Example collocations logo

Insolvency in sentence

166 examples of Insolvency in a sentence

Be it because of a sovereign default or because of large losses accumulated under complacent accounting rules, the insolvency of a large bank (particularly a European bank) is far from a remote possibility.
The collision of reality (Greece’s insolvency) with politics (Germany’s demands) was bound to create a disaster.
With no policy institution able to take charge, countries like Italy and Spain would return to the brink of panic-induced insolvency.
But monetary policy is increasingly ineffective in advanced economies, where the problems stem from insolvency – and thus creditworthiness – rather than liquidity.
Yet, when it became abundantly clear that Greece’s debt burden had been taken to insolvency levels, creditors delayed the moment of truth.
At a minimum, China needs an effective system to deal with insolvency; strict regulation of risk pricing and assessment; and robust accounting, loan-loss provisioning, and financial disclosure rules.
After all, the claim that the risk of loss will arise only for debt issued after the new crisis-resolution mechanism starts in 2014 implies that all debt issued until then is safe, and that insolvency can occur only in some distant future, rather than now, as in Greece and Ireland.
First, governments should not be pushed into insolvency just to save all banks.
The Achilles heel of this arrangement is the lack of insolvency procedures for euro members.
But doing so deepened Greece’s insolvency.
The only alternative would be a meaningful debt restructuring to end Greece’s insolvency.
Alas, Europe’s political establishment, unwilling to adopt either option, has chosen to extend Greece’s insolvency – which it pretends has been resolved through new loan tranches.
Agreement to create both a liquidity-provision facility and an insolvency procedure has implied revisiting fundamental principles – not least the no-bailout clause – showing that Europe can learn from experience.
There is an equally important need to distinguish between state insolvency and illiquidity.
If bond markets, for example, are to work well, an orderly way of resolving cases of sovereign insolvency must be found.
In the medium term, help to Spain will merely reinforce the link between the sovereign and the banks’ problems, causing even greater fragmentation in the European banking market and pushing Spain closer to potential insolvency by increasing its debt burden.
For example, the banking union needs to be strengthened through an enhanced resolution regime and an integrated financial supervisor, and a sovereign insolvency mechanism should be introduced.
They remain badly in need of protection from the threat of insolvency.
First, individual countries borrow far above any sensible level, knowing that they will be saved from insolvency by rescue operations financed by the other member countries.
As the largest creditor, Germany could dictate the terms of assistance, which were punitive and pushed debtor countries towards insolvency.
And, as heavily indebted countries are pushed towards insolvency, nationalist political parties – for example, Finland’s True Finns – have grown stronger, alongside more established counterparts elsewhere in Europe.
First, the problems of the eurozone periphery are in some cases problems of actual insolvency, not illiquidity: large and rising public and private deficits and debt; damaged financial systems that need to be cleaned up and recapitalized; massive loss of competitiveness; lack of economic growth; and rising unemployment.
The German Constitutional Court and the ECJ agree that the Lisbon Treaty prohibits the ECB from taking action to support a sovereign on the verge of insolvency; that is a fiscal and political issue.
The same is probably true when key business sectors near insolvency.
Moreover, mortgages, mutual insurance, leasing, and microfinance are underdeveloped in Islamic finance; insolvency and bankruptcy procedures must be improved; and mechanisms to deal with “Islamic bond” defaults must be established.
Under the second scenario, China’s leaders fail to rein in credit growth, mainly because highly leveraged local governments, well-connected real-estate developers, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) successfully resist policies that would cut off their access to financing and force them into insolvency.
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, which is now teetering on the brink of insolvency, account for less than 6% of the eurozone economy.
When people and governments are deep in debt, and as long as they pay positive interest on that debt, declining money income is a recipe for collective insolvency.
The proposed mechanism distinguishes between illiquidity, impending insolvency, and full insolvency.
If the crisis persists, the country automatically enters an impending insolvency procedure, in which help would be available only after a 20-50% haircut for the maturing debt.
BackNext