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Excessive in sentence

1494 examples of Excessive in a sentence

In both cases, banks took excessive risks in the expectation – eventually vindicated – that governments would bail them out.
Excessive debt caused not only the 2008 crisis, but also the East Asia crisis in the 1990s and the Latin American crisis in the 1980s.
Given the amount of distress brought about by excessive debt, one might well ask why individuals and countries have repeatedly put themselves into this situation.
My recent study with Jacopo Carmassi, Time to Set Banking Regulation Right, shows that by permitting excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks – in some cases allowing banks to accumulate total liabilities up to 40, or even 50, times their equity capital – the Basel banking rules not only enabled, but, ironically, intensified the crisis.
The stunning opacity of solvency ratios encouraged regulators to turn a blind eye to banks’ excessive risk-taking.
Thus, large banks are likely to continue to hold too little capital and to take excessive risks, raising the prospect of renewed bouts of financial instability.
Farmer, in his thoughtful commentary, argues that models of the type he has pioneered in recent years are the right way to think about chronically excessive unemployment and that, with the right microfoundations, one can conclude that fiscal policies are ineffective.
Europeans have felt oppressed by America’s excessive demonstration of hard power.
But a more cynical view permeates populist logic, namely that in its excessive adherence to globalism, the US has sown the seeds of its own political and economic destruction.
After all, huge US foreign borrowing was clearly a key factor in creating the recent financial mess, while China’s excessive reliance on export-driven growth has made it extraordinarily vulnerable to a sudden drop in global demand.
China could also expand its tech sector through homegrown entrepreneurship, except that the Chinese economy does not provide easy access to credit and is hamstrung by excessive regulations that make it difficult to start a competitive business.
My concern about excessive government debt back goes a long way, both in terms of my research agenda and along the timeline of global economic performance.
In today’s highly competitive global economy, European countries’ relatively small size, aging populations, and excessive indebtedness, combined with a lack of energy resources and insufficient investment in research and development, mean that their high living standards and generous social-welfare states are in jeopardy.
Therefore, the guarantee would not apply to debt crises caused by excessive borrowing to finance unsustainable fiscal policies.
And criticism of excessive executive remuneration has led to frantic meetings by many boards’ compensation committees.
It is tempting to conclude that the Fed’s eagerness to tighten monetary policy – despite unfavorable historical precedents and ongoing economic uncertainty – is driven by commercial banks with excessive influence in official policymaking.
A closer look at those at the top reveals a disproportionate role for rent-seeking: some have obtained their wealth by exercising monopoly power; others are CEOs who have taken advantage of deficiencies in corporate governance to extract for themselves an excessive share of corporate earnings; and still others have used political connections to benefit from government munificence – either excessively high prices for what the government buys (drugs), or excessively low prices for what the government sells (mineral rights).
Its execution, however, was crippled by its very narrow scope for application, the absence of corresponding laws governing corporate restructuring, excessive government intervention, incompatibility with the policy-based bankruptcy procedure then in place, technical errors, and a general inability to make the code operational.
To say that they were implies three things: top bank executives were rewarded for short-term results with large amounts of up-front cash; bank executives did not hold sufficiently large amounts of stock to align their interests with those of shareholders; and executives with more short-term pay and less stock ownership should have had the greatest incentive to take bad and excessive risks, and thus should have performed worse in the crisis.
So it seems unlikely that this up-front cash provided much of an incentive for the average CEO to knowingly take bad or excessive risks that would jeopardize their much larger equity stakes.
These include legal impediments to labor mobility, reform of a complex tax system beset by excessive rates and porous loopholes, and substandard road infrastructure.
The very low interest rates that now prevail have driven investors to take excessive risks in order to achieve a higher current yield on their portfolios, often to meet return obligations set by pension and insurance contracts.
But excessive foot-dragging and uncertainty – owing not least to German unilateralism – impeded EU-level action, as it enabled migration to become a hot-button issue in domestic politics.
Money-market funds’ perverse incentives to take on excessive risk remain largely intact.
Was financial institutions’ assumption of excessive risk the result of incompetence or stupidity, or was it a rational response to the implicit guarantee offered by the government?
Such suspicions can feed a climate of excessive nationalism in China.
This was and is the result of an asset bubble fueled by excessive leverage and by the massive transparency issues associated with complex securities and derivatives that were supposed to spread risk, but instead mainly increased the systemic risk already present with excess debt.
For their part, foreign businesses operating in China, as well as trade partners like the US, are focusing on inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, excessive government support of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and an industrial policy geared toward technological upgrading.
For more than a decade prior to the crisis that began in 2008, the US economy fueled itself (and much of the global economy) with excessive consumption.
The excessive domestic demand that underpinned this evolution is now gone, permanently.
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