Example collocations logo

Prudential in sentence

117 examples of Prudential in a sentence

Specifically, China needs prudential regulation that limits the use of leverage for asset purchases.
Thus, the IMF’s recommendation to use capital controls only after exhausting interest-rate adjustment, reserve accumulation, and prudential regulation is out of step with the profession.
The emerging economies’ monetary authorities have struggled to cope with these shocks using available instruments, including interest rates, exchange rates, prudential regulation, and capital controls.
Macroeconomic and financial stability require debt sustainability, prudential regulation, and sound money.
Title IV of the law would raise the threshold for “applying enhanced prudential standards from $50 billion to $250 billion.”
These include the protection of property rights, effective contract enforcement, eradication of corruption, enhanced transparency and financial information, sound corporate governance, monetary and fiscal stability, debt sustainability, market-determined exchange rates, high-quality financial regulation, and prudential supervision.
Caution dictates a more pragmatic approach, one that recognizes a permanent role for capital controls alongside other regulatory and prudential tools.
But domestic prudential measures could have only a limited effect on the rate of credit growth, because the growth was driven primarily by booming capital inflows.
Paradoxically, while Turkey’s monetary authorities acknowledged this relationship, they continued to attribute the decline in credit growth to the success of their prudential measures.
If there is a lesson to be learned from Turkey’s monetary-policy experiment, it is that domestic prudential regulations and monetary-policy tools should be viewed as complements to – not substitutes for – capital-account management.
Some of the lessons about the need for prudential regulation of the financial system were lost in the Reagan-Thatcher era, when the appetite for massive deregulation was created in part by the flaws in Europe’s social-welfare model.
Meanwhile, the Commission’s steadfast defense of competition in the banking sector – particularly in Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Poland – ended an era of protectionism in the guise of prudential control; this helped to spur cross-border financial integration to an extent unprecedented in developed economies.
There are therefore very good reasons to put discussion about new EU-level prudential institutions high on the policy agenda.
Their 1990 version of the Maastricht Treaty’s Article 25 on Prudential Supervision included the following provisions (placed in square brackets to show that they were not completely consensual): “The ECB may formulate, interpret, and implement policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit and other financial institutions for which it is designated as competent supervisory authority.”
According to Article 25 of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB may “offer advice to and be consulted by” the Commission or the Council on the scope and implementation of legislation relating to prudential supervision.
The choice of tasks to be entrusted to the ECB will ensure rigorous, high-quality, and equal prudential supervision of eurozone banks, thereby contributing decisively to maintaining confidence between the banks – and thus increasing financial stability throughout the eurozone.
High capital and provision requirements for certain transactions, or prohibition of such transactions, should also be introduced for prudential reasons.
The freedom of money, financial markets, and people to move – and thus to escape regulation and taxation – might be an acceptable, even constructive, brake on excessive official intervention, but not if a deregulatory race to the bottom prevents adoption of needed ethical and prudential standards.
The FPC is part of the complex new UK regulatory structure, in which the former Financial Services Authority has been split in two: a prudential and business-conduct regulator and a new body to monitor financial stability.
After the crisis, world leaders and central bankers overhauled banking regulations, first and foremost by rectifying the Basel prudential rules.
Unfortunately, the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive have failed to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules – namely, their reliance on banks’ risk-management models for the calculation of capital requirements, and the lack of supervisory accountability.
The most remarkable feature of the policy deliberations on prudential banking rules so far has been their delegation to the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors and the banks themselves, both of which have a vested interest in preserving the existing system.
Surely, as the economists Arvind Subramanian and John Williamson have written, emerging markets deserve the IMF’s help in designing better prudential controls over capital inflows instead of having their wrists slapped.
In the case of the banking union, they plan to use Article 127(6) of the Lisbon Treaty which allows the European Council to grant authority to the ECB to perform specific tasks concerning “policies relating to the prudential supervision” of certain financial institutions in the Union.
The OECD countries, despite being the source of modern history’s most devastating financial meltdown, have shown less appetite to advance sustainability as a design principle of their financial systems (the Bank of England’s ongoing prudential review of climate-related risks to the financial sector is a notable exception).
There are better ways to enhance stability, from strengthening prudential supervision to taxing and controlling destabilizing capital flows and letting the exchange rate adjust.
The scope of risk management will need to be expanded, so that long-term sustainability and risks from climate change are included in prudential rules for banking, insurance, and investment.
The People’s Bank of China has joined with UNEP to identify practical steps to ensure “green” financial-market reform, and the Bank of England (BoE) has initiated a prudential review of the systemic risks posed by climate change to the United Kingdom’s insurance sector.
Moreover, slowing economic growth, tighter prudential regulation, and increased liability have made banks much more risk-averse, driving them to demand a significantly higher risk premium from borrowers, who must now not only provide collateral, but also find third parties to guarantee the loans.
A further distortion stems from the prudential regulation adopted in reaction to the global financial crisis.
Next