufficient to prevent catastrophe.
Rather than creating a uniform, predictable, and scientifically sound framework for effectively managing legitimate risks, the bio-safety protocol establishes an ill-defined global regulatory process that permits overly risk-averse, incompetent, or corrupt
regulators
to hide behind the precautionary principle in delaying or deferring approvals.
Factoring in the
regulators
and local administrators whose jobs similarly depend on maintaining the current level of state intervention in the economy, World Bank-style reforms would jeopardize probably close to ten million official sinecures.
While markets are imperfect,
regulators
are not only human but bureaucratic and subject to political influence.
Former United States Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and others have argued that if markets can’t recognize bubbles, neither can
regulators.
Regulators
may also have to revive old tools.
As long as they manage their risks properly,
regulators
should be happy.
Regulators, by contrast, cannot ignore these imbalances, because if too many participants are on the same side, positions cannot be liquidated without causing a discontinuity or, worse, financial collapse.
If a bank is too big to fail,
regulators
should go even further, and regulate proprietary traders’ compensation packages to ensure that risks and rewards are properly aligned.
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