Deposit
in sentence
322 examples of Deposit in a sentence
Some foreign branches of Chinese banks offer renminbi-denominated
deposit
accounts, and qualified investors can purchase debt instruments pegged to the currency in mainland China.
That, in turn, requires the sharing of obligations – for example, through common
deposit
insurance or an emergency backstop for systemically important financial institutions.
The European Commission has argued that a fully-fledged banking union would need to rest on four pillars: a single
deposit
protection scheme covering all EU (or eurozone) banks; a common resolution authority and common resolution fund, at least for systemically important and cross-border banks; a single European supervisor for the same banks; and a uniform rule book for prudential supervision of all banks in Europe.
And, beyond transfers, will Europeans, or some of them, agree to create a banking union (that is, Europeanization of banking supervision,
deposit
insurance, and crisis resolution)?
Second, China’s central bank still controls interest rates by enforcing a roughly three-percentage-point spread between
deposit
rates and lending rates.
Both countries were required to
deposit
10% of the expected oil income in a blocked foreign account intended for future generations.
Because bank
deposit
insurance covered only up to $100,000, those with millions to store often preferred the overnight market, using ultra-safe long-term US Treasury obligations as collateral.
An Alternative to
Deposit
InsuranceArgentina's financial panic and the run on its banks that ensued, as well as Asia's financial crisis of 1997, have forced a number of countries to consider adopting
deposit
insurance schemes to protect their citizens' savings.
But is
deposit
insurance the best defense against bank panics?
By guaranteeing that there will be enough resources available for patient clients when they want to withdraw their funds,
deposit
insurance eliminates the coordination failure.
But
deposit
insurance leads to other problems, which first appeared with the Savings and Loan crisis in the US during the 1980's.
With
deposit
insurance, clients who no longer risk losing their money have no incentive to monitor their bank, while banks, with no one watching, have incentives to invest in excessively risky projects.
Following that crisis,
deposit
insurance in the US was reformed with the objective of mitigating the moral hazard problem.
I have studied policies of the type proposed by Bagehot in a way that allows me to compare them with
deposit
insurance schemes.
The main conclusion of my work is that policies aimed at ensuring liquidity can not only prevent bank panics, but also avoid the excess risk-taking that
deposit
insurance encourages.
As with
deposit
insurance, repurchase agreements solve the coordination failure problem because depositors know that, even if they wait, the bank will be able to accommodate their withdrawals.
In contrast to
deposit
insurance, however, liquidity provision can avoid moral hazard by helping only those banks that are solvent.
Implementing liquidity provision policies like those advocated by Bagehot would prevent bank panics without the incentive for undue risk-taking associated with
deposit
insurance.
The policies in question include setting the interest rate on the ECB’s main refinancing operations to zero; raising monthly asset purchases by €20 billion ($22.3 billion) to €80 billion; and pushing the interest rate on money that banks
deposit
with the ECB further into negative territory – to -0.40%.
In his book Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot quoted Jeremiah Harman, the governor of the Bank of England in the 1825-1826 crisis:“We lent...by every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased exchequer bills, we made advances on exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the
deposit
of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short, by every possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some cases over-nice.
The member states’ common arsenal of interventionist tools –
deposit
guarantees, re-capitalization of banks, guarantees for inter-bank loans, and purchases of toxic assets – seemed to give credence to the notion of European unity.
Such a union should be understood as a centralized bank supervisor, resolution authority (RA), and
deposit
insurance fund (DIF), at least for systemically important and cross-border institutions, as well as a unified rule book for prudential supervision.
Indeed, there is no European
deposit
insurance fund that could sustain a run on deposits in Italy.
Finally, the Islamic financial framework protects
deposit
balances, and prevents excessive credit growth.
The regulatory infrastructure includes supervision,
deposit
guarantee, the lender of last resort, and emergency liquidity assistance.
These are interlinked, and stakeholders include central banks, FSAs, national treasuries, and
deposit
guarantee funds.
Nordea tried to get the
deposit
guarantee rules changed to create a level playing field in which a cross-border merger would not distort competition between banks.
As a result, Germany has been reluctant to engage fully in the debate about a European banking union, owing to the belief that it would expose German taxpayers to major risks and unknown costs through bank restructuring and
deposit
insurance.
The provision of liquidity, the recapitalization of banks, more uniform
deposit
insurance across the advanced countries – these were all correct and necessary measures.
Ten years ago, who had heard of terms such as ZIRP (zero-interest-rate policy), QE (quantitative easing), CE (credit easing), FG (forward guidance), NDR (negative
deposit
rates), or UFXInt (unsterilized FX intervention)?
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