Insolvency
in sentence
166 examples of Insolvency in a sentence
My friends, many in their 50s and 60s, were looking at a downward mobility, a work-for-life proposition, just a job loss, medical diagnosis or divorce away from
insolvency.
And the IMF did impose conditions on its loans to Greece – including fiscal austerity, privatization, and structural reform of its pension and tax systems – most of which were necessary to address the country’s
insolvency.
Unlike Greece, Asia’s problem was not an
insolvency
crisis, but a liquidity crisis, caused by a sudden reversal of capital flows.
But, as its creditors have now recognized, providing more money will not address Greece’s
insolvency.
But when bad things happen and there is pressure on financial markets, with fear of
insolvency
in the air, it matters a great deal if you have a claim on an insured bank in the United States or on an essentially unregulated offshore subsidiary.
The path toward joint liability is far more likely to lead to a deep rift within Europe, because turning the eurozone into a transfer and debt union that can prevent the
insolvency
of any of its members would require more central power than currently exists in the US.
But, as long as the degree of
insolvency
is small enough that a relatively minor degree of monetary easing can prevent a major depression and mass unemployment, this is a good option in an imperfect world, this is a good option in an imperfect world.
Print enough money and boost the price level enough, and the
insolvency
problem goes away without the risks entailed by putting the government in the investment and commercial banking business.
Seventh, in countries where private and public debt levels are unsustainable – household debt in countries where the housing boom has gone bust and debts of governments, like Greece’s, that suffer from
insolvency
rather than just illiquidity – liabilities should be restructured and reduced to prevent a severe debt deflation and contraction of spending.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies should orchestrate a transition from public to private investment by strengthening regulatory and
insolvency
frameworks, increasing intra-African trade, and deepening access to credit.
Greece is stuck in a vicious cycle of insolvency, lost competitiveness, external deficits, and ever-deepening depression.
For example, harmonizing
insolvency
regimes across the continent and reducing tax incentives that favor debt over equity, while entirely logical, strike at the heart of member states' remaining sovereignty, and thus will be extremely difficult to push forward.
Second, as we learned from the crisis, substantial domestic ownership of the banking sector is crucial, in part because multinational resolution mechanisms in cases of
insolvency
are largely non-existent.
Consequently, the Fed left its interest rate unchanged throughout the summer of 2008, despite the collapse of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, AIG’s insolvency, and the emergence of global financial-market contagion.
This response is based on the hypothesis that, unlike the Greece crisis, which is a genuine case of insolvency, the Spanish and Italian crises are mainly attributable to self-fulfilling speculation.
The breakdown of negotiations last week sparked a bank panic, leaving Greece’s economy paralyzed and its banks on the verge of
insolvency.
With that much leverage, it does not take a lot to create fear of
insolvency.
The IMF does not have an adequate framework for handling the massive defaults that could easily attend a huge surge in lending, much less the political will to distinguish between countries that are facing genuine short-term liquidity problems and countries that are actually facing
insolvency
problems.
On the other hand, simply restoring adequate liquidity would stop the run, reduce the risk of insolvency, and thus preempt the need for fiscal transfers.
But, with the onset of the crisis, cross-border finance in Europe shrank as highly leveraged eurozone economies began to lose access to international capital markets, and concerns about private and public
insolvency
took center stage.
Such efforts should promptly translate into legislative changes in areas ranging from
insolvency
to patents, from CO2 emission-reduction schemes to “smart” electricity grids.
But even if prices and wages were to fall by 30% over the next few years (which would most likely be socially and politically unsustainable), the real value of debt would increase sharply, worsening the
insolvency
of governments and private debtors.
We therefore propose that contributions to the EMF should be based on member countries’ fiscal deficits and public debt levels, because both represent warning signs of impending liquidity or
insolvency
risk.
Thus, paradoxically nationalization may be a more market-friendly solution: it wipes out common and preferred shareholders of clearly insolvent institutions, and possibly unsecured creditors if the
insolvency
is too large, while providing a fair upside to the tax-payer.
Indeed, not only are governments running out of fiscal bullets as debt surges, but monetary policy is having little short-run traction in economies suffering
insolvency
– not just liquidity – problems.
Above all, the central bank must ensure that the money supply is large enough that mere illiquidity, rather than insolvency, does not force banks into bankruptcy and liquidation.
Big banks’ ability to extort such an arrangement stems from an implicit threat: the financial sector – and with it the economy’s payment system – would collapse if a systemically important bank were ever pushed into
insolvency.
But it is time to call the bankers’ bluff: maintaining the payment system can and should be separated from the problem of bank
insolvency.
Moreover, governments should guarantee insolvent banks’ loans to non-financial companies, as well as private customers’ current, fixed-term, and savings deposits, by reforming
insolvency
laws.
An
insolvency
administrator would manage the bank and ensure that all payments for which a state guarantee is given are carried out properly, with refinancing of these payments continuing to take place via the central bank.
Next
Related words
Would
Banks
Crisis
Countries
Liquidity
Financial
Should
Problems
Other
Illiquidity
Governments
Which
Their
Problem
Private
Credit
While
Public
Fiscal
Could