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Eurobonds in sentence

237 examples of Eurobonds in a sentence

To exit this policy, the ECB wants the EU’s Luxembourg rescue facility, EFSF or ESM to take over, and some countries even call for the issuance of eurobonds.
This defect could have been corrected by replacing individual countries’ bonds with Eurobonds.
Stronger countries in the eurozone must allow these spreads to narrow by guaranteeing the new debts of countries from Greece to Italy, through the issuance of Eurobonds, for example.
Now he says that Germany should exit the euro if it continues to block the introduction of Eurobonds.
If Soros were right, and Germany had to choose between Eurobonds and the euro, many Germans would surely prefer to leave the euro.
Eurobonds, however, would impede precisely this outcome, because relative prices in the north can be raised only when northern savers invest their capital at home instead of seeing it publicly escorted to the south by taxpayer-financed credit guarantees.
Ultimately, that means guaranteeing the eurozone’s survival with Germany’s economic might and assets: unlimited acquisition of the crisis countries’ government bonds by the European Central Bank, Europeanization of national debts via Eurobonds, and growth programs to avoid a eurozone depression and boost recovery.
The P-6’s goals would include measures to reduce their debt burden and increase domestic demand, probably through targeted stimulus in Germany, the formation of a banking union with a robust resolution mechanism, and the introduction of Eurobonds.
New Power, New Responsibility calls for “deepening” the European Union through measures that would include democratizing EU financial decision-making by directly engaging national parliamentarians and exchanging tighter European fiscal constraints on member governments’ budgets for a European banking union, a eurozone budget, and Eurobonds.
Though EU countries will not contribute any actual funds, they will provide implicit and explicit guarantees for the private investors, in an arrangement that looks suspiciously like the joint liability embodied by Eurobonds.
Faced with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s categorical rejection of Eurobonds, the EU engaged a horde of financial specialists to find a creative way to circumvent it.
Surprisingly, Eurobonds issued by a Germany-less eurozone would still compare favorably with those of the US, UK, and Japanese bonds.
I was arguing that the current state of integration within the eurozone is inadequate: the euro will work only if the bulk of the national debts are financed by Eurobonds and the banking system is regulated by institutions that create a level playing field within the eurozone.
Allowing the bulk of outstanding national debts to be converted into Eurobonds would work wonders.
If Germany and other creditor countries are unwilling to accept the contingent liabilities that Eurobonds entail, as they are today, they should step aside, leave the euro by amicable agreement, and allow the rest of the eurozone to issue Eurobonds.
The liabilities that it would incur by agreeing to Eurobonds are contingent on a default – the probability of which would be eliminated by the introduction of Eurobonds.
Whether Germany agrees to Eurobonds or leaves the euro, either choice would be infinitely preferable to the current state of affairs.
Sinn sidesteps this argument by claiming that there is no legal basis for compelling Germany to choose between agreeing to Eurobonds or leaving the euro.
Moreover, the German Supreme Court has indicated that Germany will require a referendum before Eurobonds can be introduced.
And even if a referendum on Eurobonds were held, it it would never find a majority, unless it is coupled with the foundation of a common European state, which is strongly objected to by France.
Angela Merkel, who will in all likelihood be re-elected in September, has said that Eurobonds will not come in her lifetime.
By suggesting that Germany choose between Eurobonds or leaving the euro, he effectively advocates the euro's destruction.
That said, Soros’s suggestion that a sub-group of euro countries could issue joint Eurobonds if they wished to do so is good.
Eurobonds are a way of perpetuating this mispricing, keeping the markets from correcting their mistakes.
Eurobonds would imply lingering soft budget constraints and huge political moral hazard effects that would destroy the European model.
Soros says countries that fail to implement the necessary reforms after the introduction of Eurobonds would become permanent pockets of poverty and dependency, much like Italy’s Mezzogiorno region today.
But if we try to escort the northern savings via Eurobonds to the south, exactly the opposite will happen.
As Sinn says, Germany will not accept Eurobonds.
The German Supreme Court has indicated that Germany will require a referendum before Eurobonds can be introduced, and it is currently considering whether the European Central Bank has exceeded its powers.
Unlike most central banks, the ECB cannot act as a lender of last resort, which, in conjunction with the absence of common bonds (Eurobonds), induced large-scale speculation on intra-European national debts.
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