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Reforms in sentence

4494 examples of Reforms in a sentence

In any case, if the EU is to survive long enough to implement the needed institutional reforms, it will to have to find ways to make the project more appealing for all.
Four years ago, big Russian companies were interested in state subsidies, not structural reforms.
Still, if oil prices fall sharply, he will face a huge political problem: bold structural reforms usually require years, not months, to show results.
Russia's recent strong growth partly reflects the reforms of the early 1990s, and the reform achievements of 2000 and 2001 will feed through to measurable economic performance only in, say, 2005.
Military reforms have stalled, as if Russia had all the time in the world to rationalize and modernize its defenses.
And both countries’ leaders must deliver reforms within a limited tenure, with limited resources, and within a global context of trade rivalry and interdependence.
For China, the issue largely concerns the design and implementation of the next stage of institutional reforms to sustain economic growth and efficiency, reduce social inequality, remove market distortions, address environmental deterioration, and combat corruption.
In the US, Obama’s re-election has led some to believe that much-needed policy reforms will bring the country back from the brink of the “fiscal cliff” and ignite a new era of growth.
According to IMF critics, bailouts allowed leaders from Brazil to Turkey to avoid painful but necessary reforms, with the perverse effect of making crises inevitable.
Such packages provide the breathing space that governments need in a crisis in order to launch longer-term reforms.
Such reforms would be more effective than any development aid, but for now they are off limits.
Europe’s central bankers fear that their political masters will order them to loosen monetary policy, that the structural reforms needed to free up aggregate supply will not be forthcoming, and that the result will be a return to the inflation of the 1970’s.
They worry that even after undertaking structural reforms to reduce the attractiveness of unemployment benefits and increase the ability of workers to move to jobs and of firms to move to workers, central bankers will continue to insist on tight money.
Of course, these fears are accompanied by the hope that structural reforms and monetary expansion work in harmony, boosting employment and output without raising inflation by much.
But the reality is that steps toward looser monetary policies are non-existent – especially with the fledgling European Central Bank anxious to establish its inflation-fighting credibility – and that steps toward structural reforms are half-hearted, hesitant, and small.
After all, fiscal stimulus can work only if it supports private investment and is accompanied by much more ambitious structural reforms – the kind of reforms that France and Italy are currently resisting.
But Germany has all of the leverage it needs to implement the stability-oriented reforms that it wants for Europe.
For starters, Germany, together with the European Commission, can compel France to pursue deeper reforms in exchange for more time to consolidate its deficit.
Germany cannot, however, indulge its obsession with supply-side reforms without also pursuing growth-enhancing policies.
As Germany knows from its own experience in the early 2000s, the benefits of supply-side reforms – namely, improved competitiveness and higher long-term growth rates – take a long time to emerge.
The German government can use its considerable leverage to compel France and Italy to pursue the structural reforms that both countries need, while allowing a growth-friendly demand stimulus to lift the threat of deflation hanging over the eurozone.
Europe needs a grand bargain, involving close coordination on structural reforms and fiscal and monetary policy.
Even a mild foretaste of such reforms would encourage a relaxation of the austerity terms demanded by the new German government that emerges from the general election there on September 24.
The prevailing view in Germany is that post-recession growth can more likely be attributed to structural reforms that increase productivity and bolster competitiveness.
But such reforms, the Germans believe, necessarily entail social costs, making them unpopular and difficult to execute.
After all, what the eurozone needs now is not to save its weaker economies from default or even to boost long-term growth; rather, it needs to recover lost output and employment, particularly in the southern countries – goals that neither fiscal austerity nor structural reforms can achieve on its own.
And structural reforms have very limited bearing on short-run performance.
Moreover, even if duress facilitates structural reforms in some cases, it certainly does not do so in societies that have already experienced severe hardship.
As Wen’s successor, Li Keqiang, attempts to engineer deep systemic reforms, understanding Wen’s policy decisions could not be more relevant.
Similarly, where structural reforms should rein in price growth by encouraging competition, leaders like Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, finding it increasingly difficult to marshal support for unpopular measures, are watering down already-modest proposals to enhance labor-market flexibility.
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