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Reforms in sentence

4494 examples of Reforms in a sentence

They could also give Macron more leverage to push through his reforms, by running candidates in national and EU-wide elections.
Vietnam, however, grew at an annual rate of 5.6% per capita between the onset of its economic reforms in 1988 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US in 1995, and has continued to grow at a rapid 4.5% pace since then.
In exchange, Trump wants an additional $25 billion for security on the border with Mexico – including his promised wall – and reforms to limit family-based legal immigration and favor higher-skilled workers, which is the norm in most developed countries.
To soften the blow, governments urgently need to pursue labor-market reforms and overhaul their education systems, starting with technical and vocational education and training (TVET).
To be sure, many claim that popular disaffection with the EU and, in turn, the rise of right-wing populism is a reaction to the lack of structural reforms in the eurozone.
Institutional reforms aimed at combating corruption, reducing overcapacity, and dealing with unsustainable local debts will generate long-term dividends and sustainable payoffs.
Other corporate tax reforms might make sense; but they, too, imply winners and losers.
The idea that structural and labor-market reforms can deliver quick growth is nothing but a mirage.
But if their reforms ignore or alienate too many voters, they could be reversed.
According to “Transition for All,” the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s latest Transition Report, the first years of market reforms hurt the vast majority of those countries’ populations.
Interestingly, many of the people who supported these reforms also favored “strong leaders.”
They argued that, because the reforms were unpopular, they needed to be imposed on the public, rather than being impeded by excessively democratic processes.
While some strong leaders managed to implement reforms quickly, the measures benefited only a minority of people, and many of them were eventually reversed.
The damage caused by certain unpopular reforms lasted far longer than the reforms themselves.
And when some of these new leaders reversed the reforms, they also removed institutional checks on their power, in order to make it harder to challenge their decisions.
Not surprisingly, income inequality in many of these countries is worse today than it was when they abandoned privatization and other reforms.
This is why democratic institutions are so important: They enable those who have been harmed by reforms to receive compensation.
Because truly democratic policies must be inclusive, implementing reforms in a democracy takes time and effort; but the painful process of building broad pro-reform coalitions also ensures that those policies will endure.
In the long run, inclusive reforms stick, and quick and dirty reforms do not.
Perhaps the only failure more glaring than the member states’ refusal to back such reforms is their own failure to act, not least because it has created a legitimacy vacuum that xenophobic populists are now filling.
Market-oriented reforms in the early 1990s changed that pattern, and annual growth accelerated to 7% under the Congress party, before slumping to 5%.
To save the euro – which is essential, because the European project’s fate depends on the success of monetary union – Europe needs action now: in addition to indispensable austerity measures and structural reforms, there is no way to succeed without a viable economic program that will assure growth.
On the positive side, it is likely to produce the political cohesion needed to implement structural reforms that shift the economy away from trade and manufacturing and toward domestic consumption.
For example, political obstacles to comprehensive economic policymaking in many advanced economies have undermined the implementation of structural reforms and responsive fiscal policies in recent years, holding back business investment, undermining productivity growth, worsening inequality, and threatening future potential growth.
The Bretton Woods organizations, instituted after World War II to maintain stability, risk losing their influence, and the countries with the clout to bolster them seem unwilling at this stage to press ahead boldly with the needed reforms.
The three that count because of their size – Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico – are all frightened of the consequences: Brazil that its companies will lose contracts, Mexico that the Venezuelans will finance opposition to their energy reforms, and Argentina of losing an ally that knows too much.
The Basel III agreement on capital adequacy and other recent reforms still have not ring-fenced trade financing from these potential shocks.
Brazil's victory in the World Cup may have no connection with these reforms, but the creativity of that winning team does say a great deal about the spirit of the country.
While fears of meltdown have dissipated, these policies have been maintained or extended, with policymakers citing the fragility of the ongoing economic recovery and the absence of other, equally strong policy levers – such as fiscal policy or structural reforms – that could replace monetary policy quickly enough.
Furthermore, the effect of internationally agreed regulatory reforms – most of which have yet to be implemented – will be to increase banks’ capital requirements while shrinking the scale of maturity transformation risks that they can carry on their balance sheets.
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