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Distressed in sentence

324 examples of Distressed in a sentence

With citizens of distressed countries bearing the fiscal burden of the crisis, the enduring presumption that they will not act responsibly is patronizing, at best.
As if this was not enough, Western governments and businesses should ponder what kind of offers may come from Russian sources, private or public, for distressed banks and companies.
The bailout fund created last year by the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank to enable Greece and other distressed sovereigns, like Ireland and now Portugal, does exactly that, but on the condition that they implement austerity programs to eliminate their deficits over a short period of time.
For example, in financially distressed Spain, unemployment now exceeds 20%.
French banks had by far the biggest exposure to distressed Southern European countries, and thus benefited the most from the bailout.
Second, some vehicle – the IMF or the European Financial Stability Facility, with either entity funded directly by countries or the European Central Bank – has to stand ready to fund borrowing by Italy, Spain, and any other potentially distressed countries over the next year or two.
In an ideal world, distressed countries would default as soon as private markets stopped funding them, and they would impose the losses on private bondholders.
Not all banks voluntarily loaded up on distressed government bonds – some were pressured by supervisors, others by governments – but many have made unwise bets.
Of course, Greeks have little love for Merkel; but, thanks to Europe’s modest economic recovery, some of the poison has been drawn from Germany’s relations with Europe’s most damaged and distressed economies.
Europe’s Doom Loop in ReverseBRUSSELS – During the 2011-2012 euro crisis, the currency area became mired in a “doom loop,” in which weak banks in financially distressed countries rationed credit, causing a recession that intensified pressure on government finances, which were already burdened by the need to cover banks’ losses.
Back in 2009, Europe faced a widely shared imperative to rescue distressed banks, fight recession, and contain a sharp rise in unemployment.
Thanks to European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech, new financial facilities to stabilize distressed sovereign debtors, and the beginning of a banking union, the eurozone is no longer on the verge of collapse.
To restore confidence and buy time for governments to reduce borrowing, ECB President Mario Draghi pledged to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the eurozone – and that meant potentially unlimited purchases of distressed eurozone members’ government bonds.
But Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, immediately challenged OMT, asserting that the program exceeded the ECB’s mandate and violated Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty, which bars monetary financing of distressed sovereigns.
If the ECB were truly convinced that risk premiums were unreasonably high, and that distressed countries’ debt was sustainable, conditionality would have been unnecessary.
Reading the decline in risk premiums as a sign of renewed market confidence in distressed sovereigns’ creditworthiness was another self-serving misinterpretation.
Even if the ECJ gives OMT the benefit of the doubt, the program’s legitimacy will remain plagued by qualms, leaving the ECB – if only behind the scenes – locked in political jockeying with distressed sovereigns.
More immigration would strengthen skills and raise income levels, while reducing distressed countries’ expenditure on unemployment benefits.
The money for recapitalizing distressed banks would now come primarily from creditors, not European taxpayers, with a pecking order to specify which lenders would be repaid first.
Beyond reducing debt, renewable-energy concessions would stimulate troubled eurozone economies by employing people to construct and maintain the projects – thereby helping distressed countries to reduce their record-high youth unemployment.
Moreover, money has flowed back to Northern Europe from the distressed periphery.
It needs either the ECB or an expanded European Stability Mechanism to purchase distressed governments’ bonds today.
Germany’s Pyrrhic VictoryBERLIN – The German Constitutional Court has ruled against the European Central Bank’s pledge to buy potentially unlimited quantities of distressed eurozone countries’ government bonds, and has called on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to confirm its decision.
Another round of bank bailouts is politically unacceptable and economically unfeasible: most governments, especially in Europe, are so distressed that bailouts are unaffordable; indeed, their sovereign risk is actually fueling concern about the health of Europe’s banks, which hold most of the increasingly shaky government paper.
It also requires more progressive taxation; more short-term fiscal stimulus with medium- and long-term fiscal discipline; lender-of-last-resort support by monetary authorities to prevent ruinous runs on banks; reduction of the debt burden for insolvent households and other distressed economic agents; and stricter supervision and regulation of a financial system run amok; breaking up too-big-to-fail banks and oligopolistic trusts.
If all the resources promised (€750 billion, including financing from the International Monetary Fund) were to be used fully, the EU could fully refinance all distressed countries (Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) for a couple of years.
They have recognized that austerity will mean slower growth – indeed, a recession is increasingly likely – and that, without growth, the eurozone’s distressed countries will not be able to manage their debts.
The credit crunch will get worse; deleveraging will continue, as hedge funds and other leveraged players are forced to sell assets into illiquid and distressed markets, thus causing more price falls and driving more insolvent financial institutions out of business.
Regardless of which party is in power, the logic is the same: financially distressed states weaken the banks, owing to the falling value of government securities, while distressed banks weaken states, owing to anticipated bailout costs.
These social anxieties are not being addressed because financial-sector bailouts, stimulus packages, and help for distressed industries with strong lobbies are testing many governments’ financial limits.
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