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Plutonium in sentence

71 examples of Plutonium in a sentence

According to the American scientist who was invited to see it, the facility, in contrast to the regime’s aging plutonium technology, appeared to be state-of-the-art, thus reinforcing the suspicion that North Korea has no genuine interest whatsoever in fulfilling its nuclear-disarmament responsibilities.
Far more worrying, had Syrian engineers built a lab at the site, or in other rebel-held territory, to extract plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel, the insurgents might even have found themselves with the ingredients of an atomic bomb.
Japan has an enormous stockpile of separated plutonium and the technical wherewithal to be a “virtual nuclear power”: without having any nuclear weapons on hand, it could quickly develop them if necessary.
In 1994, when the US and North Korea last agreed to a freeze on North Korea’s plutonium production, Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, quickly broke the deal, embarking on a secret uranium program.
More than two decades ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency caught North Korea violating its safeguards agreement and reprocessing plutonium.
After consultation with his staff, Bush responded that, absent a plutonium extraction facility, US intelligence could not confirm that the plant comprised a nuclear weapons program.
In August 1945, a plutonium bomb decimated the city, causing massive physical damage and untold human suffering.
That will require demonstrating that whatever deal is reached was not a rush job, and that concerns about Iran’s nuclear program – such as the heavy-water reactor site at Arak, which is likely to produce plutonium – have been addressed effectively.
After the US accused Russia of committing war crimes in Syria, Russia declared that it was suspending an agreement to dispose of surplus plutonium unless the US meets certain conditions, including compensating Russia for the costs of Western sanctions imposed after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014.
The US found this out in 1994 – long before North Korea had a nuclear weapon – when it planned a pre-emptive strike to destroy the North’s Yongbyon plutonium reprocessing plant, only to find that its allies in South Korea (and Japan) were deterred by the risk of conventional retaliation.
Ban should support the creation of an international facility that would provide governments access to (but not physical control of) enriched uranium and plutonium for the generation of electrical power.
The first two issues reflect the two paths toward the bomb: uranium enrichment and plutonium production.
Three days later, Nagasaki was shattered by a plutonium bomb that matched the design of a bomb that the United States had tested in the New Mexico desert three weeks earlier.
Today, nearly 2,000 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium – the raw materials of a nuclear weapon – are spread across 25 countries.
With an amount of plutonium the size of a grapefruit, or enough highly enriched uranium to fit into a five-pound bag of sugar, a terrorist could make a bomb that could level a city.
Still, the plant – along with its spent nuclear fuel, extracted plutonium, and nuclear reprocessing waste – poses significant radiological hazards that a military strike could disperse into the environment.
Dimona has produced all the plutonium that Israel reasonably needs, and the reactor – one of the world’s oldest – has suffered minor mishaps and evident deterioration, raising the specter of more serious accidents.
The regime invited international inspectors to Yongbyon, and provided substantial records of the Yongbyon reactor’s operations, which are still one of the most accurate resources for measuring the amount of plutonium actually produced there.
Notably, all six of the underground nuclear tests that North Korea has conducted since 2006 have been consistent with plutonium harvested from the reactor before the six-party talks.
Iran has agreed to halt enrichment of uranium above 5% purity; neutralize its stockpile of uranium enriched to near 20% purity; stop building its stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium; forswear “next generation centrifuges”; shut down its plutonium reactor; and allow extensive new inspections of its nuclear facilities.
Though the initial aim of freezing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium was not achieved, the four summits held since then have brought about a reduction in other sources of radioactive material, and safety measures have been improved.
The hard part is obtaining the fissionable materials – plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
A Radioactive Bank to be WelcomedCANBERRA – One of the many things the world has learned from the Iran nuclear saga is that its leaders made a mistake, when negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the 1960s, in not doing anything to constrain uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
Similarly, in 2001, North and South Korea, drawing on the 1994 Washington-Pyongyang Agreed Framework, signed a denuclearization pledge aimed at freezing and later dismantling the North’s plutonium program.
In addition, a number of countries with nuclear energy programs have the capability, if they choose, to manufacture nuclear weapons within a matter of months if their security perceptions change, because they have mastered the critical technology – uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
And in 2004, the IAEA blew the whistle on South Korea’s non-safeguarded plutonium and enrichment experiments.
The energy derived from splitting uranium and plutonium atoms was originally used for the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb.
While China, France, India, Japan, and Russia have favored reprocessing in order to recycle plutonium for new fuel, this has not solved the waste problem, because the resulting spent fuel is usually not further recycled.
Recycling proponents want ultimately to build a fleet of fast neutron reactors that could consume the plutonium and other fissionable material.
Use of plutonium fuels also increases the risk of nuclear-weapons proliferation.
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