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Reforms in sentence

4494 examples of Reforms in a sentence

In addition, a range of civil-service reforms are needed to improve flexibility and increase productivity, while health and education programs require greater cost effectiveness.
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms ignited the most rapid economic improvement in human history and, with it, the emergence of a large and growing middle class.
And it comes at a time when the pace of market opening and reduction of state control has slowed, following substantial reforms under former President Jiang Zemin and former Premier Zhu Rongji.
They concluded that China should complete its transition to a market economy with land, labor, financial, and enterprise reforms.
Moreover, housing-market reforms and the development of a mortgage-loan market in the late 1990s fueled rapid growth in real-estate investment, which reached an annual rate of over 20% in 2000.
The problem with the emergence of these new growth engines is that it enabled China’s leaders to delay important structural reforms.
In order to kick-start progress, ECB President Mario Draghi has proposed a grand policy bargain to European governments: if they implement structural reforms and improve fiscal flexibility, the central bank will expand its balance sheet to boost growth and thwart deflation.
Meanwhile, in Japan, the private sector’s patience with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s three-pronged strategy to reinvigorate the long-stagnant economy – so-called “Abenomics” – will be tested, particularly with regard to the long-awaited implementation of structural reforms to complement fiscal stimulus and monetary easing.
Second, beyond strengthening economic institutions, EU countries must accelerate structural reforms to boost their long-run growth prospects and facilitate their smooth adjustment to shocks.
Moreover, the Lisbon Agenda should be reinvigorated, with a focus on market reforms, and the EU should urgently reconsider measures – particularly regarding climate policy and the drift toward an EU-wide social policy – that risk imposing additional burdens on their economies and/or hamper the flexibility of markets.
In this respect, the mode of fiscal reforms is fundamentally important.
But no amount of lofty rhetoric can substitute for the reforms outlined here – or obviate the need for them.
Unfortunately, much of the discussion surrounding governance reforms fails to make a distinction between governance-as-an-end and governance-as-a means.
This requires moving away from the broad governance agenda and focusing on reforms of specific institutions in order to target binding constraints on growth.
Poor countries suffer from a multitude of growth constraints, and effective reforms address the most binding among them.
As desirable as the rule of law and similar reforms may be in the long run and for development in general, they rarely deserve priority as part of a growth strategy.
And Spain’s recent general election, held three days after the Brexit referendum, suggests that, despite high unemployment, austerity, and painful structural reforms, moderate, pro-European forces remain a majority.
With the exception of the United Kingdom, the extreme free-market view gained less traction in Europe in recent decades than it did in the US; nonetheless, the challenge of implementing financial reforms in the eurozone is actually more difficult.
Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections have brought to power leaders who, by implementing radical reforms, are determined to realize voters’ demands for a modern economy and an end to corruption.
Likewise, they agree to support the deep social and economic reforms that Ukraine must carry out.
Unfortunately, though such accommodation cannot be sustained forever, today’s conditions are often viewed as semi-permanent, creating the illusion of stability and reducing the incentive to undertake difficult reforms that promote future growth.
The return to public investment is affected by the presence or absence of complementary reforms, which vary from country to country.
The false hopes raised by cutting taxes would have diverted policy makers away from fundamental reforms that are necessary if the Continent is to achieve the dynamism on which high rates of innovation, abundant job creation, and world-class productivity depend.
Trump’s senior economic-policy advisers, Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross (Trump's pick for commerce secretary), argued in a position paper in September that these estimates are flawed, because they don’t take into account “growth-inducing windfalls” from regulatory and energy reforms, or the added bonanza that should arise from a sharp narrowing of America’s trade deficit.
The principal contradiction, while typically elliptical and ambiguous, frames a rich discussion of risks and opportunities, strategy and tactics, reforms and governance – all of which will shape China’s prospects for the foreseeable future.
Over the past ten years, two five-year plans – the 12th, enacted in 2011, and the 13th, enacted in 2016 – plus a major set of reforms adopted at the so-called Third Plenum in 2013, have aimed to resolve China’s persistent and worrisome imbalances.
This was a glaring contradiction of the 2013 Third Plenum reforms, which focused on the seemingly inconsistent combination of a “decisive role” for markets and steadfast support for state ownership.
Consistent with other recent pronouncements of senior Chinese officials, the political report leaves little doubt that supply-side structural reforms are now the highest priority of economic policymakers.
China’s reforms will either support the economic shift, boosting sentiment and lifting growth forecasts, or they will fall short and disappoint, with attention most likely to be focused on the size and nature of state intervention in markets.
The key liberalizing reforms that would enhance the economy’s flexibility and pace of adjustment are simply not on the agenda (owing to an underlying lack of trust among voters).
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