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Enrichment in sentence

189 examples of Enrichment in a sentence

Now it hints that it may resume enrichment, and recent press reports about the imports from Pakistan suggest Iran failed to disclose everything to the IAEA.
In the mid-1970's, many parties to the NPT planned to import and develop enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
Realizing the threat to the non-proliferation regime, countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, France, Germany, and Japan formed a "Nuclear Suppliers Group" that restrained the export of enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
For example, Russia, which is helping Iran construct a nuclear reactor at Bushehr, should offer Iran a guarantee of low enriched uranium fuel and reprocessing of the reactor's spent fuel by sending it back to Russia if Iran agrees to forego enrichment and reprocessing.
But now, at the plan’s halfway point, there has been little concrete progress, with last month’s negotiations producing no headway on two key issues being discussed: the acceptable level for uranium enrichment in Iran and the future of the heavy-water reactor at Arak.
Indeed, the US has now completely reversed its position of not negotiating with Iran until it stops uranium enrichment.
Putin and his circle are mainly concerned with survival and enrichment.
We will not prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and their eventual use, much less achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, without strict international control of all uranium enrichment, and without banning the separation of plutonium from spent fuel.
Indeed, most of North Korea’s R&D, not least its enrichment of fissile materials, occurs in secret facilities inaccessible to outside inspectors.
Every time North Korea acts provocatively – testing nuclear bombs, launching missiles, touting its secretive uranium enrichment facilities, and killing South Korean soldiers and civilians – China comes under diplomatic fire.
Germany has been determined, together with France and Britain, to get Iran to stop uranium enrichment through incentives and negotiation.
The essential defect of the NPT is now visible in the nuclear dispute between Iran and the United Nations Security Council: the Treaty permits the development of all nuclear components indispensable for military use – particularly uranium enrichment – so long as there is no outright nuclear weapons program.
A signatory in the 1960’s of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which banned nuclear weapons from Latin America, Brazil dismantled its enrichment process and research facilities during the 1990’s and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.
By contrast, some American policymakers continue to believe that Iran would abandon its enrichment program if only the European Union imposed unilateral sanctions.
The US has so far insisted that it will agree to a comprehensive dialogue only if Iran first suspends its enrichment activities.
A weak agreement that lacks adequate verification mechanisms and leaves Iran with sufficient enrichment capacity for short-term weapon development would do more harm than good.
It went hand in hand with an aggressive foreign policy and a determined nuclear strategy of uranium enrichment that repeatedly frustrated EU negotiators and forced world leaders to fall into line behind America’s crippling sanctions regime.
Both countries – indeed, the world – would be better served by a diplomatic outcome in which Iran accepted severe limits on any independent uranium enrichment activity it could undertake and agreed to place all of its nuclear-related facilities under highly intrusive international inspection in exchange for economic benefits and security assurances.
Nor has it brought peace to the oil rich Niger delta whose impoverished people resent exploitation of the resources of their territory for the enrichment of a corrupt elite.
Moreover, the JCPOA will oblige Iran to reduce its number of centrifuges, which are used in the enrichment process, progressively for the next ten years.
Despite their hawkish approach to North Korea’s nuclear threats, South Korean officials know that uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing remains only a distant possibility.
Iran has even proposed regional and multinational participation in its uranium enrichment facilities – only to be met by resounding silence from the Western powers.
The idea that you can make a difference not only for yourself but for your country and the world, that self-interest and personal enrichment are not the only possible goals in life for the “best and the brightest,” has slowly and irresistibly been gaining ground in the Obama generation.
Three European Union countries – Britain, France, and Germany – are trying to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear enrichment program, which would give it bomb material to use after a quick withdrawal from the treaty.
Decentralized decision-making is crucial for the enrichment of society.
The Iranian regime should, at the very least, commit itself to halt uranium enrichment at 20%, a figure short of the threshold needed to produce weapons.
Understandings are reached, only to be immediately broken, as with the North’s agreement in February, in return for US food aid, to accept International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, suspend uranium enrichment, and halt missile and weapons tests.
The endowments built through these donations allow successive generations to enjoy the same opportunity for enrichment.
The interim agreement reached last November in Geneva reflected the West’s de facto acceptance that Iran is entitled to carry out limited low-grade uranium enrichment within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The first two issues reflect the two paths toward the bomb: uranium enrichment and plutonium production.
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