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Liabilities in sentence

442 examples of Liabilities in a sentence

Larger firms – even those with large debt problems – can refinance their excessive liabilities in court or out of court; but an unprecedented number of small businesses are going bankrupt.
These measures, too, are supposedly doomed because they all involve increasing governments’ liabilities, and financial markets are at a tipping point with respect to sovereign debt.
The problem, the parrot would say, is that households and businesses are still trying to build up their stocks of safe, high-quality assets, and are switching expenditures from buying currently-produced goods and services to increasing their shares of an inadequate supply of government liabilities.
They will agree with the parrots that falling inflation showed that the macroeconomic problem was insufficient demand for currently produced goods and services, and that the low level of interest rates on safe, high-quality government liabilities showed that the supply of safe assets – whether money provided by the central bank, guarantees provided by banking policy, or government debt provided through deficit spending – was too low.
China’s low official government debt largely reflects the role of currency in assuming quasi-fiscal liabilities – not only the write-off costs incurred from reforming state-owned banks, but also the takeover of banks’ bad debts via note financing and the purchase of asset-management companies’ bonds.
Trump recently suggested that the US should negotiate with its creditors to buy back much of its debt at a discount – in effect, a partial default on trillions of dollars of liabilities, intended to reduce the burden of debt service for taxpayers.
Since private debts have a way of turning into public liabilities, a low government-debt burden might not, in fact, provide these countries with the cushion that they think they have.
That compromise (which also led to the US capital’s relocation to the District of Columbia, on the border of Virginia and Maryland) may serve as a precedent for limiting Germany’s liabilities if Eurobonds, or some other debt-mutualization scheme, are introduced.
The Greek government barely managed to make a significant payment last month, and even larger payments fall due throughout the summer, starting in June with an installment of more than €1.5 billion on its liabilities to the International Monetary Fund.
Thus, if reform on the eurozone’s periphery succeeds, both these economies and core countries will suffer from decreasing aggregate demand; if reform fails, either the deficits will continue to be financed, leading to further accumulation of external debt, or the entire eurozone will fall into depression, with sovereign debtors eventually defaulting on their liabilities.
Investment banks’ commitments to leveraged buyouts became liabilities.
Yet demographic shifts mean that contingent liabilities for public pensions and health care in Germany will rise sharply over the next decades.
They have also paid back a significant share of external debt and converted much of what remains into more manageable local-currency liabilities.
Otherwise, ten years from now, they will be forced to confess that today’s dithering imposed enormous additional tax liabilities on northern Europe.
An attempt at re-opening the debate about Eurobonds, or the partial mutualization of eurozone public-sector liabilities, was viewed as a pie-in-the-sky suggestion, mostly just a distraction.
Even if it gives rise to future tax liabilities (and some of it will), these will be transfers from taxpayers to bond holders.
Other countries had been fiscally responsible, but were overwhelmed by the liabilities that they had assumed from others (for example, Ireland’s irresponsible banks sank their budget).
But when house prices fell and mortgage-backed securities (and derivatives based on them) became illiquid, Citigroup took the liabilities back onto its balance sheet – and then needed to be rescued through massive, repeated bailouts.
This should be combined with the mutualization of some portion of the liabilities of highly indebted countries – defined as a debt-to-GDP ratio above, say, 60% or 70% – and modest write-downs in exchange for long-term zero-coupon bonds.
Moreover, China’s fiscal position remains strong: even after accounting for all sorts of contingent liabilities – such as local-government loans, large project loans, and commercial banks’ non-performing loans in the event of a housing-market crash, China’s public debt/GDP ratio is still below 60%.
At the onset of the crisis, the eurozone’s breakup was inconceivable: the assets and liabilities denominated in the common currency were so intermingled that a breakup would cause an uncontrollable meltdown.
These companies minimize their tax liabilities by registering and declaring their profits in a low-tax country, despite doing most of their business elsewhere.
The result is a temporary increase in budget deficits; the fiscal benefits appear only when private schemes start taking over pension liabilities from the state-run systems.
There is also a more fundamental reason to focus on future variations in the stock of pension debt associated with pension reforms: the EU has no business interfering with pension liabilities of individual member states.
This holding pattern is particularly harmful because profound transformation will surely depend on financing from a sound sovereign bond market, which cannot function properly until uncertainty related to the government’s contingent liabilities – all those implicit guarantees – has been resolved.
And the combination of economic contraction and massive liabilities is having dire consequences for the island.
If the island’s liabilities are not properly restructured, it will remain in a debt trap.
Moreover, it is potentially a wealth transfer from taxpayers to private shareholders, because under new banking rules government bailouts are possible after bondholders have covered (bailed in) 8% of a bank’s equity and liabilities.
Even today, about 70% of the core US financial firms’ liabilities are very short-term loans, like overnight repos.
My recent study with Jacopo Carmassi, Time to Set Banking Regulation Right, shows that by permitting excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks – in some cases allowing banks to accumulate total liabilities up to 40, or even 50, times their equity capital – the Basel banking rules not only enabled, but, ironically, intensified the crisis.
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